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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

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***Military Affairs***

# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-91-002

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14 January 1991

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### Moiseyev Meets with Lithuanian Defense Officials

91UM0159A Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian  
24 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by V. Gayvyanis: "Now Wait for the Summons?"]

[Text] We are talking to National Department of Defense Deputy General Director A. Baytkaytis. A meeting of plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR Armed Forces and the Lithuanian Parliament took place at the USSR Ministry of Defense on Monday. A group of five people led by Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense M. Moiseyev debated for nearly three hours with A. Abishala, A. Butkyavichyus, I. Lyauchyus, I. Gechas, and A. Vaytkaytis.

As A. Vaytkaytis stated, the negotiations with officials who occupy high posts in the military hierarchy were quite difficult. Two joint commissions were formed: One of them will prepare documents that define the status of the Army of the USSR in Lithuania and the second commission will investigate incidents of absence without leave from military units. Representatives of Lithuania and the USSR Ministry of Defense must meet once again during the first week of December.

On November 20 after a month-long break, a draft law of the Lithuanian Republic on Performance of Service to Defend the Country was submitted to parliament. The Free Democrats faction refused to participate in its discussion and did not even appear at an after-dinner session. Deputy V. Yasukaytite, who acquainted the parliament with the free democrats' position on this issue, was outraged that Z. Vayshvila and A. Butkyavichyus are once again attempting to push through an anti-democratic law. A. Abishala asserted it would be easier for the Lithuanian representatives to conduct negotiations with the USSR Ministry of Defense in Moscow after adoption of the law.

This is probably why A. Abishala protested against V. Yasukaytite's speech, having stressed that she "is consciously deceiving society." Deputies M. Stakvilyavichyus, I. Pangonis, and L. Yankelyavichyus, having left the hall, obviously could not restrain their curiosity and used the microphone to express their rebukes. Having directed attention to her enormous experience in dealing with the voters, R. Rastauskene spotted treachery in the speeches and rebukes of individual "not state thinking" people: "The CPSU and the KPL have joined forces."

National Department of Defense General Director A. Butkyavichyus warned parliament that the law on performance of service in defense of the kray—is only the continuation of previously adopted laws. Certain articles of the draft law caused stormy discussions in the Supreme Soviet. So its authors stipulated that kray defense units would be directly subordinate to the

National Department of Defense General Director and not to the government or to parliament.

Deputy I. Tamulis directed the attention of those gathered to the text of the military oath. There the following has been proposed: "...I solemnly swear to keep all secrets entrusted to me, not to give the enemies of Lithuania any information, and that I will immediately submit everything I learn about them to my commanders."

According to A. Tamulis' assertion, these words and—which is even more strange—actions would promote the rebirth of a system of total espionage and informers. Many other observations were also expressed which Z. Vayshvila assessed "as humiliation of the law and its authors."

Despite the protests, the law on performance of duty to defend the kray was adopted.

### Law to Protect Servicemen Discussed

91UM0093A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 43 Oct 90 pp 8-9

[Interview of Colonel of Military Law V. Volkov by Major of Military Law I. Glebov, from the press center of the USSR Ministry of Defense, especially for "PV": "To Protect ... the Serviceman."]

[Text] A recent decree of the President of the USSR addressed the task of strengthening the social and legal protection of servicemen. At the request of the editorial office, Candidate of Legal Sciences and Colonel of Military Law V. Volkov, chief of the Military Legislation Section of the Directorate of Legal Cases, Ministry of Defense of the USSR, speaks about how this work is progressing in the Military-Legislative Commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[Glebov] Vasily Petrovich, what kind of organization is this Military-Legislative Commission? Who are its members and what does it do?

[Volkov] The Military-Legislative Commission is a collegial organ within the Ministry of Defense which meets periodically to discuss and work out legislative proposals in the field of military organizational development. The commission operates under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff. A number of military leaders, specialists, scientists, and military lawyers are members.

The time is ripe now for a basic reconstruction of the entire military legislative system. It is essential to have a complete rejuvenation of legal relationships that exist in the army environment. We began with developing norms for the Law on the Defense of the USSR. Right now we are entering the home stretch. In the near future, this law will be presented to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This Law on the Defense of the USSR is designed to be the basic, central act for the entire military legislative system. Other laws will take it as their beginning



point, including, first and foremost the laws on "Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" and "The Status of Servicemen." Concentrated in these two proposed laws must be norms on social and legal guarantees for servicemen, and they must have a legislative solution to the problem of regulating the interrelationship: Army—Person—Society.

[Glebov] But this problem arose a long time ago...

[Volkov] Actually, it was never left off our daily agenda for the entire period of our country's existence.

And now the time has come to humanize military law.

In order to do this, it is necessary first of all to have the law firmly establish the political-legal connection between the loftier interests of security and the country's defense capability, and the personal rights and freedoms of its citizens.

I believe that we have to rethink the very concept of military obligation. Formerly, the law held that in principle everyone had the same military obligation to serve on active duty for a specified period of time, regardless of his personal potential or situation. Now we go on the basis of having the citizen himself select, in certain cases, the method of fulfilling his military obligation that would be the most acceptable to him.

A number of standard operating procedures in this law will be devoted to "alternative" service. Other procedures will deal with how one enlists voluntarily for military duty. One thing will remain firm: All citizens are obligated to contribute their share to strengthening the defensive capability of our country.

[Glebov] What then, in your opinion, should be the most important point in the new laws?

[Volkov] As I see it, the main task of military legislature is to confirm the importance of military duty and the special concern of the government for those who are prepared to sacrifice their lives for the Fatherland at a moment's notice.

In addition, of course, it is necessary to confirm the principle of justice in all its diverse military interrelationships in the army itself. After all, if one looks more carefully at our numerous military legal acts—manuals, regulations, and instructions—one can become convinced that their nonconformity, disconnectedness, and inconsistency were not conducive to social justice. And this often led to situations where it was not so simple for a person in the army to exercise his rights. Moreover, the tilt was always toward obligations. According to our calculations a regiment commander, for example, now has around ten thousand obligations, all of them locked in by Regulations, and hundreds of orders and instructions...

[Glebov] But there are apparently other social complications, as well.

[Volkov] Unfortunately, there are a lot of them. First of all is the threat of separatism. Certain people are still trying to tear the army apart by nationality into Cossack, Central Asian, and Caucasian-type villages [Tr: kuren, aul, and kishiak.]. Our country has been lashed by an unprecedented campaign to disrupt our defensive capability on the part of local organizations that have invaded the sphere of military organizational development, a sphere that is within the exclusive competence of the central USSR government. The republic and local organs have already adopted scores of anti-constitution laws that are undermining the unity of All-Union military legislation.

In the majority of civilized states with federal forms of government, power over the military is vested exclusively in the central government. For example, in the USA, if any unconstitutional law were to be passed by the legislature of a state or by a local organ, this action would constitute the basis for dissolving the legislature and calling for new elections.

In our legislative projects we are also incorporating a statute to the effect that the organization for the defense of the country is within the exclusive competence of the central USSR government. With regard to nationality military formations, they could exist as forces for public safety, whose mission could be to take care of the aftermath of natural disasters, to support public order, to guard installations important to the national economy, and so on. Moreover, in the Union treaty now being written, a provision must be incorporated to the effect that these forces cannot be utilized against neighboring sovereign republics.

[Glebov] Social activism is growing in our country by the week. In connection with this, what guarantees of political rights for servicemen do you envision?

[Volkov] We begin with the fact that all military servicemen are full-fledged citizens who should enjoy the full range of political rights and freedoms recognized by the Constitution of the USSR. But, taking into consideration the uniqueness of military service interrelationships, servicemen should have additional guarantees of political rights. For example, draftees who have been elected to Soviets of National Deputies should be deferred from the military draft until the end of their duty as deputies. Servicemen should be guaranteed the right to participate in any political party or social organization that is not at variance with the Constitution of the USSR.

However, since it is necessary to observe military discipline, there are also specific limitations. In particular, servicemen do not have the right to strike, organize labor unions, or conduct meetings or demonstrations on territory occupied by a military unit without permission of the command staff. Servicemen cannot divulge to the mass media state secrets or secrets specially guarded by law, nor can they publish anything that inflicts damage to the armed forces or to military law and order.

[Glebov] It is no secret that some of the first casualties of our country's economic decline are servicemen and their families. What legal standards are going to protect their interests?

[Volkov] The draft laws being worked on reflect the basic statutes on the State Program for the Social Security of Military Servicemen and Members of Their Families approved by the USSR Council of Ministers. Servicemen with families are required to be given housing within three months from the moment they arrive at a new post (or housing after they are discharged into the reserves or retired). Five years prior to being discharged to an area of his own choosing, a serviceman must be placed on a housing waiting list by the local Soviet. If this is not done, the local Soviet must fully reimburse the serviceman for actual expenses incurred in renting housing. Any violation of this law will be punishable by the courts.

With regard to monetary allowances, it is being proposed that basic pay for servicemen be pegged to the cost-of-living index and that their pay increase as prices and living costs increase. Military organizational specialists—and only the Ministry of Defense should have them—should be paid, according to our proposal, according to legislated labor norms. It would be judicious to exempt all servicemen from income tax based on their pay. In addition, it is necessary to adopt a set of standards for additional allowances, compensation, and pay increases for specific conditions and types of duty.

For the first time ever in our military laws there is a proposal to establish standards for the social protection of servicemen's families. Servicemen's wives would have first priority rights to employment, permission to study, preferential work probation rights and pay for hospitalization that is separate from the work probation; the possibility of an annual vacation together with her husband; and payment of benefits if employment is not obtained or if the husband is transferred to another duty station. Servicemen's children must be given places in kindergartens and nursery schools within a period of one month.

[Glebov] And what new rights will a serviceman have who is serving a term enlistment?

[Volkov] These rights exist. For example, the right of term enlistees to rest from duty is planned to be established as a 20-day leave, plus weekly passes. Those who serve under special conditions would receive a longer leave. It is essential to define more exactly and to supplement the rights of term enlistees with regard to working arrangements, training, and other matters.

[Glebov] Was the work of your commission been affected by the Decree of the President of the USSR on "Certain Measures to Strengthen Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen"?

[Volkov] Of course. The legislative drafts being worked on now include standards that guarantee legal rights of

immunity for servicemen. A separate chapter of the law on the status of servicemen will be devoted to this issue. The law will carry criminal penalties for resisting or insulting a serviceman while he is carrying out his military duties. We propose to establish rather stiff punishment for these crimes. In addition, we are working on a proposal that would make administrative organs responsible for violating the right to work of persons released from military service, as well as servicemen's wives.

We are planning to introduce life and health insurance for servicemen, including term enlistees, and in the event of death, to pay out allotments from, for example, the insurance fund of the Ministry of Defense.

[Glebov] The range of problems faced by your commission is very broad. Will there be just as broad a public discussion of these draft laws?

[Volkov] Yes, we plan to present them for citizens to judge, publish them in the press, and send them out to the troops. And while we are working on them, we invite all those who are interested to participate, and to send their proposals, ideas, and various norms to the Military-Legislative Commission of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR (Moscow, K-160).

#### **Private Elected Chairman of Lithuanian DOSAAF**

91UM0191A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
6 Nov 90 p 4

[Interview with Pvt. A. Norvilas, deputy of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, by B. Chekanauskas; date and place not given: "A Private Instead of a General"]

[Text] At the recent Lithuanian DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Air Force, and Navy] congress its participants witnessed an unprecedented event: elected in place of the former chairman, Gen. G. Taurinskas, was... Pvt. A. Norvilas, deputy of the Lithuanian Supreme Council. We offer on this surprise "castling" [chess move] involving the newly elected chairman, an interview conducted by journalist B. Chekanauskas.

[Chekanauskas] Is it not frightening for a civilian to be sitting in a chair which has hitherto been solidly occupied only by generals?

[Norvilas] No. Although had I been told a month or so ago that I would be the leader of the republic DOSAAF, I would have died laughing.

[Chekanauskas] How did you arrive in this position?

[Norvilas] A split began in the Lithuanian DOSAAF organization in April: Some people fervently supported the proclamation of independence, others even more fervently longed for strong leadership from the center. Since relations had become highly emotional, the Supreme Council Commission for Protection of the

State and Internal Affairs appointed me curator of this organization as a kind of expert.

[Chekanauskas] What are your relations with Moscow today?

[Norvilas] Not diplomatic. A Union auditing commission was recently at work in Lithuania. It left more than three weeks ago, but we know nothing of the inspectors' opinion. The DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium met in Moscow on 31 October, but I was not invited. Are we not recognized?

[Chekanauskas] A new organization structure is being devised. How do you conceive of it?

[Norvilas] This should be a decentralized athletics and technical union or association partially supported by the state, since such a costly type of sport as aviation, for example, cannot be sustained on a financially autonomous basis. A small number of employees, who will perform coordinating work, will remain in the central machinery—the board.

[Chekanauskas] How is the organization financed today, what assistance does it expect in the future?

[Norvilas] Financial autonomy and the residual balance are helping so far. The point being that Union financing ceased quite a long time ago, but republic financing has yet to begin. The republic government has promised us financial assistance, and we are for this reason expecting a quick decision. True, the Union organization owes us approximately 750,000 rubles for the training of a special contingent. But it is counting only our arrears....

[Chekanauskas] Of course, former members of USSR combined teams have ceased to receive grants also?

[Norvilas] All Lithuanian athletes have been deprived of grants. In the future we will once again pay the best a grant or a salary. I am in favor of the strongest representatives of the technical sports being professionals.

[Chekanauskas] Are there many sports facilities?

[Norvilas] I believe not. Buildings and garages have been built from republic funds. The biggest disagreements could arise on account of the so-called group "A" equipment. It has been ascribed to the military organizations. We have no intention of encroaching on others' property. Although ours is not, alas, being treated in gentlemanly fashion. Some 24 of Lithuania's light planes have, following maintenance, been "detained" for some time now in the Ukraine.

[Chekanauskas] A new broom sweeps clean, they say. Will there not now be wholesale dismissals of former DOSAAF organization employees?

[Norvilas] We have agreed not to dig up the past and not to look for enemies. People will not be dismissed for their beliefs. We will judge them by their work.

### Lt Gen Boyko 'Alarmed' at Current Trends

91UM0124A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
10 Nov 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Gen N. Boyko, member, Military Council; chief, Political Directorate, Air Defense Forces; under the "At Political Crossroads" rubric: "For the Sake of Harmony"]

[Text] Some people may think it strange that a general has written an article printed in a newspaper intended for rural toilers. I myself do not think that way, since, first, I come from a long line of peasants, and, second, villages supply a large number of men to our Armed Services, particularly the Air Defense Forces. It is their parents, other relatives, and friends that I wish to address, to share with them my thoughts and fears. I feel bound to do this as my officer's and party duty, not to mention duty as a person who has a deep personal interest in the future of the Army, country, and people.

It was not many years ago that we were firm in our conviction that the Army was the creation of the Soviet people. Today—alas!—few people think that way. The exchange of reproaches, insults, and arrogance between the Army on the one hand, and the press and part of society on the other, has reached the point where the very thought of it causes alarm. And what have we gained by all this arguing? Can we say that this has resulted in a stronger defense for the country, that our people are better off, or that our young generation has become more patriotic or stronger spiritually? None of that has happened.

Many persons are placing high hopes on military reform. However, some people—even those in high echelons—tend to equate it with mere reductions in the Armed Forces. The purpose of reform is to renew and activate all the military machinery of our state. For this reason, we really should be speaking of an integrated program for transforming the military policy and the structures that control the military area; of a combination of material and spiritual factors that exert a direct influence on the country's defensive posture. That is not the case at all. There is a continuation of mass attacks on the Armed Forces, the officer corps, and especially the higher military leadership. Attempts are being made to depoliticize and departyize the Army—to remove it from the country's social life altogether.

The lessening of international tensions and reduction in the military threat have produced a definite feeling of euphoria on a part of the population, largely the youth. Pacifist tendencies have started to seep into the Army. In this regard, even our union legislators were unable to stand their ground: They cut the Armed Forces by 176,000 men with a single stroke of the pen. I am not speaking of a purely military decrement here: Students were given a discharge, but where are their replacements? There are none. Something else disturbs me. No matter how you look at it, this measure served to defer to city youth over rural youth, for cities always did supply



a greater number of university students than the countryside. As a result, the universal military obligation was not an obligation that pertained to everyone. The repercussions of that act are still to be heard in our military collectives.

I hope that I will be correctly understood. I am not advocating military psychosis; I am not calling for militarization of social conscience. What I am saying is that there is no question in my mind that we must constantly support the people's moral readiness to defend the country. Just recall what happened to the spring call-up. The conscription quotas were filled only by the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Azerbaijan. The call-up fell short in the remaining areas.

Sociological research points out an alarming trend associated with a loss of interest in military service. In 1986, 63 percent of soldiers served with a feeling of interest and with an understanding of the importance and need for military service, while the percentage this year showed a substantial drop.

A surprising fact emerges from analysis. There is a very close connection between failure to fill the conscription quota and success of all our reforms and reform in general, since, to keep our country strong and maintain the world's respect, we must observe all the country's laws without fail. Alas!—this also is not the case.

All the problems that are battering the country like waves are in some way reflected in definite aspects of the military. Take the case of sovereignty of union republics. What battles are being fought over this problem! Here again the Army has been at the center of discussions. Some persons propose that it be restructured on an ethnic basis; others advocate the militia cadre principle; still others want nothing to do with military service. Meanwhile, the world community is watching with alarm as events develop in this area. As accurately stated by M. S. Gorbachev, the civilized world shudders at the thought that the future may produce 15 nuclear powers. The experience we gained in military construction indicates that the Army for the time being should be replenished by conscription based on the universal military obligation. Only the Armed Forces are capable of defending a union of sovereign states.

And so, these difficult conditions demand that we as never before must set up a new kind of dialogue between the military and society. Although we are often accused of isolating ourselves from the people, maintaining a closed type of activities, and adhering to "dogmatism" and "conservatism," and other shortcomings, we are still willing to participate in such a dialogue. Only he who refuses to see will not take note of how open our Armed Forces are becoming. I must admit that public opinion did exert some influence in effecting this. We, political workers and commanders of all levels, lend a close ear to public opinion and take it into account in our everyday practice.

It is gratifying that the mass information media are willing to cooperate with us. Newspapers and magazines are cutting down on the amount of trivia, rehashing of individual negative aspects and happenings from the life of the Army and Navy. They have laid to rest offers to do away with the positions of agitator and political information specialist, and dividing up the money between platoon leaders and company commanders. Discussions on the Army now proceed on a more informed basis, with knowledge of the subject, in a tactful manner. In society there is a growing realization that the armed defenders lead a more difficult and stressful life than the civilian component of the population. Although it is difficult, the people are regaining their trust in their defenders.

In this connection, it was a pleasure for me to read a short account that was published in the 1 October issue of the newspaper *VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA*: "A *VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA* correspondent drove around Moscow Oblast for two days in an attempt to discover the infamous preparations for a military takeover that have been rumored in the capital. Most of the military trucks he met on the road were carrying either agricultural products, largely potatoes, or soldiers that were dead tired from working in the fields."

In my heart I feel shock and dismay over society's insisting that the Army shoulder its own concerns, but my mind tells me that there is no other way. We cannot refuse to take on this kind of work, the same as we cannot do away with subsidiary farms, which operate in collaboration with military sovkhozes to supply military units with meat, milk, and other products. We are forced to use our own resources to erect housing, schools, and pre-school facilities, provide military installations with municipal services, and build access roads. Every year we provide battalions to help with the harvest.

The purpose of the military is to learn how to fight, of course. But who says that it should not assist the village at a difficult time? Particularly in light of society's moving toward a market economy. The Army cannot exist on its own. However, to be completely honest, this issue is not entirely resolved.

In a word, the time has come to delineate clearly the new legal basis that will govern the interrelationships between the Army and society. Then there will reign a mutual understanding that will be one of substance, clarity, and creativity, not abuse and destruction.

The Army is not isolated from society; there is a strong bond between them. For this reason, society's ills are directly reflected in the Army. Take the problem of hazing of recruits. It would be completely wrong to look for the cause of this "infection" in the barracks alone. We renew our ranks by input from our families, schools, vocational and technical schools, and collectives in the agricultural and industrial areas. We rely on their help with regard to nurturing young soldiers. There is no need

to cast stones at each other; we must work together to find effective methods of preventing the rise of shortcomings.

We always drew a measure of pride in our close ties to local party and soviet organs and to labor collectives. This bond has unfortunately weakened considerably in the recent past. Traditions are being lost. This is due largely to the decreasing role and influence of party organizations, both in military and civilian collectives. Party activists until recently enjoyed a highly favorable environment. They had no competitors nor any real adversaries. Now we are in a time of turmoil, and people who are skillful in working in the new environment are very few in number. While communists are shedding their apathy, the "unofficials" are not sleeping, instead issuing urges to go on strike, form protest meetings, and set up picket lines. But let us reason together: When will there be a stop to this destruction? What will be left after we knock down and sweep away everything in our path?

Also quite alarming to me is the way political and moral guideposts are being chipped away in society. Even discussion of patriotism, in the minds of some people, is not the thing to do. What is happening to us? Collectively, we denounce cults and struggle against those who are no longer among the living, but in real life we cannot protect monuments to Lenin and the graves of soldiers who died for the Motherland.

"The kind of abuse of one's own social structure and history that is occurring in the Soviet Union would never be tolerated here (in the West - N. B.). Here there is a feeling of ecstasy over what is occurring there, since it signifies a fall from grace and destruction of everything that is Soviet." That bitter statement is a quote from the famous dissident writer Aleksandr Zinovyev, a person who could hardly be accused of obsequiousness. What devastating words! This should make us think.

Concerning our activity, we are not waiting for reformation of political organs, but instead are continuing to nurture the citizen-soldier and stand up for the social rights of servicemen and their dependents. In the new future, our ranks will be joined by sociologists, law specialists, and jurists. There will be specialists who have ties to society, political movements and organizations. For the present time, we must make do with the forces available.

Unfortunately, not all is in order. We are particularly alarmed by the interethnic situation in military collectives. The explosion of ethnic awareness among the peoples of our country has taken on a somewhat creative aspect. The Armed Forces to a great extent reflect the present state of ethnic relations. There is an influx of soldiers who participate in ethnic opposition. They are the ones that must be formed into a united collective. We need new approaches and new forms and methods of work. However, many commanders, political workers, and a considerable number of the ideological aktiv continue to operate in the old manner; they are not

skillful in taking into account the ethnic peculiarities, mores, customs, and situation in which a young man was brought up.

Nevertheless, there are signs of hope here. In one of our construction detachments, there are 20 Lithuanians serving. They have all been on leave, returned to their unit, and continue to carry out their constitutional duty.

Now for the final thing I have to say. Society is exhibiting a definite increase in interest in the Army. We have already seen the passage of a significant amount of legislation motivating officer service, but, at the same time, the average "salary" of a young officer falls below the cost of living standard. Material conditions are exacerbated by the difficult housing situation affecting many thousands of officers' dependents. We also, the military, have our problems and difficulties. But they must be resolved, and we intend to do so. All we ask is that no more roadblocks be set up on our road to the future. We must heighten the people's respect for the Army, the Navy, and for the man in uniform. The time has come for us all to live and labor for the sake of harmony. This includes the laborer, peasant, and the soldier.

#### **'Georgian National Army' Formed in Sachkhere**

91UM0170A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
15 Nov 90 p 4

[Article by Aleksey Sinelnikov: "Where Are You From, the Guys in Pea-Jackets?"]

[Text] Along with "blue uniforms," "green pea-jackets" showed up in cordons next to Government House on the day a session opened. Volunteers wearing military-style uniforms, some in striped vests and with waist-belts, came to assist the militia.

They wore bands with the colors of the national flag on their sleeves. Where did the reinforcements come from?

They told a ZARYA VOSTOKA correspondent: "From Sachkhere. We organized the Georgian National Army in Sachkhere, to be sure, for now unofficial..."

—What political organization do you support?

—The Round Table.

—Who leads you?

—Besik Kutateladze, director of the Sachkhere Athletic Complex. He is now a deputy of parliament from the Helsinki Union elected under a majority system in the Sachkhere Electoral District. He is 32.

—What are your plans?

—We hope to become the nucleus of an official national army when our parliament resolves to form it.



### MPA Aide on Reform of Political Training

91UM0116A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
15 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Maj Gen N. Grebenkin, deputy chief, Directorate of Ideological Work, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, by Col O. Nikonov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "He Convinces the Convinced"]

[Text] **Political training under the new conditions. What is it to be? This was the topic of a conversation by our correspondent with Maj Gen N. Grebenkin, deputy chief, Directorate of Ideological Work, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.**

[Correspondent] Nikolay Aleksandrovich, the advocates of depolitization of the Army denied the need for political training. But, since such an instrument of the state as the Army cannot be outside of politics, the personnel must be well versed in the essence of its policy, and implement it effectively. What is new in political training in connection with the renewal of all our society and the Armed Forces?

[Grebenkin] I just want to make a small clarification. Even among the military at times the opinion is found that political training has outlived itself, and is of no interest to the soldiers and sailors. I believe that it truly requires reformation.

[Correspondent] But, reformation from above may have the opposite effect, as we observe this in certain aspects of social and political life. New ways should mature in the masses.

[Grebenkin] No one plans to think up something new in their offices in order then to send a directive below for fulfillment. The new approaches are already being developed in the forces.

What am I speaking about? In the area of organization and conduct of classes, for example, an interesting approach has been introduced by the political directorate of the Western Group of Forces in units standing combat watch. There political classes are conducted either twice a week for two hours, or once for three hours, or two or three times a week they assemble for a political hour. The airborne units have instituted a system of courses. Democratically? Completely.

And here is one more thing. Some units of the Belorussian and Far Eastern military districts, and the Central Group of Forces, have shifted to having only political workers conduct political training. And there was an immediate and significant improvement in the quality of classes. The Turkestan, Volga, Ural, and Moscow military districts have begun to hold competitions among politically erudite personnel, who compete for the best group or subunit on questions of knowledge of current policy and international life. And this came into practice not by directive, but in and of itself.

There are many political workers in the Army and Navy who, without awaiting instruction from above, have long been conducting their own search for methods, and who are working creatively and with initiative, taking into account the tremendous interest that the society has for history.

[Correspondent] The examples you cite, you will agree, only illustrate the new view on political training of the troops. And is there such a view itself? Has it been formulated, or are conceptual developments continuing?

[Grebenkin] Science about social development is living and mobile. But the concept of the main approaches already exists, and has been discussed in the troop units and fleets. First of all, it responds to the logic of the reform of the Armed Forces, and is called upon to eliminate dissonance in content, method of organization, leadership, and material and technical support of political training. We will conduct it, and actually have already begun, in several directions. Their thrust is to make the content more topical. A large amount of new material is being included in the training process, including basic ideas of the renewal of socialism, experience of perestroika, military aspects of philosophy, political economy, and history, and the basic principles of the reformation of the Armed Forces.

Qualitatively new sections have been provided for in the topical plans from which experimental groups created in a number of units are studying. They are oriented on intensifying military-patriotic education. For example, there is a section entitled "Heroic Legacy: Events and People."

Further, political training must become not merely a form of humanitarian training, but also a school of political struggle. It is primarily a rostrum from which anyone can express himself freely and frankly, not fearing the consequences. This means that it is necessary to ensure not only tolerance toward pluralism of opinions, but also social protection of dissidence. This is the essence of the matter. I think that the very spirit, and the entire system of political training should be an example of the democratization of all of army and navy life.

[Correspondent] Frankly speaking, Nikolay Aleksandrovich, this is a modern view of political training. Here not only the leader of the new military-political body, but also the propagandist must give up looking at the student from a "commanding view." And the latter will no longer be able to be merely an observer, or work only for appearances.

[Grebenkin] That is precisely what we want to achieve. Army service is the most favorable time to form a politically active citizen. And the task is not merely to proclaim this, but to confirm it, and make it the norm.

[Correspondent] But powerful material and technical support will be required to fulfill such a large and laborious task.

[Grebenskin] Undoubtedly. But we must not exaggerate the importance of only material assistance. We will not accomplish our tasks if we do not raise the prestige of self-education. And this is the moral sphere.

Is it possible to learn to work in the new way without purposeful, persistent self-education? No, of course not. But, if a man strives to enrich his memory with knowledge of the riches that mankind has developed (let us recall here wise Leninist thinking), he should be brought to the attention of the collective, and be honored. The propagandist who works in an interesting and creative way, who draws to himself the attention of those around him through his great store of humanitarianism, is the center of intellectual attraction. Quite so.

Once I read in Sukhomlinskiy that he who feels himself to be a researcher is more likely to become a master of pedagogical work. And this is also true for army conditions. Obviously the military schools will not manage without a special course of instruction, and without increasing the hours for study of pedagogy, psychology, and sociology; i.e., human behavior.

In the military propagandist I would like to see, most of all, a teacher. A teacher who is animated and devoted to the cause entrusted to him. But for this to happen, obviously, it is necessary for it to be prestigious and advantageous to lead a group of political classes. Yes, advantageous in the moral and material sense. Perhaps we should establish an appropriate supplement to monetary remuneration, depending on the success in this work, increase the length of leaves, and take it into account upon promotion.

[Correspondent] Nikolay Aleksandrovich, I would like to see more fully the direction in which the search for the experimenting leaders of political training is being conducted.

[Grebenskin] I can orient you to the fact that support has already been received from our specialists studying the innovations that have arisen in the troop units. For example, in the large unit where Lt Col A. Osipov is working as the senior instructor for propaganda and agitation, so-called practical games have occupied a permanent place in the arsenal of methodological techniques. Today they are being used widely in many oblast classes and practical activity. The game elements of this technique include "brainstorming," "fire on the leader," "press conference," and others. Classes in groups are lively and interesting.

Or here is another fact. Sr Lt O. Tsevelov, for example, made informational-musical evenings a supplemental class to political training. Yes, I am speaking about politics through music. Soldiers and sergeants, being young people, enjoy this, since it disposes them toward a free exchange of opinions, and also is enriching on the aesthetic plane. Such searching and range of experimentation are quite vast. And this is good, just as long as there is benefit.

[Correspondent] And is the nature of assessments of classes and political training changing?

[Grebenskin] I consider this a very important question. You see, we are not talking about the five mark or three mark system to which we are all accustomed. I consider that a man who has entered the Army has returned to school. We must give him a sense of a new level of relationships. An order higher.

It must be said that such assessments as these are used in the classes in the experimental groups: The student "is noted on the better side," or "is characterized well," and a low assessment might be "is poorly prepared."

Needless to say, there can also be other variants here, but it must be clear to everyone that by the level of their preparation the group is also more or less giving an assessment to the reader.

In short, life and the reformation of the Armed Forces are posing to us new and very difficult tasks, including in the organization of political training."

#### **Odessa MD Protests to Moldovan Leaders**

91UM0116C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 17 Nov 90 First Edition p 6

[Article by S. Balykov: "Military Soviet Protest"]

[Text] Protests by the Odessa Military District Military Soviet have been addressed to M. Snegur, president, Moldovan SSR; M. Druk, prime minister; and I. Kostash, minister of internal affairs. The documents note that anti-army hysteria is being whipped up in the republic. All methods are coming into play, all the way to crude slander and public insults, which were especially vividly displayed in the actions of Minister I. Kostash, who attempted to shift the blame for the death of people in the area of Dubossary onto the military. The slanderous distortion of the facts is exacerbating the already difficult situation in the region, and contributing to the unlawful formation of armed militia bands and detachments of volunteers.

The district military soviet came out decisively against the concoctions, that have not the slightest basis, and demanded that I. Kostash make a public apology to the soldiers and give a truthful account of the tragic events, as well as disband illegal formations and remove their weapons from them.

#### **RSFSR Afghan Veteran's Founding Congress**

91UM0116B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 21 Nov 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Col A. Oliynik: "Afghan Veterans Unite"]

[Text] On 19 November the founding congress of the Russian Alliance of Veterans of the War in Afghanistan opened in Moscow. At this difficult moment for the country, the former Afghan veterans decided to unite for

their political, social and psychological protection. For three days more than 170 delegates, representing the autonomous formations, krais, and oblasts of Russia, as well as more than a hundred invited guests from the union republics, will discuss the difficult lives and living conditions of those who passed through the flames of the undeclared war in Afghanistan.

"The main task of our congress," I was told by Col A. Rutska, Hero of the Soviet Union, and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Affairs of Invalids, Veterans of War and Labor, and Social Protection of Military Personnel and Their Family Members, is the organized uniting on a voluntary basis of all organizations of Afghan war veterans located on RSFSR territory. They will become the republic department of the Union of Veterans of Afghanistan, which, as you know, is not a state organization, but an all-union social organization, which exists not so much from the funds of its numerous founders, as on the basis of independent economic activity.

In other words, the former Afghan war veterans, who were discharged into the reserves due to their wounds or the reduction in force, are uniting in order to earn their daily bread under the conditions of the coming market economy.

The state program aimed at solving problems associated with organizing the life and living conditions of the soldier-internationalists, and the families of those dead or missing, developed by USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] in accordance with the decree of the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, drowned in bureaucratic coordination before it was even born.

Army Gen V. I. Varennikov, commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy USSR Minister of Defense; Metropolitan Volokolamskiy and Yuryevskiy Pitirim; and Afghan war veterans among the people's deputies of the USSR and RSFSR, are taking part in the work of the congress.

#### **Samsonov on Defense, State Security Committee on Defense Spending**

*91UM0201a Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Dec 90 p 3*

[Interview with Yu. Samsonov, USSR people's deputy, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security, by TRUD correspondent V. Badurkin; place and date not given: "How Much Defense Costs"]

[Text] **The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security recently discussed the draft national defense budget for 1991. For the first time in the postwar years proposed expenses for each separate budget category for the defense department had been announced and discussed.**

**Yu. Samsonov, USSR people's deputy and deputy chairman of the committee, described the specifics of the future defense budget in his interview with our correspondent.**

[Samsonov] I want to say from the start that our discussion will be largely theoretical, since we can only talk about next year's national budget hypothetically—there is still no decision on the income part of it. Everything will depend on how much we earn, that is, how much the gross national product will grow. The economic forecasts in this respect are pessimistic. Judge for yourself: The total volume of industrial production in 1990, will fall by three percent in comparison with the previous year. Commissioning of fixed assets is expected to reach only 94 percent, and residential funds—only 89 percent. Total profit in comparison even with the previous, far from best, year is forecast to reach only 96 percent.

[Badurkin] In this situation, how much did the Ministry of Defense "request" for its expenditures?

[Samsonov] First, these are not the ministry's expenditures, but expenditures for national defense. I think that the fact that they are still needed, despite the increased measure of trust, does not need justification. Especially considering that the Warsaw Pact has for all practical purposes disintegrated, and now we are, in fact, one on one with NATO. Second, the budget has been formed taking into account the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies' resolution and the subsequent government decree mandating that in 1991 military expenditures should be cut by 14 percent.

Therefore, in the draft Union budget for 1991, defense expenditures should be at the level of 66.5 billion rubles [R] (in comparable prices and conditions of the current year). However, considering the difficult economic situation in the country and growing state budget deficit, the government proposed to cut this amount by an additional R2.6 billion.

[Badurkin] So the next year defense budget will be R63.9 billion?

[Samsonov] I want to repeat that it is too early to talk about final figures. Especially considering that we are not in full agreement with government proposals. This concerns first of all expenses on research and development and design and testing activities (RDDTA). The USSR Council of Ministers proposed to cut them by more than 23 percent. In the course of discussion, our committee members came to the conclusion that these funds will not be sufficient for maintaining military-strategic parity—which is impossible under conditions of armed forces cuts unless the quality of armaments and technical supply goes up. I would like to note that the U.S. 1991 military budget expenses on RDDTA increases by four percent in comparison with this year.

Therefore, it is the committee's opinion that defense expenditures should be on the level of R65 billion.

[Badurkin] However, the press mentioned other figures—more than 100 billion.

[Samsonov] The difference in figures is easy to explain. The prices and underlying conditions substantially differ between this year and the next one. The final figures depend on which assumptions are used as the base for calculations. After all, literally everything will be more expensive—the people's economy production, armaments, technology, etc. For instance, rising prices on food, material supply, fuel, and construction materials and increase in transportation tariffs will by themselves cause a R9.4 billion increase in the defense budget.

[Badurkin] But these changes will affect the entire people's economy.

[Samsonov] True. However, they will reflect first of all on defense expenditures. I will give you a simple example. As is known, defense production is science-intensive and of high quality, and therefore is not cheap. Next year it will be even more expensive. For instance, the cost of a tank will more than double; the cost of an airplane will increase about one-and-a-half times; and so on. These are objective calculations. It takes into account increased salaries, and more expensive raw materials and energy. All of this will result in a cost increase of the people's economic production, armaments, and technology by R13.8 billion.

[Badurkin] However, the armed forces reduction also assumes smaller purchases of military equipment.

[Samsonov] Of course. That is taken into account in the draft budget. And it will be a substantial reduction, about 20 percent. However, this also presents its own "stumbling block." Smaller production runs lead to a cost per unit increase. This is a law of economics, and there is nothing we can do about it. The same tanks will cost 14 percent more for this reason alone. And how much will the infantry fighting vehicles cost, the purchases of which will be reduced by several times?

[Badurkin] Yuriy Grigoryevich, so far you have talked only about those budget categories that are supposed to be reduced. Are there others for which expenditures will grow?

[Samsonov] Yes. First of all, it will be for social protection of the defenders of the Motherland. For these purposes we plan to add R3.3 billion. Besides, do not

forget about the new pension law passed this year, and about the presidential decree on mandatory social insurance for the military. There will also be additional expenses related to the withdrawal of our troops from abroad and switching the pay for those that still remain there into hard currency. Considering changes in the ruble exchange rate, this will require at least R2 billion.

[Badurkin] When the Ministry of Defense withdraws troops from other countries, its leaves there part of its property, technology, and buildings. Much of this should be sold.

[Samsonov] The Ministry of Defense is a budget organization. Therefore, it does not get a penny of this money. All of it goes into the state budget. By the way, in relation to this, I would like to mention another myth. Some of our citizens believe that our military profits from exports of armaments and military equipment. This is not true. All export operations are conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Profits from this trade goes to the national treasury.

[Badurkin] More than once our newspaper has published materials about substantial and often inefficient expenditures related to calling soldiers and reserve officers to training camps. Will this situation change next year?

[Samsonov] Yes. The draft budget cuts expenditures for these purposes by one-third.

[Badurkin] And now the last question, Yuriy Grigoryevich. Is there a system of control over the budgeted expenditures? Is there a guarantee that the money will be spent on the purposes it is earmarked for?

[Samsonov] Recently a well-known military commander, "cooling off" after reporting to our commission, reminisced in his conversation with me about the trouble-free years when his colleagues had not had to go through the motion of "squeezing out" the funds. Now, he complained, every ruble of expenditures has to be justified. "Every ruble" is, of course, an exaggeration, but in substance he is right. In the draft budget that we have discussed every category is concrete to the utmost, and it is practically impossible to spend money on other purposes. Besides, in asking for money for the next year, the Ministry of Defense has to account for previous expenditures. I think we have a reliable control mechanism that allows me to state: All funds allocated for the national defense will be used to ensure our security.

**Biographical Note: New Commander of Western Group of Forces**

91UM0164A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Dec 90 First Edition p 1

[Biographical sketch of Colonel General Matvey Prokopyevich Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces]

[Text] By an order of the USSR president, Colonel General M.P. Burlakov has been appointed commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces.

Matvey Prokopyevich Burlakov was born on 19 August 1935, in Ulan-Ude to a worker family. He graduated from the Omsk military school imeni M.V. Frunze in 1957.

He began his military service in the position of a commander of an infantry platoon and then as company commander. In 1968, after completing the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, he was appointed deputy regimental commander. After 1969, he was the regimental commander and after 1973, division commander. In 1977, he completed the Military Academy for the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and was appointed army corps commander. After 1979, he was an army commander and after 1983, chief of staff and first deputy troop commander of the Transbaykal Military District. After 1988, he was commander of the Southern Group of Forces.



**Moldova Government Resolution on Military Service***91UM0125B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 2 Oct 90 p 1*

[Moldova SSR government decree by Moldova SSR Prime Minister Mircha Druk: "On the Call-up of Moldova Citizens for Military Service"]

[Text] To execute the Ukase of the President of the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic dated 10 September 1990 "On the Call-up of Moldova SSR Citizens for Military Service," the Moldova SSR Government decrees:

1. To approve the makeup of Republic Draft Board personnel.
2. That ispolkoms of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies:

Form rayon (city) draft boards and assign the necessary number of medical and technical personnel and transportation for supporting the call-up of Moldova SSR citizens for active military service;

Ensure strict supervision over precise fulfillment of demands of the Moldova SSR President's Ukase dated 10 September 1990 "On the Call-up of Moldova SSR Citizens for Military Service."

3. To establish that all draftees who are Moldova SSR citizens subject to call-up for active military service in the fall of 1990 are to be given a medical examination and are to be sent to the USSR Armed Forces only in response to their written request and in the presence of written consent of parents.

4. To recognize Moldova SSR Council of Ministers Decree No 108 "On Approval of the Republic Draft Board" dated 11 April 1990 as having lost force.

**Lithuanian Resolution on Service in USSR Armed Forces***91UM0160C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 22 Nov 90 p 7*

[Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Resolution: "Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Resolution on Service of Lithuanian Republic Residents in the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text] In accordance with the March 12, 1990 Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Resolution "On the Invalidity of the October 12, 1967 Law of the USSR on Universal Military Obligation on the Territory of the Lithuanian Republic" and the April 9, 1990 resolution "On Conscription of Citizens of the Lithuanian Republic into the USSR Armed Forces," the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet resolves that:

1. Residents of the Lithuanian Republic, having decided to perform military service in the USSR Armed Forces,

are obliged to inform the territorial departments of the National Department of Defense about this.

2. The Lithuanian State does not guarantee compensation to individuals who become disabled during service in the USSR Armed Forces.

3. The benefits and guarantees prescribed by housing and labor legislation do not apply to individuals who through their own will enter service in the USSR Armed Forces.

4. This resolution does not apply to individuals who have been forcefully compelled to serve in the USSR Armed Forces.

5. This resolution enters into force on the day it is adopted.

V. Landsbergis, Chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet

Vilnius, November 8, 1990.

**Association To Aid Retiring Servicemen***90UM0160A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian 27 Nov 90 p 1*

[Interview with former Air Force Major Anatoliy Mochalov by Oleg Gruzdilovich under the rubric "Timely Interview": "For the Cause, Comrade 'Convertors'!"]

[Text] The Belorussian Konversiya Association is being founded in Minsk which has set as its goal the socio-economic adaptation of servicemen released into the reserves.

ZNAMYA YUNOSTI readers are familiar with now already former Air Force Major Anatoliy Mochalov through articles associated with his totally dramatic election as a people's deputy from one of the Minsk Rayon Soviets. The editors have followed with interest how the fate of the former air force subunit deputy commander for political affairs has turned out. But Anatoliy's new role was totally unexpected even for us—he has become one of the organizers of Konversiya Association. A ZNAMYA YUNOSTI Correspondent met with A. Mochalov in order to learn about the association's goals and plans.

[Gruzdilovich] So you decided to move from politics to the sphere of real business. Problems of servicemen who have been released into the reserves are turning out to be first of all personal problems... of the type: Saving the drowning—is it a matter for the very people who are drowning?

[Mochalov] I will begin with numbers. According to our data, we will have to release into the reserves a total of no fewer than half a million men, of whom 400-500,000 will be officers and warrant officers, in the Soviet Union during the next few years. Already today we are talking about the fates of tens of thousands and several months

from now of even hundreds of thousands of former servicemen. Add to that the problems of the withdrawal of a significant contingent from our Western Group of Forces, a portion of which will be deployed on the territory of Belorussia.

In short, the republic is facing enormous difficulties. We need to determine the most appropriate areas for construction of housing—and in the current situation Mogilev and Gomel Oblasts are practically unsuitable for this. Furthermore: How to provide housing for former servicemen and members of their families? The resolutions actually adopted by local Soviets are not being fulfilled due to the acute housing shortage. The third task is professional retraining of those persons entering the reserve, especially those who are leaving the army in the middle of their professional careers. There is no system to teach former servicemen civilian specialties in the country or in the republic. And these skills really must correspond both to servicemen's skills and also meet the region's economic requirements. The pension issue has also not been resolved, especially for those individuals who have less than 15-20 years of work service. Many officers wives, who did not have the opportunity to work as a result of their husbands' service at remote garrisons and abroad, have been deprived of pension support. And the main thing: There is no effective aid mechanism from the state for those persons released into the reserves. There are no credit or tax benefits for these people and I repeat there will be increasingly more of them. It is no secret that those people released into the reserve are experiencing an abrupt drop in their standard of living and they have to practically set up house all over again. Hence also problems of socio-psychological adaptation.

[Gruzdilovich] Yes, frequently former military personnel find themselves in the role of society's social outcasts and from there they are within one step of increasing the ranks of the criminal world. Really, according to the big picture, many of these servicemen only held weapons in their hands for their entire lives. The threat of this situation is evident. And how do you intend to help these people?

[Mochalov] Incidentally we are not reinventing the wheel. Soon after the end of the Vietnam War, similar organizations began to spring up in the United States and they exist to this day. There society is extremely concerned about eliminating possible social tension among former military personnel.

What are we planning to become involved with? First—to help to somehow reduce the housing problem. We will create a system of state-cooperative construction organizations—according to the MZhK [Youth Housing Complex] type. We will create a fund for interest-free credit for housing construction. We will offer monetary aid for up to a three year period. Another very important issue is the creation of a republic job placement bureau for former servicemen. Furthermore, we want to organize a system of professional retraining courses for servicemen

and members of their families at the bureau and also at training centers of certain ministries and enterprises. A lot of effort will be required to organize stock enterprises specially calculated to provide work to former servicemen. For example, we could found a commercial passenger transport airline company at which former military pilots and technicians would work. This explains how, according to this principle, we can find jobs for servicemen of all branches of service.

[Gruzdilovich] As they say, it was sweet on paper but we forgot about the ravine. Who will help you put your idea on its feet considering that in high military circles they are not hurrying to create the most beneficial conditions for you?

[Mochalov] According to the plan, Konversiya is a cost accounting and juridically independent organization. But we need the opportunity to sell written off military equipment through our commercial center to establish a solid economic foundation for the association which will allow us to create a fund to aid former servicemen. I will provide our address for anyone who is willing to help us: 43 Leninskiy Prospect, Post Office Box 173, Minsk, 220005, Telephone: 33-12-17.

#### Resolving Persistent Problem of 'Dedovshchina'

91UM0125A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Zyubin under rubric "Posing a Problem": "Right to Protection"; first paragraph is box insert]

[Text] According to USSR Armed Forces General Staff data, this year some 350 servicemen went AWOL from the unit because of "dedovshchina."

The city did not accept him. He was a stranger here: no documents, no money and, most important, no rights. A fugitive. The fear of beatings that had lived in him of late gave way to another fear that was not a bit less—the fear of punishment. Ahead realistically loomed the "zone" with its bars, barbed-wire, endless anguish and wolves' laws of the criminal world. From the frying pan into the fire...

He had to decide on something. Return to the unit? People were already looking for him, which meant a scolding from the commander awaited him. But this was only half the trouble; the very worst would begin after retreat. He even seemed to hear the voices of his offenders: "Salaga [nickname for one who has less service], because of you we ran our legs off, while you were taking it easy..." No, just not this!

While the soldier was hiding, life went on in its own rigid order of actions as if thought out by someone. The investigator picked up a new folder on which "Case" was written in large black letters. He traced out the name of the missing soldier on it and put down the date. An

all-union search was declared. Anxious messages flew to the fugitive's home area. They had various addresses: Pinskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Internal Affairs Administration Information Center, Pinsk Psychoneurologic Dispensary, but they all began in the same way: "In connection with institution of criminal proceedings with respect to Aleksandr Nikolayevich Ya., born 1969... request you inform..."

...That is how it was in many other similar cases, or almost that way. I have before me a pile of criminal cases where the reason for instituting them was servicemen going AWOL. The circumstances of each of these cases were different: how the soldier was mocked, how and where he fled, where he hid, how he obtained means for existence and, finally, where he was detained. But each of these cases ended relatively well for the fugitive: he was released from criminal liability. It was learned that humiliations or beatings by colleagues served as the reason for leaving the unit, and they were the ones who were punished.

I read and reread dry lines of interrogation records, all kinds of official documents, and the testimony of witnesses, and contradictory feelings came over me. On the one hand, I was happy that the law did not begin blindly punishing persons who stumbled, but delved into the circumstances. On the other hand, there was vexation that this same law was trampled on by the soldier when he went AWOL. Had he really exhausted all means?

The following characteristic detail struck the eye in the cases I looked over: not one soldier even attempted to defend his honor and dignity in the barracks. They took the ruffianly escapades of colleagues almost as inevitable fate. They suffered all insults and humiliations with some kind of doom and when their nerves did not hold out, they fled; and again, it was not for help and support, but simply to sit it out somewhere. Perhaps the law does not give them the right to defense? Let us refer to an authoritative opinion.

In the opinion of Lieutenant General of Justice A. F. Katusev, chief military procurator and deputy procurator-general of the USSR, effective means against "dedovshchina" are a public critique in the collective of each instance of law infractions and preconditions therefor, as well as active use of the right to necessary defense. A serviceman has the right to defend himself and others and bears no responsibility for active resistance, which of course should not have anything in common with mob law or vengeance.

I hear the logical question "But what if a soldier cannot stand up for himself physically?" Remember the line from the song by V. Vysotskiy, "How can a schoolboy fight vile riff-raff?" Though even in this case, I am sure, one must not come in conflict with the law, but seek protection from it.

According to the USSR Constitution, every citizen has the right to judicial protection against attacks on his honor and dignity, on his life and health. True, it is not

always simple now for servicemen to realize this right. For example, the regulation does not permit them to go directly to the military procuracy.

As we already wrote in one of the issues of "Soldier's Home," work now is under way on the Law on the Serviceman's Status, where this right is to be incorporated legislatively. But another question arises: Will soldiers take advantage of it?

After talks with Lieutenant Colonel D. Nemelshteyn, military construction detachment commander (that is where the criminal proceedings were instituted against soldiers who went AWOL), and with political officers, privates and NCO's, I concluded that this is far from only a legal problem, it is also a moral and psychological problem. In places there is a unique, unwritten code of false soldier honor which does not permit complaining. For example, Colonel G. Yesin cited the following fact. Based on data of a sociological study conducted by officials of his political department among young privates, only three percent of those surveyed said that if their rights were violated they would turn to the commander for help, and one percent would turn to the Komsomol secretary. But the majority, 70 percent, said that they would be silent. They motivated this as follows: "I do not wish to be an informer."

It is fully understandable that the right to go directly to the military procuracy, which the Law on the Serviceman's Status should give, also will not be used if this psychological line is not broken. Colonel of Justice A. Yudin, deputy military procurator of the Moscow garrison, also holds the very same opinion:

"It is fine, of course if this provision is legislatively incorporated, but it already exists de facto, as the saying goes. I do not recall a case where any of the servicemen were reproached for such a request for help from us. Moreover, we definitely give our telephone numbers and address in conducting question-and-answer nights in units, but unfortunately soldiers rarely come to us. In my view this occurs because many young soldiers consider such negative traditions as countrymen's associations and dedovshchina to be inevitable companions of the Army. Since that is so, obedience and the desire to wait it out are born in place of a struggle and refutation of this phenomenon: 'My time too will come,' they say."

I had the thought: Is this not where a mutual cover-up begins? And it in turn inspires fear in a young soldier that complaining costs him more, that he will merely embitter his offenders. What tact and sensitivity the commander and political officer must have in order to perceive the slightest tension in the collective. But for this don't wait until you get a knock at the office door.

Here is something else I have to say. It is most often mothers or relatives of servicemen who go to the procuracy. And what is characteristic, they address letters to the very top: to the president and to the USSR Supreme Soviet...

Lately the following trend also has appeared. Soldiers who have left the unit because of beatings try to find protection in committees of soldiers' mothers. "Even now two soldiers from the Air Defense Forces are sitting in my home. They request protection from the old-timers'," said F. Sadikovskaya, deputy chairman of one such committee, at the beginning of our conversation.

Why did it so happen that a public organization is shown more trust by soldiers than the military procuracy, an entity whose duties include protecting servicemen against lawlessness?

...The right to protection. How can we see to it that it is not only declared, but is in effect? What must the mechanism of realizing this right be like? I cannot say that I have ready answers to these questions. I hope that a special commission formed following the USSR President's Ukase "On Measures for Realization of Proposals of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers" will provide an answer.

I am also sure that it is impossible to resolve this problem without renewed political entities as well. Professional lawyers and psychologists (all structures of political entities soon will be considerably filled in with them) have a broad field of endeavor here, especially now, when such phenomena as moral and legal nihilism are making themselves known more and more strongly. Some people attempt to substitute words about a rule-of-law state for the need to fulfill the laws themselves. For example, a number of republic parliaments made decisions which come into contradiction with the Law on Universal Military Obligation. Figuratively speaking, the union law is revolving in one direction and republic law in another. How many young lives will be ground up by these millstones if everything is allowed to take its course? A political officer can safeguard a young person from this misfortune.

But this of course already is a different facet of the question...

#### **Warrant Officer Killed in Vladivostok**

91UM0160B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 7 Dec 90 First Edition p 6

[Article by TASS Correspondent B. Palagutin, Pacific Fleet: "When Your Number Is Up"]

[Text] This occurred in Vladivostok on December 5th at 23:00 hours local time. While returning from duty at a military construction unit, Senior Warrant Officers M. Kozlovskiy and A. Legchenko were subjected to a robbery. Kozlovskiy was killed. Legchenko was injured. Kozlovskiy's 11-year-old son and 7-year-old daughter are now orphans.

Captain 1st Rank I. Gubar, head of Dalvoyenmorstroy [Far East Naval Construction Unit] political section, says:

"The attack occurred at a bus stop. Six youths accompanied by two girls, not being satisfied with verbally assaulting the servicemen, resorted to physical violence. They knocked the warrant officers down and they began to brutally beat them. When Legchenko regained consciousness, he attempted to help his comrade. But Kozlovskiy was obviously already dead. The attackers hid in a taxi. We managed to ascertain the taxi's number. Vladivostok's Pervomayskiy Rayon Procurator is pleading the case. And this is not the first instance of an attack against our soldiers

#### **Readers Discuss Introduction of Disciplinary Courts**

91UM01894 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
15 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Roundup of readers' comments: "'Disciplinary Court: For and Against'"]

[Text] This was the title of a selection of items published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 7 September. It dealt with Maj. D. Pervukhin's proposal concerning the creation in the Armed Forces of disciplinary courts which he had addressed to a committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It also quoted military legal experts' assessment of this draft.

The editorial office continues to receive letters commenting on this material, and readers have joined actively in the discussion both of the very idea of disciplinary courts and of other ways of strengthening military discipline in the Army and Navy.

Today we publish some of the readers' letters and thank everyone who has taken part in the discussion.

As a lawyer, I am struck by the fact that the ways and methods of solving questions of disciplinary responsibility proposed by Maj. D. Pervukhin come into conflict with the general principles of the social and legal reform being implemented in the country. Thus it is proposed to appreciably extend the list of misdemeanors for which servicemen may be dispatched to a penal battalion. At the present time this is possible merely in accordance with a conviction by a court of law. And this practice is fully justified. A stiffening of the punishments and a broadening of the spheres of application of custody, as an extreme measure of disciplinary response, as Major Pervukhin proposes, is manifestly at odds with an improvement in the institution of legal accountability.

Nor is there any need for a further complication of the very process of the solution of questions of disciplinary responsibility. The mechanical transference of the entire system of criminal procedure to the settlement of disciplinary misdemeanors would merely appreciably impede the process itself and entail a considerable increase in the length of time from the moment of perpetration of even a negligible offense to the imposition of the penalty. And, considering an appeal, this would be a matter of months. Not to mention the legal aspect of this question.



I do not understand why the author of the draft believes that the introduction of disciplinary courts would make it possible to rule out the concealment of breaches of military discipline. After all, the initiative of giving misdemeanors a hearing in a court of law lies with the commander, who also may not do this, leaving the offender to go unpunished, thereby concealing the misdemeanor. But depriving the commanders (command personnel) of disciplinary power would hardly contribute to strengthening their authority. Now concerning the establishment of such a demeaning title as "malicious violator of military discipline" and the service restrictions ensuing from this. Nothing can justify an encroachment on the general civil rights of servicemen. But it is to this that the measures proposed by Major Pervukhin—strict arrest, reduced rations and so forth—would lead. There are no such measures in any army of a civilized country.

To judge by everything, the draft was prepared in isolation from the processes of law-making activity under way in the Armed Forces. Some of its proposals have been borrowed from the drafts of legislative instruments and general military regulations which are being drawn up, work on which is approaching completion. They also contain a number of specific measures aimed at the legal and social protection of servicemen. I refer to the USSR laws on defense, military service obligation, and military service, and also on the status of servicemen.

Instead of creating disciplinary courts, it would be more expedient in this connection to go the route of improving the legal base of servicemen's legal accountability, legislatively extending, for example, the list of offenses in respect of which the deposition form of the pretrial preparation of material is permissible. Specifically, the application of this form in respect of all military and general criminal offenses without aggravating circumstances for which, in accordance with the new draft instruments of criminal law, punishment of up to two years' imprisonment is stipulated would be perfectly justified. Such an approach would make it possible to reduce investigation time and ensure the principle of the inevitability of punishment, what is more, within the framework of the law of criminal procedure, which guarantees the participants in the process their full legal rights.

And, finally, mention has to be made of the fact that the author's proposal would lead to substitution for the professional legal experts designed to administer justice. We have been through this, as they say, and have to this point been restoring flouted legality.

Major General of Justice V. Frolov,  
deputy chief military prosecutor.

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Maj. D. Pervukhin's draft is undoubtedly in need of additional work, but the idea itself is valuable, in my

view. We arrive at it when we discuss questions of military discipline among ourselves.

I believe that the majority of those who are directly involved in the maintenance and strengthening of military discipline and who have repeatedly heard both fair and not entirely fair rebukes of the state of military discipline would support the introduction of the disciplinary court.

Lt. Col. V. Mironenko, political officer.

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The justice which is administered by military tribunals just "slaps the wrists," and then only in respect of criminal offenses. But proceedings are not instituted against people for disciplinary misdemeanors either by the military prosecutors or the military tribunals, even if the commander of a unit presents the requisite material.

I therefore support the proposal concerning the creation of disciplinary courts, which would examine servicemen's misdemeanors, but not of a criminal nature, of course.

Col. M. Supronovich, commander of a unit.

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It is a good thing that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is helping in the search for specific ways to strengthen military discipline. It is no secret that it is now held together more by the nerves of the officers and warrant officers than "the high consciousness on the part of each serviceman of his military duty".

The time has most likely come to revise the Disciplinary Regulations, bring the rights and duties of superiors and subordinates into line with the requirements of reality, and ensure that everyone endeavor to serve better and more conscientiously.

As far as disciplinary courts are concerned my opinion is that this system would be too cumbersome. But it would be a good thing for each regiment to have a professional legal expert instead of, say, a propagandist.

Sr. Lt. V. Timashov.

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I believe that the proposal concerning the creation of disciplinary courts merits study. Of course, there are many controversial propositions in the draft, and it is top-heavy with the provisions and attributes of "big" justice. Nor can we fail to be alerted by the fact that this is essentially a return to the methods of extra-judicial punishment.

Nonetheless, something needs to be done. There are, after all, no effective means today for handling, so to speak, the chronic breaches of military discipline. Instead of creating disciplinary courts, we should, perhaps, insert in the law on criminal liability for military crimes, for example, the following: "Systematic flagrant



breach of military discipline" with the penalty of dispatch to a penal battalion for a term of up to six months. And not conduct an inquiry into these matters, a pretrial investigation even less, confining ourselves to a summons before a military tribunal with the presentation of the requisite documents, the decision of the unit commander included.

This combined with the establishment of comrades' courts for men on compulsory service could, in my view, be an effective measure. In short, it is time to switch from talk to actual deeds.

Colonel of Justice V. Nalivayko,  
chief of a district legal service.

### Chief Engineer Recalls Causes of Submarine Emergencies

91UM0167A Moscow ZNAMYA in Russian  
No 9, Sep 90 pp 173-183

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Vladimir Stefanovskiy, chief engineer of Sevastopol Ship Repair Yard, under rubric "Writings": "Damage-Control Quarters"]

[Text] *Captain 2nd Rank V. Stefanovskiy works as chief engineer of a shipyard in Sevastopol. He served aboard Navy submarines for 14 years and witnessed many of the events which he describes in his article.*

The Soviet nuclear submarine "Komsomolets" and 42 of her crew members were lost on 7 April 1989. The catastrophe in the Barents Sea became a subject of wide discussion both in our own and in the foreign press, but the focus of newspaper and television discussions was on events aboard the "Komsomolets" after the outbreak of fire and not on those which have resulted in tragedies becoming the standard of day-to-day life in the Navy.

A catastrophe is not just the loss or breakdown of equipment; it is also the loss of people. The loss of a person always is inexcusable, but it is doubly inexcusable when it is a submariner who finds himself in a closed compartment without hope of rescue; when fire, gases and water come on him simultaneously; and when failing consciousness clutches at fragments of memories, helplessly counting out the last minutes of life: "Just a little bit more, just a little." No one will hear his final words or learn his final thoughts. No one will mark the grave which, like life itself, is a necessary sign of human existence. And without a grave even memory is shorter...

It is no secret to anyone that a person drowns not because he is rescued with insufficient skill and efficiency, but because he simply was not taught to swim. Without exaggerating in the least, the very same also goes for a ship, which is handled by a crew headed by the commander. Without insulting the memory of the dead, but on behalf of and for the sake of the living, and without laying claim to a comprehensive coverage of the problem, we will try to seek the true reasons of catastrophes and the loss of people in the Navy using examples from Navy life. This question is pertinent no matter what and is worth dwelling on in detail, especially as catastrophes and accidents in the Navy continue with the very same degree of intensity even after the tragedy in "high latitudes."

Fire is the most formidable danger which gives navy-men, especially submariners, no time for reflection. It is not only those in the compartment with the emergency who die; often the entire ship and crew are lost.

Analyzing the reasons for the fire aboard the "Komsomolets" in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (29 April 1989), former submariner Captain 1st Rank A. Gorbachev heaped complaints on industry, charging it with submarines' insufficient reliability and high fire danger.

In so doing he asked the sad question: "Just why are fires not put out aboard submarines?" True, it was not understandable whether he was addressing it to industry or the CinC Navy.

It is a proper question, but before answering it we have to delve into the reasons for the outbreak of fires.

Let us refer to examples.

On 16 June 1967 fuel ignited in the control room bilge and quickly developed into a fire which enveloped the entire compartment aboard Captain 3rd Rank O. Bochkarev's submarine during an independent deployment. The personnel transferred to escape compartments. The entire submarine filled with smoke and people received serious poisoning. Four navy-men burned and the submarine herself was on the verge of being lost because of errors in personnel actions (ballast tanks were not completely blown and high-pressure air leaked out).

On 21 October 1981 Submarine Commander Captain 3rd Rank V. Marango did not have enough room to pass clear of a refrigerator ship and the submarine ended up on the bottom of Peter the Great Bay. When surviving submariners came to their senses and began to think about rescue, however, a short circuit occurred in the second compartment because of outside water contacting electrical equipment. This led to a fire, which was put out using the VPL (submarine air-foam) system, but the submariners did not have time to wipe the soot off their faces before the fire broke out with new force. Again the fire was tamed using the very same submarine air-foam system, which saved the submariners. By the way, it was still a very long time until they were rescued, but the question of saving the surviving submariners would have disappeared of itself had the fire not been extinguished.

So are fires extinguished aboard submarines or not?

An air-foam system is provided for fighting fire aboard submarines. It often fails for the simple reason that submariners treat it with total indifference.

A chemical system—LOKh (submarine area chemical)—is provided in case of serious fire or ignition in a place difficult of access. This system is rather effective, but has its peculiarities: for example, there must be no overpressure in the compartment with an emergency, it must be sealed, and personnel must use rescue breathing gear in case of fire. Submariner A. Gorbachev considers it dangerous and unreliable because of this (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 29 April 1989). As a professional, however, I will say that this system is no more dangerous than a kitchen gas stove, with which a housewife copes without difficulties. But why does a person who is outstanding in "combat and political training" avoid it? Why is the flame arrester often supplied not to the compartment where ignition occurs, but to an adjacent compartment, because of which everything ends with the death of its personnel while the fire continues to

blaze? I can cite more than one example where this system was entirely impossible to use because of its unserviceability (the reason was an absence of technical upkeep). For a knowledgeable and well-rehearsed crew it is an invaluable help in fighting a fire, but for the untrained it serves as a reason for additional unpleasantness and even involves the death of personnel.

Fires are extinguished where navymen treat firefighting equipment with respect and where, in addition, the skill of using this equipment for fighting fire also has been rehearsed. To understand this, let us return to Captain 3rd Rank Bochkarev's submarine and analyze what led to the emergency and how it was remedied. Fuel leaked through an incompletely tightened nipple joint in one of the control room bilge enclosures back before the submarine departed for the independent deployment. Access to it was difficult and it was not that simple to correct the troubles, so "it seemed" more convenient to the seaman responsible for the area to pump fuel out of the bilge to the outside. The engineering department head paid no attention to the solar oil in the bilge during the daily jacking-over of machinery and the check of the submarine's weapons and technical equipment, just as, by the way, the assistant commander also paid no attention to it during the weekly sweepdown. In addition, in violation of the "Korabelnyy ustav" [Shipboard Regulations], the commander did not hold periodic inspections of the ship, and all this led to the stream of fuel from the tank duly ending up outside, settling in the bilge. That continued until Petty Officer 2nd Class Vlasov tossed a cigarette butt there. It is necessary to explain here that smoking is categorically forbidden in a submarine, especially if she is submerged. The officer of the watch "at the periscope" lit up in the conning tower on top and the damage control watchstander lit up in the control room below. (Here, indeed, what is "on top" also is "below.") Out of a habit similar to the one where we, dear reader, toss an incompletely smoked cigarette under the wheel of a bus, the submariner tossed it into the bilge. On discovering the ignition, Petty Officer P. Seregin, who was nearby, tried but failed to use the submarine air-foam system—the reel on which the hose was wound did not turn. Seregin nevertheless unwound the hose by force, but there was no knob on it and it was impossible to supply foam. Meanwhile the fire was advancing. After messing around a little longer, Petty Officer Seregin together with Damage Control Team Leader G. Avvakumov set about to ready the bilge pump, but here too nothing happened inasmuch as the receiving screen filter was clogged with dirt and the pump did not create pressure. Seaman D. Minchiy hastened to help petty officers Seregin and Avvakumov. Seeing that things were bad, Chief Boatswain's Mate S. Uvarov (the diving planes watchstander), after setting the diving plane manipulators for surfacing, began to blow the tank with high-pressure air, but mistakenly opened the vent valve for the middle group of main ballast tanks, because of which air swiftly escaped outside and the tanks were not fully blown. Inasmuch as it was impossible to organize people for damage control under conditions of solid fire

and total smoke, Executive Officer Captain 3rd Rank K. Golubev, who arrived in response to the damage-control quarters signal, gave the command: "Everyone abandon compartment!" Not everyone heard his command and it was impossible to check the presence of people because the compartment was completely smoke-filled and because of the raging fire. In addition, this element had not been rehearsed in drills, because of which the personnel's departure from the compartment in distress took a long time and was unorganized. During this time fire spread to adjacent compartments, the entire submarine became smoke-filled and the incompletely blown ballast tank and a storm which had broken did not allow either the submarine to be ventilated or the submariners to go on deck. An attempt to make their way up through the hatch of one of the compartments failed. Water which gushed into the compartment short-circuited electrical equipment. A fire broke out, which was extinguished in this compartment using the very same submarine air-foam system. But the navymen's situation remained deplorable. Having assembled in the aft compartments ready for anything, the doomed people counted out the remaining hours, recalling the life they had lived. Some did not hold up under this torment; to avoid the worst, they had to be calmed, which means with the help of improvised means.

This drama lasted seven hours; it was only later, in a control room burned to ashes, that they found the bodies of four submariners who either did not hear the command to abandon the compartment or could no longer hear it...

In those years our submarines were only beginning to master the "world ocean," and so no one had sufficient experience in lengthy deployments. Moreover, no one raised the question of burying the dead, and none of the officers even knew what to do in this case. Permission to bury the navymen was received only three days later in response to the submarine commander's radioed query. All this time the living were in the same compartment with the remains of their dead comrades in 50-degree heat...

These tragic events unfolded in the Mediterranean when the submarine was on patrol duty. A U.S. Sixth Fleet destroyer was in the distress area. Guided by the naval honor code, her commander offered help when the submarine surfaced, but her commander refused the help of a "potential enemy." Well, "the Soviets have their own pride" and we esteem a person least of all. What forced the submarine commander to disregard the people? Fear of responsibility for "forbidden contacts"? Fear of disclosing secrets of a military object?

Both from my own experience and from official statistics I know that 85 percent of fires aboard submarines arise from a violation of rules for operating electrical equipment and from clumsy handling of it. Alas, these violations have a broad range.

But not all fires occur through the submariner's fault, the reader will say. Yes, not all. Some fires, up to 15 percent, are the result of imperfect design developments and technical solutions and of nonobservance of technology in fabricating and installing ship's electrical equipment. But the rest of them lie with the submariners; they are ours. This includes low professionalism, poor technical and (as they say in the Navy) submarine culture, insufficient responsibility and elementary slovenliness, and this concerns more than fires.

For example, a diesel submarine sank on a Northern Fleet combat training range on 27 January 1961 because of improper crew actions. The reason was that water entered the fifth compartment. The entire crew was lost.

On 23 June 1983 the very same misfortune also occurred with a nuclear submarine, which ended up on the bottom with an open air shaft not only because of unsatisfactory crew training, but also because the ship was wretchedly prepared for putting to sea. The submarine was raised from the seabed and placed in a dock, but she simply proved "unlucky"—she sank once and for all at the completion of repair work.

I will clarify that she sank not in the sea, but right at the yard berth.

A number of catastrophes occurred for reasons about which it is somehow awkward even to speak—it is when a commander "lacks" room to pass clear of an oncoming ship or even with shore. I already mentioned the submarine lost in Peter the Great Bay—she collided with a refrigerator ship on 21 October 1981. In that same October of that same ill-fated 1981 a Baltic Fleet submarine was unable to miss the shore. She got stuck on coastal rocks of Swedish fjords, after which naval jokers dubbed her the "Swedish Komsomolets"...

During performance of a combat mission several years later a submarine with Formation Commander Captain 1st Rank S. Poteskin aboard collided with a torpedo recovery boat, which went to the bottom together with seven crew members.

(It is typical that formation staff officers were the senior officers aboard essentially all submarines that suffered disaster or had an accident.)

Things are no better for "surface" personnel. On 14 May 1986, after crossing through the navigationally complicated Bosphorus Strait, the underway replenishment ship "Berezina" did not pass clear of a motorship and received a hole in the afterbody. Fuel leaked into the sea as a result of fuel tank damage. Ignition occurred in the after electric power plant on the way to Sevastopol—water fell on electrical equipment through the torn side. No one presumed to de-energize it. We will note that Formation Commander Captain 1st Rank I. Vinnik and Deputy Formation Commander Rear Admiral N. Gorshkov were aboard the unlucky supply ship at that moment.

Repairs to the ship cost five million rubles.

This is one of many examples. Fires and loss of ships have turned from an extraordinary phenomenon in the Navy to a commonplace matter. Of course, not all personnel errors end in catastrophes, otherwise there would be enormously more catastrophes in the Navy.

For example, in October 1978 Captain 2nd Rank V. Kruglov's submarine, which was standing at a pier in a foreign port, almost sank. The submarine began to submerge with hatches of the third and aft compartments open and an electric power cable extending through a hatch to shore; had water entered there, the consequences would have been unpredictable. Everything unfolded further as in a bad tragicomedy. Having succeeded in descending to the sinking submarine, the flag engineer officer began blowing the aft group of main ballast tanks to prevent her from going to the bottom like a rock, but things did not go as planned. Apparently having decided that the flag engineer officer had a screw loose, this submarine's executive officer and engineer officer, who were readying her for a cruise, threw themselves on him to keep him from the emergency blowing station. His physical conditioning saved him; had he not gotten free from his colleagues' "embraces" the submarine would have been lying on the seabed. The ship managed to be saved, but the electrical equipment was disabled for a long time inasmuch as water still got on it...

Just how does the Navy react to the latest accident or catastrophe? An immediate reaction follows—All Stop! All combat training ceases and a campaign begins to "impose regulation order and improve the organization of duties." It stands to reason that someone is relieved of his position here, usually the commander (for a navigation incident) or engineer officer (for all the rest). If for example the accident involves a hydrogen explosion aboard a submarine, then all storage battery charging ceases in the Navy according to a circular, and this lasts until the personnel take quizzes on charging batteries and monitoring hydrogen. Battery charging is again permitted after a report "topside" about quizzes having been taken and that "damage from the emergency incident was slight." That same hydrogen explodes a short time later and everything repeats itself—circular, quizzes, reports "topside"...

I personally see the reasons for accidents in the Navy not just in the fact that seamen do not know a particular provision or instruction; accidents also are the consequences of negligence and poor discipline in the Navy. Otherwise how is it to be explained that one does not succeed in slowing down a string of accidents even after a serious accident or catastrophe and after serious dressings-down and punishments?

Navy men well remember the year 1970, when our nuclear submarine sank in waters of the Bay of Biscay, beginning the count for ships of this type. The entire Navy was moored to the berths after what happened.



"Training" began. According to official findings, the submarine perished as a result of loss of longitudinal stability. Naval scientists and unscientific men began travelling across the Soviet Union, explaining to submariners what longitudinal stability is and how its loss or reduction threatens a ship, although even an ignorant person understands that a submarine sinks not because someone does not know the formula for longitudinal stability, but because water enters the pressure hull.

The submariners sank more than one submarine after "acquiring" knowledge on stability. The last of them was the "Komsomolets." Events aboard her developed in a similar manner, and neither Northern Fleet Headquarters nor the submarine commander remembered the "longitudinal stability lessons" even from the standpoint of an emergency's possible development and its consequences. Neither menacing Main Navy Staff directives nor Minister of Defense orders, which are published systematically based on results of investigations of the reasons for particular catastrophes, lead to an appreciable improvement of the situation. Everything is taking its normal course: accident—order; catastrophe—again an order, and again an accident.

Right after the "Komsomolets" was lost the primary loop of a nuclear reactor depressurized aboard another Northern Fleet submarine. A minesweeper blew up and sank in the Black Sea Fleet on 19 August 1989. Three persons were lost. A month later a dry dock sank in that same Black Sea Fleet while a dock operation was being carried out.

There is no need to prove that culture in keeping up a ship and culture in operating equipment are a necessary condition for accident-free sailing and faultless operation of equipment. As we already have seen, the principal reason for fires is electrical equipment and an absence of culture in operating it. I wish to explain to the person not involved in maritime service what this means. So-called ground connections—"bridges," which as a rule are sources of ignitions—arise because of its unserviceability (for example, poor network insulation). In the words of Captain 1st Rank A. Aladkin, around 700 such ground connections were discovered in the ship network during a check of the nuclear-powered cruiser "Kirov"! There were even more aboard the air-capable cruiser "Kiev." Both these ships were on independent deployment. In addition, fire extinguishing equipment aboard them also turned out to be unserviceable.

Of course, unpleasantness for submariners is not limited to electrical equipment. Well, any equipment takes vengeance for disrespect shown it. A light attitude is fraught with serious consequences. I visited Captain 1st Rank D. Smirnov's submarine in line of duty. At that time her storage batteries were being recharged. Bilges were flooded half and half with water and fuel. Water was rolling noisily from side to side, and fallen wrenches, rags and other garbage were there as well. Bulkhead doors were open and some were not even stopped. Hydrogen monitors were unserviceable. To the left of the passage

was an open, unsecured fuel drum and on it a pile of butts! Boxes of regeneration substance were not secured and were peeping out from a bilge half filled with water (this was already in the sixth compartment). A fire occurred on this submarine a month later. Another month later hydrogen exploded when a storage battery was being recharged. Fortunately there were no victims; they got by with mutilations.

A valve for controlling presence of water in an air shaft proved to be closed aboard a Northern Fleet submarine that sank in 1961. It is difficult to say specifically what decided the submarine's fate, but had the valve been open, the submariners would have noticed the entry of water into the compartment sooner, for the fate of a submarine and crew often is decided by seconds.

But negligence is manifested not just in the attitude toward technical equipment; what is most bitter, it is displayed toward survival aids as well. In raising the nuclear submarine that sank in the Pacific Fleet on 23 June 1983, salvagers suggested a clever way of draining the after compartments by supplying air to a compartment of the sunken submarine, but suction hoses in the sunken submarine's compartment had not been connected...

All aft compartments and the central compartment were flooded because of a lack of seal of bulkheads aboard the diesel submarine that sank in this same Pacific Fleet in 1981 (the commander was Captain 3rd Rank V. Marango). While water entered the fourth and fifth compartments because bulkhead doors were open, the third compartment was flooded because the after bulkhead was non-watertight... Individual survival aids aboard the submarine had been stripped; a portion of the divers' woolen gear was in shore quarters, according to Senior Lieutenant A. Tuner, the assigned engine group officer who was aboard the submarine at the moment of the emergency. It turned out there were potatoes in emergency food tanks in place of the required contents. Here it is difficult to lodge complaints against anyone except the submariners themselves. Why they had that attitude toward survival aids and toward their own ship is another question. We will attempt to delve into this.

Letter combinations—IDA-59, ISP, VPL, LOKh—have been mentioned more than once in the press concerning the loss of the "Komsomolets." All these are survival and damage-control aids. The IDA-59 rescue breathing gear, which has been in the submariners' inventory since 1959, essentially has not undergone design improvements. The ISP-60 submariner's individual gear is a 1960 model. The submarine air-foam system was still designated VPL-52 not long ago, i.e., it was created in 1952. The LOKh system remained at the level of the 1970's. What follows from all this? The fact that means of human destruction are keeping step with the times, but means ensuring ship survivability and the rescue of personnel (submariners) have fallen more than 30 years behind. Is this not why submariners have a feeling of



indifference both to themselves and to the ship, a feeling similar to inconsolability and doom?

A surfacing buoy with telephone communications and a signaling device is among the equipment for rescuing submarine personnel. The length of the buoy's tow line corresponds to the submarine's operating depth, but a submarine floats (and sinks) at depths of over a thousand meters. How can a buoy help a submariner in this case? In no way! Because of a design imperfection of attachment to the hull, it has a "habit" of breaking off and going on an independent cruise, which threatens great unpleasantness. According to Captain 2nd Rank N. Desyak, the commander of a submarine which lost two buoys was even recommended for removal from his position. Well, after weighing everything rather well, the submariners resolved this difficult matter simply: they began welding the buoy solidly to the submarine hull. Buoy losses decreased, but not submarine losses. All this did not add to the submariners' optimism and respect for their ship. Moreover, even the surfacing chamber is welded to the submarine's hull—if we sink, we sink! Do search and rescue service specialists who check the readiness of survival aids prior to departure for sea know about this? Of course they do. They also know that everything is done after their departure from the submarine, but they do not wish to change anything. The welded buoy and chamber force a submariner to ponder: Is he at all necessary to anyone if everything is the way it is?

And generally how is a ship prepared for a deployment?

It would seem that the nuclear submarine that sank in the Pacific Fleet on 23 July [sic] 1983 did not prepare for departure at all. Her equipment was unserviceable. The crew was assembled from specialists detached from other submarines and these people's training level was not checked by anyone! No one paid attention to the open air shaft during submergence. I believe it is not necessary to explain why the submarine went down like a rock after the main ballast tank flooded...

Unfortunately, these omissions are repeated aboard almost every ship to one degree or another. Why is the equipment unserviceable? At times because the time set aside for preventive maintenance and equipment inspections is used for other purposes, anything at all—guard duty, details, and other work and nonwork off the ship. In addition, the unsatisfactory supply of materials and spare parts as well as the understrength personnel do not permit performing quality preventive maintenance even with sufficient time. The supply of spare parts for the obsolete models of equipment being operated is not arranged at all. Often some assemblies or even entire machine units are removed from other submarines prior to a ship's departure to sea, and a ship that is planned to be repaired is so ripped off that by the end of repairs the despondent foundations of individual pieces of machinery peep out forlornly from the bilges in place of the machinery.

A crew also is selected from the entire formation for putting to sea. Who among those temporarily detached for duty will care so much for something that is not their ship? Unfortunately a submarine also often departs on a lengthy deployment with half of her crew different from the one with which the entire combat training course was worked (albeit poorly). Some of the old-timers have been demobilized. The understrength crew is filled out from other crews with different levels of training, and this usually is done prior to departure, i.e., the ship's crew essentially rehearses and is made cohesive while already on deployment. It so happens that a submarine in the first period of a lengthy deployment more resembles a simulator on which a crew is rehearsing (and not always successfully). In addition, this simulator is not always serviceable, and it often has a completely used-up life.

Broken-down equipment was repaired and damage control was conducted during an entire deployment because of poor personnel training aboard a submarine where at one time Captain-Lieutenant V. Mashechkov served as executive officer and Captain-Lieutenant T. Burkulakov (who died aboard the "Komsomolets") served as political officer. The submariners later said that this was not a deployment, but long-drawn-out damage-control quarters and a constant battle against death. One crew member died.

The very same situation took shape aboard Captain 2nd Rank Ye. Sulay's submarine, which was sent on a long deployment with the main engines' life fully used up. In 1979 our diesel submarine lost way in the Bay of Biscay area for these same reasons. Navymen who were in the Mediterranean at this time saw her on local television being towed to Yugoslavia for repair to bursts of laughter and hoots of all kinds of "voices" there.

After returning from deployment, Submarine Commander Captain 2nd Rank I. Mirkitantov reported to the formation commander that he had performed the mission but "had slept under the same overcoat with death" during the entire deployment. He had accepted the submarine—neglected, dirty and unserviceable—directly at sea from the main crew. The second crew, itself poorly trained, descended into the compartments of the unserviceable ship and silently went about performing the assigned mission. The formation commander was present at the submarine's first submergence before departure. He did not dare report the submarine's condition and delay departure. The absence of democracy and glasnost in the Navy did not permit the commander to tell the truth, which would have cost him dearly and the submarine would have departed all the same. Covering up the true situation, like covering up accidents and catastrophes, had become the norm. On the other hand, however, catastrophes are the result of a cover-up and concealment of the true situation in the Navy. Meanwhile, this "devil's wheel" not only is turning, but is picking up steam.

If submarines are at sea with untrained crews and unserviceable equipment, as we already have seen, then

naturally the question arises: Is a ship really not checked by higher headquarters before putting to sea? She is, and how! Even by a fleet commission. Some adverse comments "are remedied during the inspection." The ship commander and formation staff are given a certain amount of time—two or three days—for the most serious ones which "are not remedied on the spot" even with the help of the ship provision room (just try to tell me what is and is not a "serious" adverse comment for a submarine).

The formation staff itself does the reporting about the "remedying" and the ship departs according to plan, although it is difficult to surmise that something can be seriously changed aboard ship in two or three days. No one really sets hopes on this. It is simply that a staff officer, most often the formation commander or his deputy, is "added" to the submarine to rehearse the crew and to ensure survivability and operating safety.

In the Navy a staff officer who "ensures operating safety" is called an "uncle." True, for a crew without good base training, even with an "uncle" aboard a submarine remains a training simulator and he himself becomes a hostage of an unprofessional crew. There also was a staff officer aboard Captain 1st Rank D. Smirnov's submarine, on which there were two emergency incidents in one cruise. Chief of Staff Captain 2nd Rank Karavekov, who was teaching the commander how to sail, was the senior officer aboard Captain 3rd Rank V. Marango's submarine.

An absence of professionalism and responsibility clearly is not the last reason, if not one of the first, in addition to the above obvious reasons for accidents and their accompanying factors. Since it is a matter of the level of professionalism and responsibility, then just why have we not acquired all this during the rather lengthy period of the Soviet Navy's existence?

Who teaches the new recruit the ABC's of naval service and the specialty? Often it is those who have not found themselves in the Navy: those who love to drink, those who hoped to receive a great deal from the Navy without burdening themselves in any way, and other unprofessionals, including those written off from the Navy as lacking promise. There are enough examples. This cannot help but contribute to forming a corresponding view in a seaman (who is forced to serve in the Fleet by "compulsion") of shipboard duty, or even of life remaining...

There also is special training taken directly aboard a submarine. There is not always time for it. Here is the admission of rescued "Komsomolets" crew members to a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent (21 April 1989): "Four persons managed, not without difficulty, to cast off a life raft during a winter drill." From what was said by the submariners it followed that these drills were conducted very rarely, that the objective of the drill—to rehearse and improve a skill—was not achieved, and that all efforts went to casting off this awkward raft. They did

so with difficulty, gained no skills, and on this the class ended. A seaman aboard the aforementioned submarine where Captain-Lieutenant V. Mashechkov served as executive officer felt bad immediately after using the rescue breathing gear set during a fire in the compartment. He died a half-hour later. Because of the absence of firm skills, he forgot to open the oxygen cylinder valve, drew a sharp breath, received a barotrauma (rupture) of the lungs and died. Now he cannot be asked how many classes and drills Executive Officer Mashechkov held with him.

During a crash dive aboard the submarine which Captain 2nd Rank N. Dyudyayev commanded at one time, Damage-Control Team Leader N. Shanin made a blunder—he closed the quick-diving tank kingpin valves without completing the blowing of the tank. The rubber seal was torn off and the submarine received a large negative buoyancy and could remain at the depth only at full speed and with a large trim by the stern. It turns out that there was insufficient time for the third shift (which also included Warrant Officer Shanin) to rehearse the "quick-diving" maneuver at the combat training range, and the ship was readying for an independent cruise. That is how the commander himself was the culprit of the future emergency situation.

In an item about reasons for the loss of the "Komsomolets," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 15 March 1990 notes "the high level of submariners' professional knowledge." But the fact is, in addition to knowledge one needs both ability and skills as well so that in an emergency situation a submariner could manage to perform quickly and precisely that which had been rehearsed in drills until it was automatic. That same Warrant Officer Shanin whom I mentioned above knew the submarine's design better than anyone in the crew, but he had no skills or, more accurately, had not acquired them through the fault of the commander. By the way, crews do not arrive for practical classes in diver training—which is even more serious!—at full strength, but these are "trivial matters" for commanders—they often include those absent as well in lists of persons who have taken the drill... For a long time it also has been no secret to navymen that survival aids (including the rescue breathing gear set) are "studied" by a submariner when he is in a critical situation, when the fate of the ship is decided by minutes or even seconds. Oh, how necessary high professionalism is in such cases! But that is what is absent.

The reader, I am sure, will pose the questions: But how, strictly speaking, are ship commanders selected? Who becomes a ship commander?

Conditions of naval service are such that officers' job qualities and level of professional training have not been the principal criteria for a long time, partly because service in the Fleet has lost its attractiveness. An officer's everyday life ashore has not been adjusted and if he basically has nowhere to "stick" a family, what attractiveness is there here? That is one thing. It is no secret

that some commanders are appointed if there are influential acquaintances or family ties. It is most vexing and even dangerous that in climbing the command ladder these "father-commanders" later become "fathers of the fleet," and then "topside" in headquarters they are all the more without time for navymen's needs. They hardly will remember what a ship bilge is and how to keep it up, let alone remember the people for whom this bilge and the submarine are home.

For a certain portion of officers the captain's bridge is an opportunity to solve (to some extent) their social and everyday problems, for every next step in the hierarchic fleet ladder is marked with new opportunities and benefits. The absence of glasnost and democratic principles in the Navy contributes to all this and it would be naive to expect that such a commander-"favorite" will try to fully realize his own professional skills.

Of course, all this is not a specific naval illness. All our society is infected with these metastases, and if people "rob" or give bribes to higher-ups in civilian life, why not rob and give bribes in the Navy? (For example, in the large strategic submarine command where Rear Admiral V. Sergodeyev, later a Flotilla Military Council member, served as political department chief, officers received positions for services rendered, for being obliging and, finally, for money.)

It is impossible to educate a new recruit to be a professional, rated submariner in three years. Modern equipment is complex and in this time he also has to acquire naval and submarine culture, as they say in the Navy. In addition, not everyone has the desire to master this profession, for everything a person is taught will not be needed a short time after demobilization.

Along with all else, a phenomenon such as "godkovshchina" also exists in the Navy, which is the very same as "dedovshchina" in the Army. It takes up a great deal of time to analyze conflicts and search for "fugitives"—those who go AWOL from military units after not enduring the mockery.

All these problems can be resolved to some extent by shifting to a professional principle of manpower acquisition of naval cadres and by creating a modern basing system and training facility. It is said that the Navy has no funds for this. Is this so? And how are funds spent that the state allocates to the Navy for its vital activity and performance of missions? It must be said that they are spent in an ill-conceived manner, and often simply are cast to the winds. The Navy is becoming a not very inexpensive offspring of the state because of the loss of ships, because of navigation incidents, accidents and fires, and because of unprofessional treatment of equipment and disrespect for the sea. To what extent would it be possible to raise the level of a navyman's professional training were we to save those funds which turned out to have been wasted on building ships that sank or burned? "Just what interferes with elevating navymen's proficiency?" was the sacramental question asked by Captain

1st Rank S. Bystrov (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 March 1990). "Above all the limited nature of funds." I do not agree with this—the Navy has funds, but people are unable to use them intelligently.

Catastrophes in the Navy are not yet the most ruinous item of expenditure of the people's money. Some of it is destroyed "by peaceful means" daily and in gigantic amounts.

For example, in 1983 the Kronshtadt Naval Yard received the cruiser "Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya" for repairs. By the 70th anniversary of October the cost of repair work approached five million rubles. It was necessary to change the steam drums of main boilers (a total of 30), but the Navy did not have them. No one thought to give an order to industry for their fabrication in advance, and the cruiser was written off for showing "signs of being unfit for repair" (not for reason of a reduction of the Armed Forces, as we may be told). Now she is at the parting base in Leningrad to which the destroyer "Blagorodnyy" also was sent, and which also was first repaired and on which just as much money was spent. The dry cargo ship "Ravenstvo," which was purchased by the military from the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, underwent refitting at that same Kronshtadt yard. When expenses approached three million it was learned that the vessel had a bad hull and so it was better to write her off. That is what they did. Unfortunately, this list is endless.

Admiral of the Fleet I. Kapitanets reports in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that as of 1 January 1989 19,220 families in the Navy have not been provided with housing and that another 19,362 families need improved living conditions. It is easy to speculate, for example, that it is possible to build 25,000 square meters of housing that supports 625 naval families without quarters just for the funds thrown away to repair the "Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya."

It is not just for this that the Navy lacks funds. After the death of navymen from Captain 3rd Rank O. Bochkarev's submarine, the father of deceased submariner D. Minchiy sent a request to the unit where his son had served to visit a submarine and speak with those who had seen his son in the final minutes of his life. (Submariner D. Minchiy and his comrades G. Avvakumov, S. Uvarov and V. Skvortsov were buried at sea. Here are their graves—36°20'0" North Latitude, 10°57'11" East Longitude.) The father also was counting on the Navy's help at least to pay his travel expenses. The Navy found no funds. There were none.

The Navy also has no funds to commemorate victims of the loss of the battleship "Novorossiysk," but the fact is that over 30 years already have gone by.

By the way, it is not a matter of funds here, but of bad memory. These are the words of L. I. Baksha, a surviving crew member of the lost battleship: "I understand the reason for accidents in the Navy. Will a navyman willingly serve if the Navy cannot even bury us

humanely? Who could believe that, having taken the lives of its seamen, the Navy would plunge their names into oblivion? The person, with everything humane, has been left overboard off the Navy machine. That is why it is breaking up and skidding."

The tragedy continues to this day both for him and for those near and dear to those 608 persons who gave the Navy their lives. Even the memorial plaque at the navymen's fraternal graves is being "forced through" not by the Navy, but by an initiative group. The Navy had neither the desire nor the funds for this...

One reason for the accident rate in the Navy is the catastrophically low prestige and significance of naval engineer services. The position of engineer in the Navy is not fashionable. The word "engineer" gradually was struck from naval ranks beginning with the 1970's. For example, there was an "engineer-lieutenant," who became a "lieutenant-engineer," but now he is simply a lieutenant. It is enormously more difficult for an officer of the engineer corps to receive a position title and advance in service than, for example, a political officer, although the engineer officer is that unskilled worker of the Navy without whom a ship would not live even an hour. But for some reason the political officer's position pay is higher than for an engineer officer, and the political officer moves into new quarters much earlier...

Seeing this, many engineer officers became political officers so as to look down later on their former brothers in the compartment. The fall of prestige of engineer services affected such qualities needed by the submariner as submarine and technical culture and engineer thinking. The status of special training also fell. Priority is given to political training, although in my view, the supreme criterion of political awareness and patriotic nature of a navyman only can be the level of his specialized knowledge and a careful attitude toward the combat equipment which the country has entrusted to him. The status of naval engineer has to be restored immediately. This also can be done at the expense of the Navy political apparatus. The priority of methods of persuasion is not for the Navy. Professionals in their job, professionals with a capital "P," are needed here.

And what is the worth of the decision for general demobilization of naval officers according to age? This decision was adopted contrary to the widely propagated slogan about glasnost and democracy; it was adopted by surprise and for many it was a stab in the back. A captain 2nd rank who has barely reached the age of 45 and who just yesterday was certified for the position of chief of a school chair today receives notification of discharge to the reserve: excuse us, it is your age. But in my view, only at this age does the officer gain an opportunity to realize his professional experience. On the other hand, if an officer no longer can cope with accomplishing missions at age 45, then how do officers on the General Staff cope with their duties at a much more venerable age?

The loss of the "Komsomolets," with which we began this story, is linked to this day with the fact that this was a new, most modern, and to some extent unique submarine. No one before her had submerged to a depth down to 1,000 m. Since she was new, this meant she was not completely mastered or checked, and anything unexpected is to some extent understandable and explainable (right down to her loss). This submarine had been in operation for far from the first year, and during this time it was possible to study her features; however, she was lost by no means "because of the depth," but because of an ordinary fire which the submariners allowed to start and with which they were unable to cope. Essentially all sunken and burned submarines and surface combatants had been in operation for a long time. Their operating reliability had been taken to that level where a trained crew could sail aboard them comfortably. It is not equipment quality that explains catastrophes and accidents, but the level of crew training. It is another matter that the flow of equipment failures is increasing because of poor operating reliability of individual machinery, devices and systems of new ships and submarines. Some have been the reason for emergency incidents, which serve as a convenient excuse to accuse industry of destroyed ships. Of course it is possible to lodge charges against industry, but the fact is that industry supplies the Navy with what it orders, and the Navy sails on what it ordered and what it accepted.

The article by Admiral I. Kapitanets in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA to which I often refer here is entitled "How the Navy Is To Develop." And so I wish to suggest to the admiral: with concern for the person; then there will be fewer catastrophes.

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#### **Capt Pilipchuk Debates Capt A. Gorbachev on Fleet's Capability**

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[Article by Capt. 1st Rank A. Pilipchuk: "'Rescuer' of the Fleet"]

[Text] Today the subject of the Navy never leaves the pages of the press. Central and local newspapers, weeklies and thick journals, departmental and "samizdat" organs write about the Navy, and radio and television broadcasts cover it. It is not surprising, therefore, that the commercial newspaper NACHALO, and PEREVAL, the newspaper of the Moscow municipal council of a military-patriotic association and capital reports agency, scarcely having begun publication, devoted significant space to the "military seascape" in their very first issues. It would hardly be worthwhile paying attention to these publications were it not for one circumstance. Both publications, as if by prior agreement, opened their pages for an interview with the same author, Capt 1st Rank (Res.) A. Gorbachev, previously "accredited" mainly in



KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, OGONEK, and Central Television. The introduction of the author to the readers in PEREVAL, for example, is framed in the spirit of a life of the saints (I quote): "Anatoliy Nikolayevich Gorbachev, until recently commander of a nuclear-powered missile-armed submarine of the Northern Fleet, and now Captain 1st Rank of the Reserve, is today called nothing less than 'our naval Sakharov.' He has hundreds, thousands of like-minded individuals in the Navy..." I do not know the services of Anatoliy Nikolayevich to the democratic movement in our country and the height of his rating in the Navy, but here is what I know about the service record of the former combat training officer of the Navy: he held the position of commander of a nuclear-powered vessel in 1973-1974, i.e. sixteen years ago, and as you can see, for quite a short time, for one-and-a-half years. If they had wanted, the editors along with A. Gorbachev could have avoided this slip (incidentally, it migrates from one newspaper to the next), and precisely for this reason I believe that here the point was stretched deliberately, with the purpose of creating the image of a former nuclear commander from the fleet depths, torpedoing the "military-industrial mafia in the Navy." And indeed, the author himself happily resorts to this false equivocality. In talking with the correspondent of PEREVAL, in particular, he asserts: "I have been analyzing the state of our Navy, with knowledge of my job, for almost twenty years. I began back before my admission to the Naval Academy. But I decided to acquaint the higher leadership of the country with the results of my observations and studies only in 1985. Why exactly 1985, I believe there is no need to explain—even a year earlier I would have been discharged from the Navy on the spot..."

Nevertheless I would like it to be explained to me: if it comes to that, what was it that prevented the Navy command from finding a plausible pretext for discharging the "disagreeable" officer to the reserve in that same year of 1985? Nevertheless Anatoliy Nikolayevich "left for a deserved rest" only a few years later, upon reaching the maximum age for his rank, 50 (as incidentally many thousands of Army and Navy officers). No sort of "observations and studies," attempts as he claims to convince in his day N.S. Khrushchev of the error of the decision not to construct aircraft carriers, prevented Gorbachev from climbing the steep service ladder, graduating from the Academy, and receiving an appointment to the highest level.

Now a captain 1st rank in the reserves, he "has set himself the goal of restoring the glorious Russian fleet, to which he has devoted all of his life and which is now in such a catastrophic state that one might as well sound a common 'SOS' for the combat vessels." Just what appraisal of the state of the fleet does this person give, who has devoted "all of his life" to it? A. Gorbachev says it is a "criminal lie" that the country has created a "mighty oceanic, missile-carrying, nuclear-powered, balanced Navy." He gloomily predicts that "The Navy is

not capable of truly defending the motherland (so it is in the text, uncapitalized—A.P.) In the event of the start of combat actions, our Navy is capable of resisting the adversary for mere days, and... we will lose everything. The adversary's Navy, on the other hand, will retain sufficient combat capability..." (It is interesting that Gorbachev imagines here some sort of phantasmagorical "war" of two navies in the style of the 17th century, without participation of other components of the armed forces of the warring states. In addition, it is common knowledge that the U.S. Navy surpasses our fleet in the number of large surface ships, naval amphibious forces, and in certain other parameters). Yet another unintelligible quote: "The leadership of the Navy orders that which at the given level of construction of ships is not required by the Navy or country, because these are ships which are known to be inferior to foreign analogues, incapable of a naval battle with the adversary." And later: "Calculations show that from a formation of ten submarines, only one might break through to an American aircraft carrier, in the best case..." (It is not clear why submarines with antiship missiles having a range of hundreds of kilometers would have to "break through" to the carriers). But the author has been carried away, so to speak: "Each voyage has demonstrated to the world the foolish noisiness of our nuclear submarines." "Those submarines which our state advertised do not meet the needs of the Navy, because they are noisy, deaf, and blind." "Each voyage under the ice shrieked of the extremely low technical equipment level of our nuclear combat vessels..." The reserve captain 1st rank also has his own views regarding air-capable ships of the "Tbilisi" type. Calling them the "fruit of deception of the people on a state scale," he heaps "proofs" on the reader: allegedly the strength of the "aircraft carrier" lies in its strike combat aircraft. Are our aircraft suited for this? They take off from the deck but stay so close that they are always visible from the home vessel. A. Gorbachev simply ignores in silence, which is much like deception, the fact that up-to-date fighters like the Su-27 and MiG-29, known today throughout the world for their flight and performance characteristics, will be based on those ships.

A. Gorbachev inquires ambiguously, "Today, do you understand what foreign military specialists meant when they once sarcastically noted that our Navy is not dangerous except perhaps to its own personnel?" I do not know to what specifically the author is referring (it is doubtful that any state would use the services of military specialists who represent the adversary as a weak fool). But as for the U.S. defense secretary, in his report to the President and Congress of 1990, he stressed that "at present U.S. forces face a Soviet Navy of comparable strength, possessing great combat capabilities." And the annual brochure "Soviet Military Power," published by the U.S. Department of Defense, says (I am citing the 9th edition of 1990): "Thanks to the adoption of more up-to-date weapons systems, command, control and communications systems, and other technical equipment, Soviet submarines and surface ships presently

under construction significantly surpass their predecessors in combat capabilities... New submarines, whose design features ensure a reduction in noise level and increase in diving depth, and their provision with diverse weapons systems and onboard apparatus, will raise the combat capabilities of Navy submarines even more... Equally impressive is the Soviet program for construction of surface ships. The program allows them to guarantee that in the coming century the USSR's Navy will have sufficient capabilities to combat surface ships and submarines..." One can relate to these statements in different ways, but these are the appraisals today of the persons who answer with their heads, so to speak, for the security of the U.S.

Does this mean that the Navy does not have defects or problems, and is not protected by a "three-hundred mile zone" from criticism and analysis by the public? No, of course not. The people have a right to know that in our complex times the Navy too is undergoing many difficulties. The only question is, what was it that resounded from the pages of certain publications, constructive criticism, profound analysis, or an unrestrained maliciousness? As follows from the articles, A. Gorbachev dreams of being an "independent expert" in naval affairs. Independent of what, objectivity?

#### **Floating Dock 'Anadyr' in Pacific Following Repair**

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[Article by Major S. Leonov BOYEVAYA VAKHTA correspondent in the column "More on the Topic": "The Cost of Dock Construction"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In the fall of 1988, the Navy commissioned the floating dock "Anadyr," which had been built in a foreign country for service in the Pacific Ocean Fleet. While the vessel was anchored in the Baltic, some of her machinery and systems fell into disrepair as a result of negligence on the part of the crew. This was discussed in a letter which the editorial office received from Captain 2nd Rank V. Gorlov (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 3 January 1990). Vice Admiral R. Paromov and Rear Admiral P. Kashauskas informed the editors that measures were taken to restore the floating dock. The officials who were found guilty of lack of responsibility and malfeasance have been disciplined, and the former commander, Captain 2nd Rank A. Korotkov, was relieved of his command (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 March 1990). What happened to the "Anadyr" after that?

It was necessary to repair the vessel once more in a foreign country (at a price, of course); the same vessel whose construction had cost the government several tens of millions of foreign-exchange rubles. Quite recently, after having traversed the Northern Sea Route, the "Anadyr" arrived at her station in the Pacific Ocean Fleet. The Navy had never previously had this kind of

vessel. Her length is 323 meters and displacement 27,000 tons; she has a 150-meter dock with a beam of 18 meters and height of 11 meters. The dock well, which is flooded in the amount of 6.5 meters, receives vessels with the respective draft. The craft is provided with a 120-ton crane for lift work. The speed of the "Anadyr" is 20 knots. The vessels capability of navigating in high latitudes says something about the craft. There is an enormous need for this kind of multipurpose vessel; it can pay for itself in a short period of time.

Nevertheless, it appears that it is easier to overcome eternal Arctic ice than our traditional lack of foresight. The crew underwent training under the supervision of representatives of the firms that built the vessel and her highly automated "goodies" only after it became necessary to dig deep into the pockets to pay extra for repairs. (Our "averaged" educational system is clearly inadequate to assure maintenance of superequipment.) Here again the matter was not carried all the way to completion: The firms' offer to produce videotapes for instruction purposes was turned down by the contract office. Only 50 percent of the spare gear and tools was acquired. It is understandable that the driving force behind this "strange" behavior was an attempt to economize on the use of foreign exchange, something that is in short supply in our country. However, what happens in practice is that we wind up paying twice for something every time. When will we learn how to do things the right way, from start to finish?

#### **Debate over Loss of 'Komsomolets' Continues**

91UM0157A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Dec 90 First Edition pp 3, 5

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Pilipchuk, deputy editor, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Navy Combat Training Department: "The Second Go-Around"; first paragraph is box insert]

[Text] Passions over the loss of the "Komsomolets" have not abated even after the state commission's conclusions.

The far-off Norwegian Sea, where the SSN "Komsomolets" sank after a fire on 7 April 1989, riveted the attention of the country's public for many months. Now and then the mass media would return to the coordinate point of the loss of the ship and 42 crew members. A state commission worked for one and a half years to clarify the circumstances and reasons for the tragedy. It completed its work and a brief announcement about its results was published in the central press. They were received ambiguously.

Not long ago a roundtable discussion devoted to the "Komsomolets" was held in Moscow. Several people's deputies of the USSR and RSFSR, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and SOBESEDNIK called themselves the initiators and emphasized: "We are not seeking a confrontation nor do we pursue the objective of casting doubt on the findings of the state commission.

whose work involved a wide range of specialists." But in the address to members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs adopted at the roundtable discussion, there were proposals to organize an additional in-depth investigation of the causes and circumstances of the loss of the "Komsomolets" and to form under parliamentary committees a group of experts made up of independent specialists with the objective of studying and analyzing the actual state of affairs in the Navy, with a subsequent examination of results and proposals in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

A meeting of former "Komsomolets" crew members and of friends and relatives of the deceased submariners with representatives of the state commission was held in Leningrad following the roundtable discussion. And here certain USSR deputies attending the meeting, particularly SOBESEDNIK Deputy Chief Editor A. Yemelyanenko, cast doubt on results of the one and a half years of commission work. One necessarily wonders why the spring is being wound with such persistence for the "second go-around" of the hullabaloo over the tragedy?

It is apropos here to cast a retrospective glance at writings about the "Komsomolets." "The true reason for what happened is hidden now not just by a thick layer of water. It is difficult to get to for now. A government commission is working which is to dot all the i's, but the fact is that everyone involved in the tragedy is leaving his own punctuation marks in this story: they are basically question marks for now," wrote SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA (now RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA) correspondent Adel Kalinichenko. Only two weeks had gone by since the loss of the "Komsomolets," and many journalists were bringing a footnote "into the margins" of their first articles: final conclusions are premature before completion of the commission's work...

While specialists empowered by the government painstakingly put together an integral picture of what happened from the mosaic of scattered and at times contradictory information, writings appeared in the pages of some newspapers in which journalists attempted to find their own key to solving the nuclear-powered submarine's loss, preempting the state commission's conclusions. It is curious that on 11 April KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Sagaydak reported from London: "Conjectures which the press splashed on their pages a great deal on Saturday have been replaced by commentaries of specialists." Can a more paradoxical situation be imagined? It was KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA that preferred "imported" fabrications to specialists' commentaries by including excerpts from the German journal STERN. The performance characteristics of a certain submarine borrowed from there had nothing to do at all with the lost SSN, but the newspaper hastened to take a "tracing" from them without troubling itself to check.

Inaccuracies naturally were inevitable and perhaps partly excusable in that pattern with which the journalists covered the first act of the tragedy, but definitely not the deliberately false references, profoundly incompetent opinions and unconscientious calculations based on which some journalists attempted to recreate in the readers' minds their own version of what happened (a rather detailed list of factual inaccuracies in writings about the "Komsomolets" already was cited in the interview of CinC Navy, Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 13 May of last year and there is no need to repeat it). And it was quite inappropriate to "relay" all kinds of rumors. In the 18th issue of SOBESEDNIK journalist V. Yunisov wrote: "Even now, two weeks later, the city of Severomorsk is living only on rumors, suppositions and surmises about the true reasons for the submarine's loss. The versions are quite varied, including incredible ones hard to believe even for a non-Navy person, such as the following: allegedly the submarine was especially sunk out of fear of its secrets being discovered by Norwegian and Dutch aerial reconnaissance aircraft." In December of last year KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA started another far from inoffensive false rumor that the Sevryba Association allegedly undertook to bargain with the Navy about payment for rescue work. Why did the youth newspaper and its annex need to gather those kinds of fabrications surrounding the "Komsomolets"? An analysis of numerous items by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and SOBESEDNIK persuades one that this youth "tandem" were putting in their "punctuation marks" from the very beginning: the Navy allegedly is attempting to hide the traces, to find the end one and heap all the blame on him...

"Why did the Northern Fleet leadership so carefully sidestep questions about the crew's training, the personnel's professional proficiency and their ability to perform damage control? The fact is, herein lies the original cause of the tragedy..." wrote A. Yemelyanenko in SOBESEDNIK. The verdict of the crew's guilt handed down long before the end of the commission's work reflects the author's position, which he occupied in the triangle "of those who designed the first deep-diving submarine and who built her, those who performed combat service aboard the ship, and those to whom it fell to survive in the icy hell of the Norwegian Sea..." In fact truly a "Bermuda Triangle" was created—industry, Fleet, crew—within which truth risked going to the bottom without a trace if each of the parties listened only to itself. And such a danger existed. On 15 March of this year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote: "The persons with whose help the viewpoint of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is being formed belong to one interested party and, alas, one opposing the Navy. D. Romanov is deputy chief designer of the submarine Komsomolets, V. Chuvakin is the responsible deliverer of this project, and E. Leonov is the delivery engineer..."

To find a "field of agreement," to deeply uncover all circumstances and reasons for the ship's loss, and to



audit the status of our shipbuilding and the system of training submariners to operate and service nuclear equipment was in fact the task that faced the state commission. It included scientists, designers, developers, military specialists and people's deputies. Many thousands of people, ministries, departments, scientific research establishments, and production and military collectives were drawn into the orbit of commission activity. Hundreds of thousands of rubles from the Navy's budget were spent on experiments, tests and expert opinions. The commission arrived at conclusions to which it objectively could not help but arrive: the flame of a hellish fire threw its ominous reflections both on the creators of naval equipment as well as on those who are left one-on-one with it in the ocean, both on creators of individual and collective survival aids as well as on the country's search and rescue services. In familiarizing journalists with preliminary results of the commission's work, Cochairman O. Baklanov emphasized that during the investigation the specialists found an entire series of technical imperfections in various systems of the submarine which contributed to the accident. Many questions arose concerning manpower acquisition and training of submariners. Serious deficiencies were noted in the organization of the rescue service. Joint decisions of the Navy, Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry and USSR MVD were made based on results of the commission's work about improving submarine fire protection and about fulfilling priority measures aimed at increasing submarine survivability. A special government decree came out on measures for improving survivability and ensuring accident-free operation of Navy ships and vessels. These documents extend not only to ships being designed, but also to submariners under construction, under repair, and in the Navy order of battle. A plan of measures was drawn up and is being implemented in the Navy to improve specialized training and damage control training of personnel. No one in the world ever before proposed another shorter and easier path to preventing accidents at sea lying to one side of a symbiosis of design solutions, technological capabilities and the human factor.

Then why even today does the titanium hull of the "Komsomolets," which burned right through in a terrible fire, attract certain journalists, people's deputies, and reserve officers and admirals to itself like a magnet? To attempt to answer this question it is necessary to return to one publication of long ago. On 3 May 1989 LITERATURNAYA GAZETA contained a query by USSR People's Deputy Gavriil Popov to the Minister of Defense: "As a USSR People's Deputy I request you answer the following questions: What (by hours) did the Ministry of Defense do in the period when the crew was fighting for the submarine? Or—as in the Rust flight—did a number of hours again prove insufficient for our staff apparatus? Why were life rafts dropped from aircraft? Are there really no reliable means aboard the submarine herself? How many persons died aboard the submarine and how many drowned or froze in the water? Does our Army have aircraft capable of landing on the

water? When was the command given to the crew to abandon the submarine? Why did the crew begin to abandon the submarine only in a supercritical situation?"

I will remind you that it was May 1989 on the calendar. Dozens of writings devoted to the "Komsomolets" already had appeared in the press. The names of all crew members and circumstances of the loss of each of the 42 submariners had become known to the country. Excerpts from the ship's log had been published, beginning with the moment of the fire's outbreak and up to the minute when the "Komsomolets" went under. The dramatic episodes connected with the use of survival aids, from a surfacing chamber to aviation rafts, also had become the property of the press. Much other information also went the rounds of newspaper pages (the Minister of Defense specifically directed G. Popov's attention to this circumstance in his responses published in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA). Just what practical need was there in a deputy's query broadcast through the press, the more so as conversance with what happened and a clearly set bias in the approach to it could be seen in the wordings of the questions themselves?

I am sure that the tragedy of the "Komsomolets" is being used for quite specific purposes by a group of people who do not always have even an indirect relationship with the Army and Navy. The decision to link their name with the "bombastic proceedings against Army and Navy departments" is dictated above all by the desire to get into the focus of public attention. It is far from a new technique. This essentially is the usual practice of foreign democrats which we are importing into the country because of a lengthy absence of our own democracy—the desire to take advantage of "Watergates" and natural disasters, the government's defense programs and scandals over conjugal infidelity of the strong of this world, an increase in taxes and an electoral district rival's predisposition to heavy drinking to achieve our own political objectives.

Our own political activity also brings such examples to us more and more often: someone makes points in attempting to leave the Navy without the most modern component, air-capable ships; someone strives for immediate depoliticization and removal of the party from the Army; someone defends with might and main our unilateral cessation of nuclear weapon testing (let the United States, France, England, China and others test them—their people are more complacent); someone vigilantly follows the movement of airborne units in readiness to shout: "Call out the guard! Military coup!"

In casting a gaze today around the "combat formations" of different political forces and currents, one cannot help but notice "specialists on the Army and Navy" in their formation whose duties include a purposeful campaign against the Armed Forces. The destiny and problems of the Army and Navy are merely a background against which they are playing "their own card." Take the position of Yemelyanenko. Of course the deputy chief editor of a youth publication has the right to select as his



"main" topic, let us say, not problems of the rural youth or pupils of vocational-technical schools, not rejuvenated crime and prostitution, but the tragedy of a nuclear submarine in high latitudes. But why, in his newspaper "martyrologies" of the lost "Komsomolets," are the author's sympathies noticeably given to designers and builders of the ship, while the crew is given the role of a sacrifice of its own lack of training? The situation nevertheless probably will become clearer if we take one circumstance into account: many members of the production collective that built the deep-diving nuclear submarine are among electors of the people's deputy.

At one time a "standard" set of names—Capt 1st Rank (Res) A. Gorbachev, Capt 1st Rank (Res) I. Kolton, Capt 2nd Rank (Res) G. Melkov—appeared in the press... Not having found even one from among present submarine commanders who would hasten to cast a stone at his lifelong job, some mass media almost used carbon-paper in duplicating statements of former officers who, despite reality, drew apocalyptic pictures of the "end of the Navy." It is noteworthy that all three were presented to the readers as "submarine commanders of the recent past" (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 18 July 1989). This high-flown introduction has nothing in common with the truth. First of all, Kolton was an engineer officer in the distant past and simply could not be a ship commander. Secondly, Gorbachev commanded a nuclear submarine over 16 years ago and for only one and a half years. (He once sideswiped a neighboring nuclear submarine with his ship during mooring and put her out of commission for a long time. He subsequently was given an opportunity to continue serving in positions not connected with shiphandling.) Just why are positions which they did not hold or credit for fighting accidents in the Navy which they did not receive insistently ascribed to officers who went into the reserve long ago? For one purpose only—to create an image of people to whom society should entrust control over the Navy as "independent experts."

At the height of the state commission's work the "Analysis of Actions by Personnel of the Submarine Komsomolets During Damage Control in the Norwegian Sea on 7 April 1989" came to light. Its author was then Naval Academy Deputy Chief Vice Admiral Ye. Chernov. Materials of the analysis are secret, but Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich "disclosed" his chief conclusion in the press: design deficiencies on the SSN were not the cause of the accident which occurred aboard ship, the "exceptionally poorly trained second crew" was at fault for the tragic outcome." But the fact is that for a long time Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich commanded the large strategic formation which included the "Komsomolets," headed a board for experimental operation of the deep-diving nuclear submarine, and bore responsibility both for identifying and remedying design deficiencies as well as for the high organization of training of both submarine crews. In one talk with a journalist, Chernov expressed his conviction that "a professional critique should remain in the circle of professionals." But nevertheless

he himself seeks a broad (which means least informed) audience to publicize his "special opinion": the most unsinkable submarine in the world was sunk by the crew.

Categorical statements were heard at a roundtable discussion: the state of affairs in the Navy today allegedly cannot satisfy the public and the Navy. Whose lips for the umpteenth time said "the public and the Navy"? Among participants of the meeting were Ye. Chernov, A. Gorbachev, I. Kolton, G. Melkov, Capt 1st Rank Ye. Selivanov (in 1984 a fire occurred aboard the submarine which he commanded; the commander's fault for a violation of fire safety measures by the personnel was proven), responsible deliverer of the "Komsomolets" V. Chuvakin, "Komsomolets" delivery engineer E. Leonov, and journalists A. Yemelyanenko and V. Yunisov... All familiar faces, as they say. The initiators of the meeting lodged a complaint that the Navy command did not deem it necessary to take part in preparing and conducting this meeting. In fact the Navy refused to participate in another measure organized already after the commission's findings. I do not assert that this is the best decision, but regardless of the reasons the organizers did not succeed in reaching a "quorum," and it was hardly correct to adopt an appeal to parliamentarians also on behalf of "submarine officers . . . and relatives of the deceased navymen" (the mother of only one of the deceased navymen attended the meeting, and she did not wholly share the viewpoint of those assembled). It is true, such a substitution of concepts is nothing unusual now: passing oneself off as a spokesperson of public opinion but striving specifically for the opposite objective—forming such opinion in the direction one needs. Detached attention to acute problems facing the Navy only gratifies, but what did the latest discussion produce? A proposal to create yet another "comprehensive group of experts made up of independent specialists"? This inclination in the work of various representatives of the "general public" to play detective—to investigate and expose "internal enemies"—already has fairly well palled on everyone with its futility.

Implementing the state commission's conclusions and government decisions addressed to the Navy and industry demands no small efforts and means, which moreover have to be found. Under these conditions resuscitating views on the tragedy in the Norwegian Sea as extreme as fire and water and inflaming the passions again means substituting logomachy for practical work.

#### Recovery of Precious Metals from Black Sea Vessels

91UM0168A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel of Justice A. Saushkin: "Priceless Waste"]

[Text] The Military Procurement, together with the Gokhrana [USSR State Administration for Preservation

of Valuables], conducted an audit to determine how precious metals were stored, inventoried, and disposed of in military units, organizations, and in the Black Sea fleet yards. What were the results of this audit?

Honestly speaking, the results are just depressing. Since 1982, the Naval Aviation stores facilities, for instance, have accumulated 260 grams of gold, 456 grams of platinum, and over 4.5 kg of silver, to the total sum of 84,000 rubles [R] in the items that they wrote off.

But this is what they call chicken-feed compared to the "collection" in one of the underwater ordnance units. They found over a thousand sets of depleted battery cells there. They contain a large amount of silver and so many new battery cells could have been made out of these!

A matter for a special concern is the situation concerning ships that are to be sold to foreign firms. Precious metals disappear together with precious alloys, so needed by our home industry, as they are not removed completely from the ships.

A similar practice of neglecting our people's assets can be observed as they remove equipment from ships that then are sent to the ship-repair yards. Units and instruments that contain precious metals are removed and left without any accounting. Various equipment, taken off the ASW Cruiser Moskva and the Admiral Golovko Guided Missile Cruiser alone, was stored for years unprotected on the yard territory. As it turned out, the equipment was not registered anywhere. Meanwhile, it

contained 63.15 grams of gold, 86 grams of platinum, and over 34 kg of silver, to the total sum of over R284,000.

Violations of this nature are made possible by the absence of any permanent stations in the fleet where equipment and instruments can be dismantled; they are also helped by lack of supervision from the superior headquarters and flag specialists, and by the absence of any reference to the precious metal content in the equipment certificates. Another reason for the violations may be the disinterested approach displayed sometimes by the supply organs (technical administration, hydrographic service, underwater ordnance sector, and other organizations) as they issue documents verifying the disposal of the dismantled equipment, as well as their closing of accounts.

According to the audit results, the Military Procurator ordered nine unit commanders and organization managers to stop violations of the law. Some of the people who had to make a deposition about the reasons of the precious metals incorrect storage and accounting are: Captain 3rd Rank V. Levoshkin, assistant manager of the engineering department, Captains 2nd Rank V. Kutyin, I. Snegirev, and V. Borisov, flag specialists, and Chemical Engineer I. Rusina. The fleet commander in chief issued an official reprimand to Colonels V. Polyakov and B. Nabilkov, Lieutenant Colonel V. Maystruk, and some other officials.

### Liberal Military Reformers Attacked as Dilettantes, Conspirators

91UM0127A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 11 Nov 90 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[Letter to chief editor and article by Captain 1st Rank A. V. Bobrakov, deputy chief of Naval Engineering School imeni V. I. Lenin: "Conspiracy of Dilettantes, or What Kind of Army Do We Need?"]

[Text] *It seems I have found "my" newspaper! SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA seemingly does not call us to "wild capitalism" and lives up to its name. My article "Well Just What Hinders Fulfilling the Law?" which you published on 21 October generated approval and support from cadets to naval veterans. Thank you very much!*

*Allow me to present certain considerations for your judgement about the destiny of the state's backbone, the USSR Armed Forces. Since I am taking a dig at our officers, let me introduce myself. I have been ashore only two years; prior to that I spent 23 years afloat without a single break. I began as a helmsman-signalman aboard a Pacific Fleet submarine in 1959. My last positions before going ashore were as commander of a destroyer brigade and chief of staff of a formation of Baltic Fleet amphibious landing forces.*

*Respectfully,*

*Captain 1st Rank A. V. Bobrakov  
Deputy Chief, Naval Engineering School imeni V. I. Lenin*

In the not-too-distant past many who spoke out in the press, on radio and on television in our country had a very good understanding of agriculture and soccer and offered wise advice. Having made a mess of both once and for all, now it seems they have switched to the Armed Forces... It is common knowledge that neither the people themselves who sound the call to go to the village and lease land nor their children plan to leave comfortable apartments in the city and do not intend to work in the field from sunup to sunset. And so it is with all "specialist"-advisers on the Armed Forces: they either have not served in the Army or they hope that their children will avoid this service.

One can understand the ignoramus or his mama who discuss the needlessness of service to the homeland in fine, clever words, since their sole objective is to shirk difficulties. One also can understand deputies who have freed students from callup. They are thinking about their sons and wish to spare them from the burdens of civilian obligation. I am sure that none of those who speak out for establishing a "small professional army" plan to go become a soldier, swallow dust in a tank or get sick from a ship's motion. This will be the lot of village lads from Russia's deserted villages.

One can excuse nonmilitary people for the imprecise term "professional army," although it is clear what they

have in mind: abolishment of universal military obligation and introduction of a voluntary principle of Army manpower acquisition. One step has been taken along this path: evasion of service to the homeland has been legitimized above all for children of the rich and the powers that be, since it is incomparably easier for the son of a professor or restaurant director to become a student than it is for the son of a Ryazan peasant woman.

By the way, the government which has come to power in Lithuania, which cannot be called anything other than bourgeois, complains that the majority of the 900 Lithuanian young men called into the Army this spring were peasants...

Even earlier, children of the powers that be did not always serve, but this was illegal as it were. In 30 years I have not found a single high official's son among the seamen. There was one son of an oblast committee second secretary, but even that one was sent to the Fleet by his papa for re-education. In short, behind the fine phrases about concern for the destiny of the country and Army can be seen an egotistical interest to spare oneself and one's children from obligation to the state and a desire to place it on someone else, on that same mythical volunteer.

But it is surprising when military people count on volunteers. Thoughts creep in: Are there officers under the uniforms of professionals? In 1918 we already tried to get by with volunteers in the Red Army, having forgotten that war kills and a soldier's life at the front is measured not in years, but in days.

When I saw a major in a black uniform with blue central stripes on his shoulderboards speaking on the television screen for the first time, I thought: "Good lad, a naval pilot! A bold person! But the fact that he reasons about a professional army like a dilettante—well, what can be gotten from him, a pilot? Apparently not a commander. It is clear that both the pilot and the aircraft technician must be professionals, but in flight the ego forgets that an airfield has to be guarded, snow has to be removed in winter and there is much more that is routine but has to be done."

I recalled a scene from one American movie about the destiny of soldiers returning from the war in 1945: a handsome captain, a fighter pilot, his chest all covered with medals, is being hired for a job. The firm's manager says: "Oh, we need officers. How many subordinates did you have?"

The Air Force captain: "What do you mean, subordinates? I was alone in the sky."

"Excuse me, we don't have any work for you."

Pragmatic Americans learned long ago that the ability to manage people is the most difficult of all the arts, takes a long time to acquire, and is costly.

When I learned that Major Lopatin was not a navyman although he wore a black uniform, that he was not a pilot

although his shoulderboards had blue central stripes, and that he was not a commander, i.e., he never had a single first-term serviceman subordinate to him, then the sources of his dilettante speeches became understandable. But one thing is disturbing: the direction of the incompetence.

In substantiating some kind of idea, Major Lopatin quotes the kind of facts or figures which one does not even suspect, but he gets by with concepts unacceptable in calculations such as "many," "few," "small forces" and so on. But he knows for certain that according to data of the London Institute of Strategic Studies our country's draft contingent is two million young men a year, of whom, if we are to believe S. Shenkman (PRAVDA, 3 July 1990, "Who is Responsible for Our Health?"), half are unhealthy.

Occupying a sixth of the world's inhabited land, it is clearly unrealistic for the Soviet Union to have an army of 550,000 such as the FRG. And if we have at least two million in the Army, i.e., less than the United States, then manning it necessitates calling up all healthy men of draft age to the last one. But there still is the MVD and security of the longest land border in the world. Every commander would like to have subordinates with a lengthy term of service—having taught them once, then just maintain skills. That is not what we have now—begin with "zero" every year. One wishes for a great deal, but it is necessary to be realists.

In discussing military reform, the dilettantes completely forget the experience of the Russian and Soviet Army and that of armies of other world countries. They prefer to speak about all-volunteer armies of the United States and England, island states according to geographic position, and do not wish to take what is useful from armies of France and the FRG, manned according to a mixed principle. And they especially do not wish to see one of the most combat-effective armies of the world, the Israeli Army, manned according to the principle of universal military obligation and including women, i.e., this is an Army of citizens and not mercenaries.

The 28th CPSU Congress came out in favor of a mixed principle of manpower acquisition, and this is sensible.

Democracy and strictness of laws made more than one state powerful, but now people have appeared even among our officers with doubts: Is a commander's order mandatory for subordinates? And they reason that one must first think about whether it is worthwhile fulfilling the order, whether it meets demands of democracy and pluralism; doubts of that sort sown in 1937 in the form "Was it a traitor's order that the commander issued?" produced millions of Red Army prisoners of war in 1941.

You listen to what kind of a nightingale that same major-eagle, who has flown to the States and back, sings like, and you begin to have doubts about something else: Is this dilettantism or a well thought out line toward corrupting our Armed Forces?

We have enough officials and departments in our Army and Navy who live according to Bernard Shaw's saying about the system: "He who can, does. He who cannot, teaches." I was taught rather often (after sea cruises, of course) how to handle a ship correctly specifically by those who never had commanded a ship; I was taught how to educate seamen specifically by those who themselves personally never did this. And again, those who themselves had been responsible all their lives only for their own briefcase sounded a call for responsibility and evaluated official activity. The impression that forms is that these people already are teaching the entire country. There is witty deception contained even in their favorite term "professional army."

Comrades, ladies and gentlemen, you who have signed on for work voluntarily and who receive money for this! Look around you! Do you see many professionals around you, i.e., masters of their affairs? A few individuals. More often you will see average ones within a limited range, or even simply the inept, lazy or drunk. So that manning the Armed Forces only with volunteers still is no guarantee of creating a highly professional army. In order to truly have professionals of a high class it is necessary above all to have a special training system and an absolutely new Army and Navy structure.

By the way, for some reason I didn't hear specific proposals in the military reform concept from Major Lopatin and other reformers.

It is high time to put a stop to the offensive of the dilettantes or of those who control them. The dilettante is not as inoffensive as he may appear at first glance. It was Plato who affirmed that the accumulation of incorrect knowledge is more dangerous than total ignorance. Begin at least by repealing the law on the virtual release of students from service—it is not in the interests of all people, but is a class, anti-village law. Yes, it is stupid to interrupt studies. Therefore those who already have served in the Army should be trained as reserve officers; those who have not served before the institute should be trained as junior commanders, and let them serve after the institute. The law on universal military obligation must be equal for everyone without exception.

Now even the "In Service to the Homeland" television broadcast generously presents an opportunity even for pupils and "refuseniks" to reflect on military reform, but it ignores the professionals. For example, I have experience in employing guns and surface-to-air and cruise missiles, I fire all kinds of small arms in the air and underwater, I can control a missile craft, small guided missile ship, destroyer and landing ship; perhaps the television people also will permit me to say a word about military reform, or can only Major Lopatin speak about it? It turns out that it is advantageous for someone to arrange the "discussions" in this way. For whom? For whom our one-sided glasnost? In analyzing statements in the press, on television and from various rostrums by



supporters of a "professional" army as well as those who revile the Army and the state, one arrives willy-nilly at the following conclusions:

1. A system of various forces has appeared that is united by the objective of seizing power in the interests of the rich. Revelation of the complexities of the alliance and mutual struggle of the old nomenklatura "boyars," the new "nobility," and the "old" and "new" moneybags is a separate issue.

2. An external threat is absent for these forces, since they have no ideological differences with the world of capital, and from an economic standpoint it is cheaper for imperialism to rake out Russia's riches by the hands of its own residents in exchange for green papers which can be additionally printed in the United States... Cheap labor, cheap raw materials, and an assemblage of individuals who are resentful but who worship the foreigners and hate each other for motives of the full spectrum of differences existing among people in nature (language, color of eyes, place of residence and so on)—how is this not an ideal colony? Why send one's soldiers there as well?

3. Consequently, the existing Army is not needed by these forces either for its makeup and structure or for personal qualities; most important, it is not needed with that officer corps which was educated by the Communist Party. Military reform also is essentially unnecessary. They do not need an army of citizens, an army of patriots who have honor! It is not for nothing that the point of the attack against the Army is directed against officers.

4. Since these forces reflect the interests of big money, they need a small, all-volunteer army for internal use, for ill-gotten money has to be protected, and a mercenary has that very ideology which they need... I would like to remind those who attack our Army not out of malice that the republic in Ancient Rome fell when mercenaries replaced free citizens of Rome in the Legions.

So the establishment of "their own" armies in Estonia, Lithuania, Armenia and other regions has a clear-cut class objective, and all the rest is a consequence or screen, a camouflage. "Democrats," "leftists" and so on all have the opposite meaning. They camouflage the pilfering of national wealth to private apartments by the foreign word "privatization" and they dream of providing for themselves for many generations ahead. Either people do not know what they are doing or those who know what they are doing have not completely figured out the consequences of their actions.

Seventy-three years of October cannot be tossed out. They are in people's awareness, habits, and psychology. That overwhelming part of the people which lives from

paycheck to paycheck will not extend its hand to the new bourgeoisie for alms. It will extend a fist. The Russian bourgeoisie always was selfishly near-sighted, for which it paid in 1917. Has it forgotten the lessons of October?

#### **Response to Reader on Officers' Trade Union**

91UM01994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Dec 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Captain Second Rank V. Urban, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA parliamentary correspondent: "Do the Officers Need a Trade Union?"]

[Text] Recently the Supreme Soviet adopted a law on trade unions and the rights and guarantees of their activity. I watched on television the segments of the meeting where they were deciding the issue of trade unions for servicemen, but I had a hard time understanding what positions the deputies were taking and what the parliament decided on for the final version.

Senior Lieutenant N. Safonov.

#### **Captain Second Rank V. Urban, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA parliamentary correspondent:**

The draft of the aforementioned law, which has been submitted for a second reading, has two articles affecting servicemen.

There was heated discussion. Article 2 of the draft law was discussed first. USSR People's Deputies V. Kulikov, N. Tutov, N. Medvedev, I. Zelinskiy, V. Shabanov, and others expressed their points of view.

The opinion of the deputies was divided. On the one hand, Deputy V. Shabanov declared that "life in the military cannot proceed according to two sets of regulations: The regulations of the Armed Forces and the regulations of the trade union." On the other hand, Deputy N. Tutov expressed a different point of view: He fought for the creation of trade unions in the Armed Forces.

In the name of the government, V. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, requested that the provision on the right of command and enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces and other formations to create trade unions be excluded from the draft law. In his opinion, it could be examined in the future.

In the legislative act adopted by the Supreme Soviet, it is stressed that "the particulars for applying this law in the USSR Armed Forces, organs of internal affairs, USSR KGB, internal and railroad forces, and other formations are defined by the legislation of these formations."

### Rail Freight Handling In Moscow MD

91UM0108A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
14 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Maj Gen Ye. Sorokin by Col. (Res.) F. Semyanovskiy: "Down Time Is Down"]

[Text] One of the most urgent problems hampering the normal operation of railroad transport is the excessive down time of thousands of cars awaiting unloading.

How is it resolved in the Moscow Military District? This question began the conversation with the Chief of the Military Transportation Service of the district, Maj Gen Ye. Sorokin.

[Sorokin] First of all I should say that the Armed Forces do not have their own rolling stock. We are given rail cars by the Ministry of Railroads in accordance with the corresponding requests. We and other departments bear our share of responsibility for their timely unloading, and the strict sanctions for excessive down time of rail cars apply to us in full.

I can say with satisfaction that despite the stiffening of the demands imposed this year, fines in the district units for the ten months were down 0.3 percent. By way of comparison, for the Moscow Railroad they increased by 81 percent in this time and amounted to 35 million rubles.

[Semyanovskiy] How did you manage this?

[Sorokin] We imposed strict day-by-day monitoring, and we made extensive use of computers for this purpose. In this way we can make a more detailed analysis of every unit, directorate, and service for each railroad on the territory of the district, and immediately correct bottlenecks.

We are also introducing systematic analysis of how things stand with respect to the use of freight rail transport in units and organizations located on the territory of the district. Then the corresponding directorates and heads receive telegrams and letters from us discussing the specific facts and recommendations. At times we also have to make representations to the organs of the military procuracy.

In short, we have developed a kind of information service. Here it is especially important that the information is preventive in nature, in order that the commanders and chiefs are able to know ahead of time how many cars are entering their jurisdiction with what loads.

[Semyanovskiy] And how are relations between officers of the military transportation service and the commanders of units and heads of organizations and institutions?

[Sorokin] We strive to ensure that in his relations with the commanders and chiefs, each of the service officers acts like a professional, that he does not simply monitor, but is ready to suggest a particular plan of action, and to help in organization of the loading and unloading of cars in order to ensure accomplishment of the work schedule. There is one important characteristic feature here. Our officers are active intermediaries between the administration of the railroad stations and the command of the corresponding units, organizations, and institutions. It is no secret that tense situations, which at times proliferate into conflicts, arise precisely at this nexus.

Things are more difficult in the construction and quarters and utility organizations of the district. They receive large quantities of the most diverse construction materials, which must be unloaded without specially equipped yards and the necessary mechanized equipment. And then a tense situation is created when fines are about to be imposed. For this reason, our officers are required to show efficiency, calm, and persistence in such situations. Colonel A. Zemskov and Majors I. Avramenko, P. Dvoretzkiy, and others organize the work with just such ability.

[Semyanovskiy] In your view, what problems of the service have still not been resolved?

[Sorokin] I would first mention a problem in the moral context. Unfortunately not all the officers of units, organizations, and institutions here are imbued with a sense of responsibility, or have realized the state importance of the tasks of ensuring precise organization of loading and unloading operations.

It is especially distressing that the facilities for accomplishment of the loading and unloading operations are poorly developed. We have repeatedly proposed to the corresponding commanders and chiefs that they acquire the necessary mechanisms and transporters, etc. Incidentally, amateur innovation work in our service has been directed toward this area. Some innovations, e.g. for securing combat equipment to flatcars, for unloading cars, etc., are being successfully introduced into practice.

It goes without saying that this does not exhaust the list of problems which concern us. There are still many untapped resources that could improve our work and reduce the down time of rail cars to a minimum.

**RSFSR Education Ministry Curtailing Pre-Draft Training**

91UM0095C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 10 Nov 90 First Edition p 6

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col A. Plotnikov: "The Future Soldier, Politics, and Money"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] On 12 June 1990, the USSR minister of defense and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education signed the order entitled "Improvement of Pre-Draft Training of Secondary School Students."

The above date marked the origin of a new name - pre-draft training - for basic military training of youth that had been introduced into schools in 1968 in connection with the shortened term of service for noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel. It was suggested that new forms and methods of organizing the training of youth for active duty be installed in teaching collectives of general schools, specialized vocational and technical schools, secondary-level specialized schools, gymnasiums, and lycea. A cardinal feature was the granting of schools independence, initiative, and the opportunity to employ exploratory approaches to accomplishing this task of national importance.

However, the "independence" and "initiative" aspects turned out to be troublesome for military training officers. The editorial office became aware of this by virtue of the greater number of letters it received. Examples follow.

"The order states that reductions should be made in military officer positions in training centers of schools where youths undergo pre-draft training, and that the wage fund should be turned over to local public education organs.

"Dear leaders in Moscow, does it not seem to you that with the general state of chaos the country is experiencing, action will be taken everywhere to cut out this category of schoolteacher? Perhaps we should start leaving of our own accord, without waiting until we are booted out!" (Reserve Senior Lieutenant V. Korenkov)

"The decision to administer pre-draft training of youth in schools and training centers will undoubtedly encourage local leaders to curtail this kind of training, eliminating the training structure we worked so hard to create." (Reserve Major N. Klimov)

With time, the feelings aroused by the above seemed to cool down. I noticed that during my temporary duty in Voronezh Oblast.

"Some of our military training officers were ready to quit immediately," said Military Commissar Major General V. Klochkov. "However, workers of the military commissariat and public education administration talked them into staying. It was then decided to follow the old

program to train youths for active military service in the 11th grade, but employ the new program in the 10th grade, in compliance with the order issued by the USSR minister of defense and State Education Committee chairman."

After spending some time in a few schools in Georgiudezh, it became plain to me that the military training officers were going about their job as usual. There was a good training facility, in which pre-draft training was set up to be interesting and effective.

One month later, the editorial office received a telephone call.

"I am the president of the Moscow Military Training Officer Club. My name is Konstantin Nikolayavich Davydov," I heard a disturbed voice say. "Are you aware that Order No 62 of 17 October, which was signed by two deputy education ministers of the RSFSR, virtually puts an end to pre-draft training of secondary-school students in the Russian Republic?"

On that very day, I met with Colonel V. Bogdanov, who is deputy chief of a directorate in the Main Staff of the Ground Forces. He informed me that on 2 October a deputy public education minister of the RSFSR, Ye. Kurkin, sent a request to public education administrations of the republic, krais, and oblasts, which I quote below.

"I request that you telegraph me: your opinion regarding elimination of pre-draft training in general schools and in vocational and technical schools; number of military training officers functioning and the possibility of reassigning them to other jobs in the school system; suggestions for utilizing the hours previously earmarked for pre-draft training; salaries of military training officers; number of vacant slots; use of discretionary time in schools."

In two weeks' time, i.e., on 17 October 1990, Order No 62 was signed. It did indeed have the purpose of curtailing pre-draft training in schools. In the final analysis, this Russian ministry had no great desire to solicit public opinion regarding the given problem. However, the Main Staff of the Ground Forces continue to receive telegrams from all corners of Russia.

"...We consider it wise to continue offering pre-draft training..." (Public Education Administration, Kaluga Oblast)

"... We stand against eliminating pre-draft training..." (Public Education Administration, Ulyanovsk Oblast)

"... Pre-draft training is a vital necessity..." (Ministry of Public Education, Kabardin-Balkar ASSR)

"... Decision made by RSFSR Ministry of Education regarding elimination of pre-draft training was premature..." (Ministry of Public Education, Mari ASSR)

I wonder what use the above letters can serve, considering that the following document "flitted out" of the ministry:

"...Until Article 17 of the Law on Universal Military Obligation is abolished, pre-draft training is to be administered by holding training sessions at defense-oriented sports and health camps during school time...School principals are to utilize the training facilities set up for pre-draft training to organize mass sports work. Special-purpose equipment and weapons are to be turned over to military commissariats or specialized sports organizations. Military-oriented training aids and materials are to be removed from yards."

"Even now there is a shortage of defense-oriented sports camps," said Colonel V. Bogdanov. "No teachers' collective will give up any school time in spring—during the examination period—to conduct training sessions. This really means the end of pre-draft training. Military training officers worked for decades to set up a training base; this cost enterprises enormous means and enthusiasts incredible efforts. What are we to do now, set up a new training base? The idea here, of course, is not to keep anything; just throw everything away."

Not long after that, I had the opportunity of meeting with Gennadiy Alekseyevich Yagodin, the chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education. I asked him questions, one of which was the following:

"What do you think about Order No 62 issued by the RSFSR Ministry of Education?"

After he explained the nature of the document, he gave the following answer:

"That is a right of the sovereign republic."

"Yes, but quite recently you and the USSR minister of defense signed the order 'Improvement of Pre-Draft Training of Secondary-School Students,'" I told him.

"The purpose of our order is to make recommendations. Executive functions lie within the purview of local organs of authority and school administrators," he answered.

I later related the above conversation to the president of the Moscow Military Training Officer Club.

"Then why was it necessary to issue a union-wide order?" complained Davydov. "The fact is, it just does not make any sense."

Incidentally, Konstantin Nikolayevich Davydov is one of the signers of letters sent to M. Gorbachev, B. Yeltsin, and I. Silayev. In the letters it was asked if someone could please do something about the problem. So far there has been no response from anyone. They evidently have no time. That is why I asked Davydov the question:

"Have you seen Deputy USSR Education Minister Kurkin about this?"

"Yes," he answered. "I even asked him, 'What instigated the decision?' He answered, 'Money and politics.'"

What a fine kettle of fish, I thought. An anti-military campaign that was waged in some areas of the mass media, particularly the UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA, first spilled out onto the streets, then turned into hysteria at a congress of soldiers's mothers, culminating in ill-advised "military" decisions on the part of certain sovereign republics, going so far as to influence the Russian Ministry of Education. What can you do when the entire matter boils down to a struggle for power and everything connected thereto. The participants here are not interested in the Fatherland and how to protect it.

### **Adm Kulak Questions Civic, Mobilization Value of Volunteer Force**

91UM0095A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Rear Admiral M. Kulak, Pacific Ocean Fleet, under the rubric "Military Reform: Problems and Ideas": "Recruitment Instead of Call-Up?"]

[Text] In all the discussions on reform of the Armed Forces, it seems to me that we were being fed switched concepts. Everyone talks about a professional army, but if we separate the wheat from the chaff and attempt to gain some idea of what the future Army may be like, we can easily see that everything boils down to an army that is supplied with manpower by means of recruitment.

Speaking of professionalism, will someone be so kind as to tell me why we cannot attain it by replenishing Armed Forces ranks on the basis of universal military obligation? Is this something we learned from our experience?

On the one hand, we may find that experience does indeed show that we were unsuccessful in making true professionals out of servicemen. Lack of professionalism became the scourge of the Army and Navy and a cause of many material and human losses. However, let me ask the question: Is this really a manpower pipeline problem? Should we not blame the system used to train military specialists? Or the lack of a suitable material base? Or, finally, our lack of skill and even our refusal to offer material and moral incentives so that troops can improve their qualifications?

But wait: The way manpower has been replenished has been made the scapegoat; all the blame for lack of professionalism has been placed on it. What we hear are cries to make an immediate change to the volunteer (i.e., contract - author) system.

But who will go to serve in a paid army, considering that society - especially the intellectual strata - has painted a negative picture of the Army? Those who cannot make the grade in the new relationship system in "civilian" society? Those who are incapable of standing up to the emerging stiff competition on the entrepreneurial level, cannot obtain the necessary education due to deficiency



in means or mental ability? Or could this be persons who we may say in general are rejected by "civilian" society or perhaps would like to utilize military service to play out their adventurous fantasies? If so, not much imagination is needed to guess at what will happen to our Army.

Our Armed Forces until recently have constituted a structure which has played a major role in completing the first serious phase of a person's realization of identity as a citizen. The Army and Navy, even with all their shortcomings, molded in the minds of young people such concepts as patriotism, loyalty to the Fatherland, a striving to protect the latter from all threats, and developed the skills necessary to accomplish all this. Can we be sure that an army consisting of nothing but volunteers will retain this nurturing function?

It is a fact that such an army in its purest form exists in only two highly developed countries: Great Britain and the USA. We should ask ourselves the question: Why is it that the Americans, who are concentrating their forces in the Near East as a result of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, are forced to resort to mobilizing reservists? Can it be that Iraq's military power is comparable to that of the USA? Of course not. However, it seems that, even for a superpower such as the USA, in that kind of situation it is difficult to accomplish military missions by means of an army alone. The reason is clear: This kind of army does not possess sufficient mobilization resources.

In general, in the matter of Armed Forces reform, I stand against rallying to the shout of "Give us a volunteer Army!", instead opting for sober consideration, careful analysis of available ideas, scientific forecasting of positive and negative consequences of any changes that may be made.

### Studying Health of Pre-Draftees

91UM00954 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 13 Nov 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by S. Karkhanin: "Fit for Limited Duty: Physician Deputies Study Problem of Draft-Age Youth Health"]

[Text] It was not very long ago that grief came to the family of Nadezhda Nikolayevna Pribylova: Her son would not return alive from the Army. In the last four years, 15,000 mothers were visited by this misfortune. That is why Deputy N. N. Pribylova, a professor at a Kursk medical institute, asked to be first to speak at a session of the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet for Public Health Protection.

"I myself grew up in an officer's family," she said. "However, standing here today and speaking as a physician, I say that only people who enjoy good health should be called up for Army service. Also, someone must be charged with the responsibility of making the selection."

The committee of deputies was discussing a problem that was the subject of an appeal prepared by mothers of soldiers and sent to the President of the country, one that is well-known, but still largely unresolved. It has to do with the fact that medical examining boards at military commissariats, in their pursuit of fulfilling the notorious induction plan that stresses volume rather than quality, send boys off—even those who are seriously ill—to perform military duties. They apply the indefinite label "Fit for Limited Duty," thus masking cases of mental retardation, psychopathy, extreme nearsightedness, and disorders of the skeletal-motor system. All the stresses that manifest themselves especially acutely in the first few months of service result in worsening of illnesses. Some of the young soldiers suffer irreversible deterioration in health, while others even suffer death.

**There is no end to complaints from parents, citing arbitrariness on the part of medical examining boards. We are striving for the immediate passage of measures designed to protect the boys' health, calling for independent medical examining boards to be set up at the draftees' place of residence or work. We demand that this problem be treated in a most serious manner." (Extracted from a letter written by the Chelyabinsk Association of Soldiers' Mothers.)**

It is easy to understand the parents' alarm. However, before the physicians are denounced, we would do well to look at the statistical background typifying the health of draft-age youths. What we see is a depressing picture. There has been a three percent drop in number of youths fit for regular duty compared with the figure of nine years ago. At first glance the difference is not large, but a closer look reveals a disturbing dynamic. Nervous disorders grew by 50 percent; internal diseases, by 38 percent; diseases of the eye, by almost 23 percent. There is no doubt as to the causes: congenital conditions, drug addiction, hypodynamia. Small wonder that last year the minister of defense issued a new order setting stricter requirements on health of servicemen. As a consequence, 50,000 draftees afflicted with various disorders were released from service; 80,000 inductees that had already joined units were issued an early discharge into the reserves.

Nevertheless, approximately 3,000 lads a year fall victim to errors committed by military commissariat examining boards. Major V. P. Zolotukhin, who is president of the Subcommittee of Deputies for Affairs of Army Youth, cites an example from his own experience. He states that in his battalion there was a soldier whose arm was paralyzed, and another had a paralyzed leg. Naturally, line commanders are not interested in accepting sick persons into their ranks. This means that the harm caused by physicians' errors strikes twice.

N. N. Kamenskov, who is chief of the Central Military Surgeons Commission, is of the opinion that such things come about due to deficient examination of draft-age youth and poor qualifications on the part of physicians. The truth cannot be denied. It is a fact that one out of

three practitioners with three years of experience that were undergoing additional training in Novosibirsk using devices simulating heart noises failed to detect a pathological condition. Also, it must be stated here that supervisory physicians in polyclinics and hospitals refuse to release their best specialists for draft board work, for a completely understandable reason: A doctor should be providing treatment, not writing reports for a military commissar.

**"In compliance with the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation, health care institutions of the USSR Ministry of Health supply a yearly total of about 40,000 medical specialists and 65,000 support personnel, a situation that causes difficulties in organizing the work of preventive medicine facilities and generates numerous complaints from the populace and medical community. Every year this effort takes away 175 million rubles from the salary budget". (From a report by USSR Deputy Health Minister A. Moskvichev.)**

"What are the sick located in rural areas to do, if the only doctor they have sits for months in a military commissariat, examining draft-age youths and filling out reports?" asked A. Moskvichev at the session of the committee of deputies. Physicians insist that contractual arrangements be drawn up between polyclinics and military commissariats. That is the method of solution of many problems, including those associated with the unjustifiably large medical examining board staffs. In addition, there is the preventive medicine aspect: An effort must be made to include adolescents for treatment in departmental and trade union sanatoria.

Thus, the controversy has taken a turn. It appears that the military department has very little to do with practical work with draft-age youth. Help is definitely needed here. Adolescent medical treatment facilities in many cities are being shut down in line with the new economic procedures. Small wonder that a lad reporting to a military commissariat is afflicted with an "array" of illnesses.

Call-up into military construction units is a separate story. That is the usual destination of boys whose records contain the phrase "Fit for limited duty." N. Lysova, a member of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, spoke of the disturbances rampant in that kind of unit. She was joined in that by USSR People's Deputy and physician L. Zhigunova, who said, "I previously felt that the problem of draft-age youth health should not be made an issue, but, judging from letters written by voters, the issue is red-hot. The soldiers' mothers are right. I never saw a case where a physician was punished for acting negligently by sending a sick lad off to military service. It stands to reason that representatives of the public should be given a place on these commissions."

**"In consideration of the measures involving reduction of the USSR Armed Forces, it has become possible to introduce as of 1 October 1989 substantial changes in the Statute on Medical Examination in the USSR Armed**

**Forces, the purpose being to raise the health requirements of draft-age youths, conscripts on active duty, and military construction personnel. It is planned to take the next step in this direction in 1991-1992 as we make progress in improving the draftee resource problem." (Excerpt from a letter by USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov)**

A new document has already been prepared by the Central Military Medical Commission, but it is still in draft form. Among other things, provision is made to replace the label "Fit for limited duty" with another one: "Fit for military service." However, the document must be reviewed by interested departments and scientists, a process that may take about 18 months.

"Too long!"—that is the feeling shared by physician deputies and soldiers' mothers. They intend to appeal to the Academy of Medical Sciences and Military Medical Academy, requesting that the document be completed as quickly as possible. Radical changes in call-up for service will come probably when military reform is made a reality, but for the present there is need for valid and definite decisions that can clear the atmosphere surrounding the health problem of future soldiers. Otherwise, this may be a cause of bitter gatherings that can inflict discredit upon the Army.

This is no time for squabbling and hurling reproaches back and forth. "We tend to have too much talk about troubles the country is experiencing," justifiably remarked N. N. Pribylova. There can be no progress without concentrated interdepartmental action. There is a need for precise and strict criteria for selecting people that are fit for military service. We cannot do without preventive treatment of youth. The ties between military commissariats and polyclinics should also apparently be reorganized. In addition, the motion was made to introduce material responsibility on the part of the Army for the life and health of soldiers in peacetime, in other words, organize an insurance system. Of major importance is the fact that everyone—the military, deputies, doctors, and parents—came out in favor of changing the existing practice. Goals have been set up for joint work, which will be initiated without delay. This means that the conscription quota will no longer play a major role in medical examining boards; it will cease being a cause of physician error, the cost of which is poor health.

#### **Difficulties of Outlawed Military Commissariats in Lithuania**

91UM0106B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 14 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview of Maj Gen A. Visotskis by Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak: "Military Commissariat 'Outlawed,' or Why Officials of the Military Commissariats of Lithuania Must Perform Their Duties Under Uniquely Difficult Conditions"]

[Text] The decree on halting the activity of the military commissariats on the territory of the republic, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania on 14 March of this

year, put the officials of the organs of military administration in an extremely difficult position. Since the military commissariats are working in this situation, how is the draft being implemented? Regarding this, a conversation between our correspondent and the republic military commissar Maj Gen A. Visotskis.

[Gromak] Well, you have been "outlawed" for eight months now. How are the military commissariats operating under these conditions?

[Visotskis] We are working, and the men are coming to us. The decree itself regarding the halting of our activity, I believe, was adopted by incompetent persons who did not know the essence and the content of our work. Many of our functions are associated with specific persons, with specific fates. One of the tasks of the military commissariats, as you know, is maintaining the files on veterans of the Great Patriotic War, soldiers who performed their international duty in Afghanistan, and soldiers who participated in elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. At present, with adoption of the new union Law on Pensions, the military commissariats are granting the corresponding documents to veterans of war and soldier-internationalists. Tens of thousands of pensioners of the USSR Ministry of Defense are having their pensions recalculated.

A great deal of time is devoted to examining letters, complaints, and statements regarding early discharge from the Army, granting of leaves, and transfer of compulsory-service soldiers to other units. Here is an example. In 1989-1990 we provided assistance in order to help more than 600 service members be transferred to a new place of service, and 377 men be discharged from the Army...

[Gromak] But after all, a department of kray protection has been created in the republic. It was declared that from now on it will assume the functions of the military commissariats for the entire republic.

[Visotskis] The department of kray protection is an organism very hard for me to understand, and I have served in the Army for 35 years. After all, it has no plans, no prospects, no finances. A Law was adopted regarding a military obligation to protect the state, and detachments of volunteers are being formed. Where will the resources come from? It means that subsidies for education, culture, and health care will be cut...

[Gromak] I believe you agree that nevertheless the draft of young men into the Army has been and remains the basic function of the military commissariats. How do things stand now?

[Visotskis] Economic support and financing of military commissariats was halted, and military-accounting offices were closed. They also refused us transport, medical personnel, and draft commissions, and information regarding conscripts. On 1 November about forty

demands and claims were sent to the military commissariats of the republic: five demands to quit the premises of the military commissariat, 13 claims for payment for rental of premises, four demands to turn the premises of the Main Military Commissariat to house the sections and divisions of the department of kray protection, seven warnings that the telephones would be disconnected.

For example, on 28 September a document arrived at the Klaipeda Oblast Main Military Commissariat from the chief of the directorate of housing of the city, which informed them that on 31 December 1990 the contract regarding the rental of the premises occupied by the military commissariat would expire. And when the military commissariat was visited by section chief of the Klaipeda zone of the Department of Kray Protection, former Lt. Col. (Res.) Ts. Norkus, the demand was made that six rooms be assigned for his section in the immediate future. He also stated that in the event of failure to meet their demands, all measures would be taken, including the use of force. These are the conditions under which the draft is being carried out.

[Gromak] Many of those problems of which you spoke above also occurred in the spring. Have any correctives been introduced in the work since then?

[Visotskis] The main conclusion from the spring draft campaign was this: the parliament, the mass media of the republic, conducting an anti-Army propaganda, got their way by frightening the young boys and their parents. We could not always deal with this situation.

Therefore now we have stepped up individual work with the draftees and their parents. Officers and employees of the military commissariats have gone to see 16 thousand families. First they sought to remove the fear which had accumulated among the parents. Most of the families were friendly toward us, understanding that all young men must serve in the Army. But many are confused. They know that Lithuania is legally part of the USSR, but every day they hear over the republic radio and television that service in the Armed Forces is a crime. They all say that the President of the USSR should address the question of whether Lithuanian lads should serve.

We have sought to speak in the press and television. Unfortunately, we succeed very rarely. We are simply not printed, not granted air time. And representatives of Sayudis have the green light everywhere.

Over republic radio, a representative of the Department of Kray Protection recently addressed the citizens of Lithuania regarding the draft. He stated that the work of the military commissariats on the territory of the republic had been stopped, that by Lithuanian law they had been outlawed: "Do not pay attention to these notices, and do not go to the commissariats."

[Gromak] And for all this, how is the autumn draft going?

[Visotski] The main thing is that young men are going into the Armed Forces. The first stage of the draft is concluded. We have manned the combat units of the Baltic and Baltic Fleet. Among those sent to units, 40 percent are Lithuanians. The second stage will begin after the holidays. Here I believe it will be easier. You see, now many are biding their time, and having doubts: but if Lithuanians have gone into the Army? If they went, so will I...

#### **Lt Gen Ter-Grigoryants: Update on Fall Draft**

91UM0106A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
15 Nov 90 First Edition p 1

[Lt Gen N. Ter-Grigoryants, deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces: "How Goes the Draft?"]

[Text] Could you provide figures on how the draft for the USSR Armed Forces is proceeding? (R. Zarundnev, Leningrad)

Lt Gen N. Ter-Grigoryants, Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces:

As you know, in accordance with the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers dated 25 September, the country began its regular conscription to active military service. The majority of Soviet organs are successfully resolving the problems of the autumn draft.

We are gratified at the fact that in many republics, krais, and oblasts, they have responsibly approached the preparation of youth for Army service, and the dispatching of the young replacements to the ranks of the defenders of the Fatherland. Here are just a few figures regarding the draft: Kazakhstan, Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan, Turkmeniya—within ten percent of the plan. This corresponds to what was expected for the given period. The draft is taking place in a difficult sociopolitical situation in the republics of the Baltics. And still, the figures here are these: Lithuania, 9.5%, Latvia, 20%, Estonia, 16%. And these also correspond to the plans for the given moment for the region.

However the decisions taken by the Supreme Soviets of a number of republics and the picketing of the military commissariats and assembly points—these acts of opposition to the draft in fact put the youth in a most difficult position, and undermine the foundations of national security.

Unfortunately certain committees of soldiers' mothers have taken an incorrect position in connection with this, and are virtually calling for the disbanding of the Armed Forces and picketing the military commissariats. While they are precisely the ones who should be doing everything possible to prevent the destabilization of the political situation in the country. I must stress here that there are also committees who actively assist us in this respect.

An especially difficult situation with respect to the draft has developed these days in a number of oblasts of the

Ukraine: the Lvov Oblast, 0%, Ivano-Frankovo Oblast, 0.3%, Rovenskiy 3%. And in Moldova 4.6%.

To pull apart the Army into national barracks, to limit the geography of the draft, these are the goals set by a number of leaders of these regions. For what purpose?

The dispatch of the draftees has just begun. And I believe that the Soviet organs should do everything in order that the draft (this is after all a matter for all the people!) take place in a timely and quality manner.

It is time for everyone to realize the attitude toward the draft is not a private matter. It is a factor of stability of society, unity of the country, and integrity of the Union.

#### **Azerbaijani Commissar on Fall Draft**

91UM0173A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 1 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant General A. Kasimov, military commissar of the Azerbaijan SSR: "Who Needs Volunteers?"]

[Text] Azerbaijan has never failed the Army; however, a military reform should not ignore the interests of the Republic either. I will not play the hypocrite if I say that the insignia of a general have never been as heavy for me to bear as they are now. The entire country seethes. The fires of interethnic strife flare up here and there. Blood is spilled. The Army barely manages to make it to the hot spots in order to save the people and bring violence to an end.

At present, the life of our young men who put on military uniforms is not easy. "Occupiers" is not the worst curse by far that they happen to hear. Following these words, stones, stakes, and Molotov cocktails are hurled at them, and at times even bullets...

Believe me, I am not saying this for the sake of rhetoric: At times, I draw fire that is hardly better than that from a "Kalashnikov." Our informal press spares no black paint portraying the image of a heartless military commissar, a bureaucratized member of "the top brass" who sends the sons of the Republic to the slaughter. Pressure on the military commissariats has increased lately, since the regular fall draft began. Recently, I received a delegation of the mothers of soldiers. I will admit that this was a difficult conversation. After all, the arguments of reason do not appeal to the mothers' hearts. They worry about their sons who appear to them to still be boys playing with toy soldiers. However, the game has come to an end, and their sons have become soldiers themselves.

I told the women that the Republic has secured arrangements whereby 70 percent of draftees will serve in combat units rather than the notorious construction battalions. After all, as recently as five years ago, more than one-half of our young men were issued shovels rather than weapons. I also said that Azerbaijan does not



forget its sons. Seventy-eight delegations of the public visited districts, military units, and fleets where our young men serve last year alone; this year, as many as 147 delegations have [visited].

I do not know whether I managed to convince them... Perhaps, not all of them and not completely. Besides, persuading people is not easy when you personally do not agree on all points with the existing practice of the draft for military service. I am a professional military man myself, and I understand full-well that it is absurd to pull the Army apart into national quarters, as some irresponsible informals propose. The exterritorial principle of forming the armed forces is not an imperial whim, as some people believe, but a necessity of life. There are 150 military occupation specialties in a motorized infantry regiment alone; yet, this is not the most technically sophisticated unit. Therefore, it is not merely unreasonable to create one's own army by leaving all draftees to serve in the republic, but there is just no room for that.

However, something else is also correct. Azerbaijan is one of the trouble spots of our country. The borders of the republic are restive. Soldiers die here. In various corners of our country, their mothers picket draft centers and stop trains with new recruits going to Transcaucasia. I understand them, just as I do our mothers in Azerbaijan. The decree of the president of the country on legal and social protection of the servicemen needs to be finally enforced.

Is there a way out? I think that it is found in a compromise, as in many other cases. I mean a reform of recruitment to the armed forces as a component of the military reform. In October of this year, the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan adopted a resolution in which it was suggested that the Republic military commissariat resolve the issue of retaining some of the draftees in the republic in coordination with the Ministry of Defense. The issue still has not been resolved.

Unfortunately, an absolutely different trend has emerged. I read in the 13 November issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in the article "Great Assembly of Deputies" that a decree of the USSR president has been prepared on sending draftees to Transcaucasia only on a volunteer basis. I think that some of his advisers are doing a disservice to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. How does it look? If such a decree appears, only volunteers will come to Transcaucasia to serve (if such are found), but we will continue to send Azerbaijani young men to Central Asia, Moldova, and the Baltic area as we used to, so to speak, as our constitutional duty "commands" us. Is this not too glaring an inequity? I will stress that by the Azerbaijani young men I mean not only Azeris, but also Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Lezgins, and Armenians—all of those who live in our republic.

As far as the current fall draft is concerned, I am convinced that it will not fail, despite all difficulties. I am looking at a schedule for dispatching draftees. It has

been strictly complied with up to now. Azerbaijan has never failed the Army. Suffice it to mention that our republic accounts for more than one-half of all personnel drafted from Transcaucasia.

### Results of Conscription in Bashkiriya

91UM01584 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Dec 90 First Edition p 7

[Article by Maj I. Korotkikh, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Bashkiriya: The Conscription Plan Has Been Fulfilled"]

[Text] "Don't send your sons to the army. They will die there! Don't trust the officers! They are all tyrants and murderers, and their hands are stained with blood," a woman with a megaphone implored the draftees and their parents. Right here, at the induction center of the Bashkir Republic Military Commissariat, her companion was trying to foist on the future soldiers addresses to which they could turn for help.

People looked upon the organizers of this act more with bewilderment than with interest. Soon other information was heard over the loudspeaker from the military commissariat: citizen Vyacheslav Grigoryevich Alekseyev, who distinguished himself as chairman of the Bashkir Independent Committee for Social Protection of Soldiers and Seamen, during performance of military service was sentenced to five years imprisonment for physical assault of a superior.

Anticipating outrage on the part of the inductees, those "looking out for their welfare" considered it right and proper to withdraw. We later sort of encountered them a couple of times in the city and at the train station, but they no longer dared to undertake an obvious provocation similar to the one that failed at the induction center.

Col V. Trofimov, the republic military commissar, told me about this episode that took place in the spring of 1990 more as something amusing than as a serious incident. The workers of the military commissariat are concerned about other, more important problems, and rightly so. Vladimir Ivanovich [Trofimov] informed the USSR President about some of them during his recent meeting with deputies who are service members.

At first glance, there should not be any special grounds for concern here: the induction plan in Bashkiriya is being fulfilled 100 percent; matters are quite good with the selection of candidates for enrollment in military schools; and a strong base has been created for conducting preinduction training. Still, it would be naive to believe that the republic has avoided the problems that have worsened in the country.

For example, it is no secret that in a number of regions and republics the soviet and party bodies of various levels not only disassociate themselves from preparing youth for service and induction but also oppose this. This involves unlawful acts repealed recently by a USSR

Presidential Ukase on instances of seizing military commissariats and disrupting the work of military medical conscription boards.

No, before this things had not gone this far in Bashkiriya. And I think it was largely due to the fact that during any of the many meetings with the republic leadership the representatives of the military commissariat tirelessly advanced the idea that it was not the military commissariats but the soviet power that was drafting the young people into the armed forces. It should be the representatives of soviet power in the localities that should assume the main burden of organizing and conducting measures associated with the conscription.

Here is the result: on 2 April of this year, the Council of Ministers of Bashkiriya adopted a decree on measures for preparing induction- and preinduction-age youth for active military service in the USSR Armed Forces and for the call-up of citizens for military service in 1990-1991.

I will not retell its content in detail, but will dwell on the main thing. The detailed document created a legislative base not only for military commissariats. The decree directly obliges the executive committees of city and rayon soviets of people's deputies, ministries of national education and health, and other departments to take steps to intensify monitoring of implementation of the USSR Law on Compulsory Military Service and raise the quality of preparing young people for service.

Certainly, this makes me happy. But the people with whom I spoke in Ufa emphasized that far from everything is going without a hitch. For example, they did not immediately find a common language with the representatives of the public health bodies. Today, it is profitable for medics to work many hours in a row as part of conscription boards without material compensation, and there is a shortage of qualified specialists in some regions. Sometimes obstacles are encountered where they are least expected. An irritated Col Yu. Otleuev, chief of the political department of the military commissariat, joined our conversation. It turned out that he had just called the city party committee to request that its representatives address the inductees. The secretary of the city party committee, I. Zharinova, responded: "If we come, all the inductees will scatter. You know what the attitude toward the party is like now..." I do not want to comment on the position of the party leader who has gone into the deep "underground," for this is an isolated case, fortunately.

We encountered another important problem while working at the republic military commissariat. The call-up here is not a brief campaign. Rather, it is the result of intense and purposeful work throughout the year. It is not just a result, but a beginning for the future. Each inductee completes an anonymous questionnaire containing about 20 questions. When summarizing, the various answers noted make it possible to single out the most vulnerable spots in preparing youth for military

service and to make changes in time. Thus, an approximate analysis of questionnaires already received, conducted by employees of the military commissariat at my request, showed that everything is not as satisfactory as one would like. For example, only 24 percent of the young people answered in the affirmative to the question, "Would you like to meet with the leaders of the rayon or enterprise in a relaxed environment?" Only 50 percent of the inductees attended an interesting measure associated with the call-up; local leaders and collectives of enterprises held a ceremony on the occasion of the induction for only 41 lads out of 100. Only 28 percent of the inductees characterized the attitude toward young people in their rayon or city as thoughtful. The majority said it was formal or indifferent.

These are the sad results. Naturally, the military commissar will have a detailed conversation with the republic leadership and local authorities concerning this on conclusion of the call-up. But employees of the military commissariat are already thinking about how to fill this vacuum in the future. After all, the lack of sincere attention toward the problems of young people can turn into serious complications. Therefore, special emphasis is being placed on military-patriotic training of future soldiers today. And it is being organized not from high speaker's rostrums, not in the language of admonitions and edifications, but in a trusting and relaxed environment. Experience shows that the activities of military-patriotic clubs and associations make it possible to achieve a good educational effect. There are more than 40 of them in Bashkiriya. The rayon party and Komsomol committees and military commissariats organize them.

It is unthinkable to imagine the activities, say, of the "Dolg" [Duty] Military-Patriotic Club, which assists relatives of those who died in Afghanistan, without close contacts with the military commissariat. Finally, it has been possible to find a common language even with the city committee for social protection of service members, which was talked about at the beginning of the article. More precisely, a division of positions occurred in the committee itself. The most sensible members of this structure, led by Capt (Res) V. Simarchuk, rejected the extremist actions and took the course of helping to provide service members with housing, repelling attacks on the army, and studying the conditions of daily life of the soldiers and their families. During the period of the call-up, activists of this organization helped to supply the snack bar of the induction center with tobacco products and the like.

Therefore, at the republic military commissariat they look at everything in the future with optimism. Here they have been convinced through practical experience that there are no problems that are impossible to solve.

### Replacing Old Military-Patriotic Education System

91UM0171A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 9 Dec 90 Second Edition p 1

[Letter by Ye. Shchekatikhin: "What Contradicts What?: Letter About How Military Patriotic Education of Youth Was Eliminated"]

[Text] Our time is very dynamic for new trends and for a sharp change of ideological principles and views. Rejecting and demolishing, we are running at such speeds that we barely succeed in realizing whither we are running.

Now, it appears, it was decided once and for all to eliminate such a "rudiment" as the military-patriotic education of young people. Today, you will not even run into the concept. In June of 1990, a joint order of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR State Committee for Public Education No. 263/408 abolished the term "military-patriotic education" and replaced it with "prescription training."

Well, prescription it is. The gullible public did not react to it at all. And then a new step was taken. On 2 September 1990, Ye.B. Kurkin, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] deputy minister of education, sent instructions to the cities and villages of Russia in which he proposed to the managers of kray and oblast departments of public education to examine the question of abolition of prescription training in schools and PTU's [vocational training school], and to think about the future use of military instructors in the educational system. Of course, no one intended to discuss such measures with the immediate participants of this "demilitarization"—the directors of the schools and PTU's, the teachers, the students, and the parents.

But someone, apparently, was hurrying Ye.B. Kurkin a lot, because, not waiting for the unanimous "approval," even at the level of departments of public education (the instructions did not even succeed in reaching all oblast departments of public education), on 17 October 1990, within just 15 days after the inquiry and without coordination with the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, he published Order No. 62. Together with his colleague, V.M. Zavarykin (Is responsibility to future generations less?).

A remarkably ascertained part of this document: "A study of public opinion showed that the prescription training of young students that is being conducted on the premises of schools and PTU's contradicts the true aims and tasks of public education and evokes a negative attitude in the students and their parents."

Indeed!.. Well, in the first place, when did Yevgenniy Borisovich and Valeriy Mikhaylovich have the time to study public opinion? And, secondly, how does the preparation for service "contradict the true aims and tasks of public education?"

We look into our country's and the world's experience, and we remind the deputy ministers: From the times of ancient Sparta and Athens, every society concerned itself with military-patriotic education. In his own country, young Aleksandr Suvorov was becoming proficient in military matters starting at the age of five and, from 12 years of age, in the Life Guards of the Semenovskiy Regiment. Pavel Nakhimov was in the Naval Cadet Corps starting at 13 years of age. Napoleon Bonaparte, they say, was assaulting the military ABC's in school in Brienne from the age of 10. Charles de Gaulle—from 11 years of age in Immaculate Conception College, where the center of studies was "the throne and the altar the sword and the aspergill." And the young Aleksandr Pushkin, who by no means can be categorized among the esthetically uneducated people, studied military affairs and fortification in the Tsarskoselskiy Lycee.

Cushioning the ruinous nature of their order, the authors, it is true, complain that the "physical unpreparedness of youth for service in the ranks of the Soviet Army gives rise to a lot of unfavorable criticism," and the course in civil defense "does not meet the norms...of behavior under conditions of extreme situations, natural calamities, and technological catastrophes." It would seem from this that there is one way out: To do everything to make the course suitable and to improve physical training. But in doing this it is useful to recall: In all current extreme situations it is those people in uniform who were the most "suitable." They did not let the Chernobyl reactor blacken everything with smoke, which it was capable of doing, and they rescued people from exploding railroad trains...

"We order...." the aforementioned document announces, "that prescription training be conducted in field training sessions at defense-sports health camps at the expense of academic time that is set aside for this training during the last two years of studies." It would seem then why did we have to start all of this in the first place? All hours of prescription training simply relate to the end of the ninth and 10th classes, and the sessions and the camps will train youth for service in the Army, simultaneously giving them a charge of patriotism.

That would seem to be the case, except that the last paragraphs of the order doom the above indicated sessions to nonexistence. First of all, "the appraisal of prescription training does not affect the document on education." Further, there is a requirement to remove from the schools "specific equipment and arms and to clear courtyards of militarized educational means and visual aids." So here is your elective course. Moreover, a seemingly good effort "to review the educational plan and to increase the emphasis on physical culture" is made "at the expense of a reduction in hours for prescription training." Then where does one get the promised hours at the end of the year for the camp and the sessions?

Also omitted from the pages of the order is the question: But how, nevertheless, will the students be prepared for actions in extreme situations?

God grant that there will be peace. We will struggle for it. Protect it. Only do not let them convince us that there is no longer any need to learn military matters.

### **Medical Boards Faulted on Psychiatric Health of Draftees**

91UM0163A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Dec 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain Third Rank P. Ishchenko: "Time of Stress and Passions"]

[Text] The psychiatric wards of military hospitals... Not so long ago, I could not even imagine that we would have to discuss their problems in the open press. We, the journalists, shunned their problems, and not just the journalists... However, at present it is clear that we should write about this. After all, the issues exist, and they do not become less acute just because we keep silent about them, all the more so at present, in our difficult time which is sometimes called a time of stress and passions.

Some people say: The country is sick. This may be strongly worded, but it is not unjustified. At any rate, it is a fact that an increase in the incidence of psycho-neurological disorders is being registered in our society. Of course, this situation cannot but affect the armed forces that are bound to our society by a million communicating vessels.

Chief Psychiatrist of the Northern Fleet Medical Service Colonel V. Kon says: "Last year alone, 344 military construction workers with various psychiatric dysfunctions, suffering from oligophrenia were given early discharges. This is primarily indicative of the flaws in the operation of draft medical boards of military commissariats. However, one may sympathize with them too: The choice is increasingly limited."

An increasing number of draftees who have previously used narcotics, drug addicts, are coming to the fleet. Last year, 39 of them were detected, whereas in the several months of this year as many as 42 were.

How can the medical service of the fleet counteract this sweeping wave of psycho-neurological disorders? We have to state regretfully that as of now there is little apart from the enthusiasm of physicians. There is no drug treatment service in the fleet; there is no sex pathologist at either the main hospital or polyclinic of the fleet. For example, Chief of the Psychiatric Office of the Fleet Polyclinic Medical Service Major S. Altukhov (in the picture above) is at the same time a supernumerary narcotics specialist and a supernumerary sex pathologist of the garrison. Actually, all those needing treatment in his two supernumerary specialties come to him from the entire fleet because the staff positions of psychiatrists are only being introduced at the garrisons of the fleet now.

Chief of the Fleet Polyclinic Medical Service Major V. Zhuk believes that the organizational staff structure of the polyclinic does not meet the needs of the fleet for the treatment of psycho-neurological disorders. Viktor Grigoryevich notes: "We need to have a ward for reducing psycho-neurological stress in which no fewer than four people would work; we do not have it at present."

In the opinion of Medical Service General Major V. Stroganov, chief of the medical service of the fleet, there is an acute need to set up a neurosis ward at the main hospital. Meanwhile, reality is as follows: Even if they succeed in opening this ward it will be in the very remote future. For now, neurological patients who need a non-disturbing regimen of treatment sometimes have to be placed in the psychiatric ward of the hospital which is overcrowded in excess of all standards to begin with. When we visited the psychiatric ward, its number of patients exceeded the norm by a factor of more than 1.5. One may only admire the endless patience of psychiatrists who work—and work well at that—under such, putting it mildly, crowded conditions. What about the patients? To some extent, the problem will become less acute when a psychiatric ward with 20 beds opens soon in one of the garrisons. However, there is no other way out than to make radical decisions.

Of course, to a certain degree the success of controlling psycho-neurological disorders is associated with improving the living conditions of military sailors. However, the role of medics still remains extremely important. For the medics to take care of us we first need to take care of them...



**Military Assistance Program in Egypt Recalled**

91UM0097A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
10 Nov 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by Aleksey Basenko: "The Egyptian Odyssey of Soviet Seamen"]

[Text] "In mid-1967," recalls Vice Admiral V. Zub, "we didn't give the orders, we weren't in control..." The Operation at Port-Said.

After KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (20 Sep 1990) published the article "In the sky over Egypt," the editor's office began to receive many letters requesting that we tell about the international assistance to the Arab countries which was provided by Soviet military advisors and specialists and representatives of other military professions. The interest of our readers in this topic is understandable. After all, for many years it was counted among the "closed" topics. Today we are publishing new material about the work in Egypt by Soviet naval seamen.

The man stood out sharply from the officers of the Egyptian destroyer. Both because of his civilian clothing and because of his non-Arab appearance. And he was certainly not addressed according to regulation—Mr. Vitaliy. He was one of the seventy Soviet naval advisors working in Egypt.

Soviet military advisors had begun arriving in that country in mid-1967. After the June war, in which Egypt lost a significant amount of combat equipment, at the request of Nasser there was a sharp increase in the scope of shipments of Soviet arms. Ships with Soviet weapons arrived in Egypt in a steady stream, and the "air bridge" operated continuously, carrying military gear by transport planes.

Soviet arms also reached the naval forces of Egypt. They included Soviet-produced destroyers, torpedo and missile boats, anti-submarine ships, and trawlers. From the Soviet Union the navy received new artillery complexes, radar stations, communications gear, and various equipments and apparatus. Advisors also appeared on Egyptian combat ships—cadre officers of the Soviet Navy.

"Our main task was to assist the Egyptians in mastering and using the new equipment, to train specialists, and to transfer the combat experience of the Soviet Navy," says Vice-Admiral (Ret.) Boris Sutyagin, who worked in 1967 and 1968 as the chief advisor with the commander of the Egyptian Navy. "At the request of the Egyptian commander, we also helped them to plan and conduct combat operations."

"The situation in Egypt at that time was complex, incendiary," recounts the former chief advisor with the commander of a brigade of destroyers, Vitaliy Zub, also known in the past as "Mr. Vitaliy." "Although the line of the front had stabilized on the canal, it was felt that in just a little while there would be a new flaring up of

combat actions. Thus there was no time to get accustomed to the situation, to adapt to the new conditions. The decisions had to be made at once, instantaneously.

"...Information arrived regarding proposed shipments to Israel of the American air-to-ship 'Bull Pup' missiles. The missiles had a semiautomatic guidance system. Their accuracy of guidance to target was very high, and there was a powerful warhead. It was expected that these missiles would equip the Skyhawk ground-attack planes. A problem arose: how to protect the Egyptian ships against strikes by the new weapons.

"We proposed a training method similar to that which was effectively used in the Soviet Navy," recounts Vitaliy Zub. "Two MiG-21 fighters with specially trained pilots, who simulated the operating tactics of the Skyhawks, would 'attack' an Egyptian destroyer on the open sea. Instead of missiles the planes had high-speed cameras, and each 'attack' was recorded on film, so that its results could be easily determined. The task of the destroyer was to evade, to avoid the strike, to not allow the pilot an opportunity to deliver an aimed attack. In one sortie the planes managed to conduct 10 to 12 simulated attacks. Tens of such training sessions were conducted with each ship, practicing the actions of their commanders and crews until they were automatic. Ultimately they achieved excellent results: in 20 MiG 'attacks' they managed to achieve only one or two 'direct hits' on the ship."

The basic tasks of the brigade of destroyers, as the most powerful ships of the Egyptian Navy, were to defend the Egyptian coast, to protect cargo ships and ports from the attacks of Israeli ships, and to oppose attempts to land amphibious assaults. Their functions also included fire support of Egyptian amphibious operations and delivery of artillery strikes on Israeli coastal installations. Any such operation had to be carefully prepared.

Recalls Zub, "Unexpectedly, very interesting ideas arose. For instance, when practicing actions to support a naval landing, we proposed using missile boats armed with Soviet missiles. These missiles proved to be very effective in destroying coastal targets having a powerful radar reflecting surface—concentrations of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery positions. We tried to use the 'Strela' portable SAM complexes to combat enemy aircraft. They were brought on board to supplement the organic ship air defense systems. Such ideas were born in the collective work of the Egyptian and Soviet seamen."

They shared together all the dangers and adversities of wartime. Soviet advisors were on destroyers, submarines, squadrons of torpedo and missile boats, and in coastal artillery units. When a destroyer set out on patrol, there was an advisor on its bridge with the commander; if a submarine embarked on a mission, with it departed an advisor for its commander. "We didn't give the orders, we were not in control of the actions of the Egyptian officers. They made the decisions. Our job was when necessary to propose an optimal decision for

the situation. From then on, the actions were those of the Egyptian commander," says Boris Sutyagin. And our advisors could establish their authority only through thorough knowledge of all the subtleties of naval affairs, through the highest competence in all branches, from questions of tactics to the characteristic features of various types of shipboard armaments. They worked 18-20 hours a day, frequently without days off.

"But the most vivid recollection of my work in Egypt," continues Vitaliy Zub, "was my participation in developing and conducting a large-scale operation to destroy a major Israeli ground facility in the Sinai in November 1969. This action was performed brilliantly."

...According to reconnaissance data, warehouses with an enormous quantity of ammunition and fuel were concentrated at the Romani railroad station in the Sinai, 40 kilometers from the line of the Suez Canal. An Israeli mechanized brigade would periodically move back to it from the front line. Egyptian ground artillery could not engage this point from behind the canal—it was too far. It was possible from the sea, but dangerous to the ships, for the depth off the coast was just 10 meters and the draft of the destroyers was 7 meters. If the Israelis suspected preparation for such a mission, they would plant mines off the coast and the ships would inevitably be blown up.

"Therefore the operation was prepared in the strictest secrecy," recalls Vitaliy Zub. A month before the date of its conduct, two or three destroyers began moving regularly from Alexandria to Port Said. They got the Israelis used to the appearance of Egyptian ships near the Sinai. And when on the day of 7 November two destroyers and a frigate appeared off Port-Said, the Israeli observers considered it to be a regular patrol. But as soon as it grew dark, the ships did not head back toward Alexandria, but went on, along the coast of the Sinai. From the sea they were protected by two torpedo and two missile boats. The destroyers reached the designated point unnoticed... The nighttime silence over the sea was broken by a powerful salvo of 130-mm guns.

For thirty minutes the destroyers shelled the Israeli base at Romani. After the second salvo, an enormous column of flame appeared on the horizon, a direct hit on the oil storage facility. In a half hour the base was obliterated. As was later learned, a mechanized brigade had also been at the station at this moment.

Even as they departed, Israeli ground-attack planes "fell on" the ships. Their efforts proved vain; besides bullet holes in the hulls and superstructures, there was not a single direct hit by bombs or unguided missiles. The ships maneuvered under fire as once they had evaded the MiGs and remained invulnerable to Israeli missiles.

...Vice Admiral Vitaliy Zub gazes for a long time at the photographs brought back from Egypt twenty years ago, which show the Soviet military advisors with Egyptian officers. and among them he himself, a 38 year old

Captain Second Rank, "Mr. Vitaliy." Then he says: "Perhaps each of us left a part of himself there, in Egypt."

#### **New Information on 1920's Soviet-German Military Cooperation**

91UM0119A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
24 Nov 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Maj B. Boytsov: "The Reichswehr and the Red Army"]

[Text] Recently, significant attention has been given to the history of military-technical collaboration between Germany and the USSR in 1922-1933. But in our nation this subject for many decades has been hidden behind a curtain of secrecy. This has given rise to a number of conjectures and misinterpretations on the reasons for the involvement of the Soviet side in such collaboration, its results, consequences as well as legal and moral aspects. At present, Soviet researchers are beginning to gain access to the documents kept behind seven seals concerning German and Soviet collaboration in the military sphere during this period. The materials are not only of historical interest. In light of the Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Partnership and Collaboration which was just signed in Bonn, specific measures are being planned to strengthen the mutual contacts between the Soviet Armed Forces and the Bundeswehr.

The situation in which Germany and Soviet Russia found themselves at the beginning of the 1920s had certain similar features. Both countries were experiencing serious economic difficulties from the damage suffered in the war and this was felt in the social sphere and they were also under conditions of foreign policy isolation. This contributed to the search for ways to draw together and in April 1922 this led to the signing of the bilateral Rapallo Treaty on restoring diplomatic relations and the most favored nation provisions. In taking this step, the RSFSR government saw in this a means for splitting the hostile encirclement by the ruling circles of the Entente nations and which, as is known, after the collapse of the military intervention against the young Soviet Republic did not abandon their intention to stifle it by a blockade or eliminate it by military means.

Dating approximately to this time was also the beginning of the Soviet-German collaboration in the military-technical area. According to the Versailles Peace Treaty, the victorious powers imposed significant military limitations on Germany. It was prohibited from having such weapons as tanks, aviation and a submarine fleet. The size of the German Army, the Reichswehr, was limited to 100,000. Its leadership was seeking a way out of the existing situation. Thus arose the idea of military cooperation with Russia by organizing Reichswehr centers on Soviet territory. This idea originated from the Reichswehr Commander-in-Chief, Gen H. von Seeckt.

Through intermediaries, von Seeckt opened up preliminary talks with the Soviet side and which generally

agreed with his proposal. In Moscow they proceeded from the view that Russia in no way was bound by the Versailles Treaty and in establishing military contacts with Germany was not violating the standards of international law, for such contacts even at that time were being introduced into the practice of international relations. Contacts in the military area promised to be mutually advantageous. German military experience could make it possible to improve the armament and combat capability of the Red Army as well as the training of its command and technical personnel.

For carrying out direct ties with the leadership of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army], at the beginning of 1921 the German military department established a special group Sondergruppe-R ("Russia"). Its representatives traveled to Moscow headed by the Reichswehr officer O.R. von Niedermayer in order on the spot to determine the possibilities of setting up training centers, testing ranges and military industrial facilities and where it would be possible to create and test types of weapons banned by Versailles as well as train personnel.

In December of the same year, arriving in Moscow were representatives of the Reichswehr and the aviation firm Junkers-Dessau. Talks with them were conducted by the Chairman of the RVSR [Republic Revolutionary Military Council], L. Trotsky, and the RKKA Chief of Staff, P. Lebedev. As a result, an agreement was worked out on creating the production structures of the German defense industry in the RSFSR and these would be camouflaged as Soviet-German enterprises and concessions.

Junkers made a beginning to such a practice. In 1922, the firm began building a plant for producing metal aircraft and aviation engines in the suburban Moscow Fili. In 1924, the plant began to produce several hundred aircraft annually and soon became the leader of domestic aircraft building.

After Junkers, roots were established on our land by Friderich Krupp (cannons, shells and tanks), BMW (tank engines and aircraft engines), Berssol (toxins), Karl Walter (small arms) and others.

In parallel, von Seeckt concluded in Berlin a secret treaty with the Soviet representatives, K. Radek, and this provided for the training of German military personnel and the testing of military equipment for the Reichswehr in the RSFSR. A preliminary agreement was reached on the traveling of RKKA representatives to Germany for studying military experience. Soviet naval ships gained the right to enter German harbors. In July 1923, the USSR People's Commissar for Air Communications A. Rozengolts visited Berlin. His meeting with the German leadership led to the concluding of yet another secret agreement "On the Construction of the Russian Defense Industry and the Manufacturing of Military Materials for Germany." The establishing of the first flight training center near Lipetsk was agreed upon.

One hundred fighters had been purchased for it from the Dutch firm of Focke. Initially, pilots from the Imperial Army undergoing retraining were to be the trainees. Then new recruits began to arrive. After completing the school, they were given the appropriate military ranks without indicating that they belonged to the Air Force.

Everyone who was sent to the Lipetsk Center were formally stricken from the Reichswehr rolls and their last names were changed. This was done in order to avoid possible revealings of identity or other unforeseen circumstances. Numerous problems arose over the returning to the motherland of the persons killed in the frequent accidents and disasters. They were sent via Leningrad by sea in containers with the inscription "Machinery Parts." Relatives were not informed about the true causes of death.

The losses and difficulties, however, appeared nonsubstantial when seen against the background of the real return which Lipetsk provided. The models of aircraft tested out here were to become the basis of the first series types of fighters and bombers in the Air Forces of the Third Reich, the Luftwaffe. By the end of 1933, around 450 fighter pilots, air observers and members of bomber crews had been trained at the school. Many of them subsequently were to become the leadership core of Goring's Staff.

But Lipetsk was only a part of the practical training activities of the Reichswehr in the USSR. In the aim of coordinating this, at the German Operational (General) Staff, a special department was established: T3 with a section in Moscow Z Mo (Moscow Center). "Maj (Ret)" Niedermayer became the chief of this (like all the Reichswehr officers on Soviet territory he was stricken from the army rolls). Niedermayer had the broadest powers and could appeal directly to the RKKA leadership, including to the People's Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov. Through Department T3 an entire network of military training, testing and industrial facilities was developed and financed and these were given the code name of the "Secret Military-Technical Laboratory" of the Reichswehr.

In 1926, a Reichswehr Tank School was established near Kazan. The German tank troops wore Soviet uniforms without insignias and used tanks provided by the RKKA for training. The school was visited by the future "king" of tank warfare, H. Guderian.

For conducting exercises and testing the military equipment, the testing range of the Red Army at Voronezh was used. Joint exercises basically came down to artillery firing with the use of spotter aircraft.

We should particularly mention the development and testing of combat toxins and protective equipment against them. The RKKA Command viewed this work as a forced necessity. It could not be excluded that in the event of unleashing a new war the toxins could be employed by the probable enemy, even if this was banned by an international convention.



Not far from Saratov, a range for aerochemical testing was built. Here everything was also carried out on parity principles. The German side provided the technical personnel and the aircraft. Expenditures were split in half. The production of the toxins (yperite and mustard gas) was organized at an enterprise of the Berssol firm in Ivashchenkov near Samara. Yperite production reached up to four tons a day. Also established was the Tomka testing range near Volsk where they ascertained the reliability of protective equipment. The RKKA leadership showed increased interest in the joint chemical testings, particularly firing gas shells from guns and mortars.

At the same time at the yards of Nikolayev and Leningrad, production was commenced on submarines and cruisers for Germany. The reconstructed plants of Tula, Leningrad and Zlatoust annually began to produce hundreds of thousands of artillery shells for the Reichswehr. The International Small-Arms Machine Gun Trust and the Karl Walter Firm signed a contract for organizing and producing barrel riflings for machine guns and rifles.

This is an incomplete list showing the volume of military-technical work carried out in our nation by the Reichswehr together with the RKKA representatives. Approximately 150 million Reichsmarks (around 1/3 of its budget) was spent by the German Military Department on purchasing weapons and ammunition in our country.

The German-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression signed on 24 April 1926 in Berlin to a significant degree facilitated further joint work of the RKKA and the Reichswehr. The Soviet Ambassador to Germany N. Krestinskiy was an active supporter of this. Upon his insistence, Berlin was given a program for broadening the sphere of bilateral military ties on a mutually advantageous basis. In particular, there was the question of the systematic sending of RKKA commanders to Germany for training and the establishing of direct ties between the navies and other questions.

This program was carried out. Beginning in 1927, Soviet military leaders began to be sent to Germany for training. They attended lectures in German academies, together with students from the Reichswehr they carried out operational tasks, they became acquainted with staff work, they visited the training centers and ranges and were present at maneuvers. According to German sources, "the Russians were given an opportunity to become acquainted with the army manuals, with all the tactical and operational standards, the areas of training and practical activities, and with the organizational planning in acquiring illegal weapons, in short, they were given all the material which was kept in strictest secrecy in the Reichswehr itself."

In being sent on missions to Germany, the army of this country and the military theoretical views adopted in it were studied by such prominent military figures as N. Tukhachevskiy, I. Yakir, I. Uborevich, A. Kork, V. Primakov, V. Putna, R. Eydeman, E. Appoga and others.

Just now far did the Germans come in meeting us half way? This can be seen from the evidence of the then Chief of the German General Staff, Gen W. Blomberg. In a secret report of 17 November 1928, he wrote: "The training of Russian commanders using our military procedures is a sound return benefit for the opportunity for our activities here (on Soviet territory—B.B.). The strengthening of the Red Army involved with this is in the interests of Germany."

With the coming to power of Hitler in January 1933 in Germany, the Rapallo and Versailles Treaties began to fall into disuse and at the same time the military-technical collaboration went into decline. Hitler did not need military collaboration with the USSR, since the bans on limiting German armaments by this time played a purely declarative role and soon thereafter were completely annulled. There was no benefit for us to continue to adopt German military experience. For the Soviet leadership the continuing of collaboration was also becoming evermore odious.

Certainly, it was not easy to immediately eliminate all the military ties and the German military personnel working in Russia until the last day did not know of the coming rupture. Planned flights continued at the flight school in Lipetsk and they were still training in Kazan to drive tanks with target firing. But the RKKA leadership was suddenly refused to participate in the carefully prepared joint exercises with the testing of combat gases near Saratov. Also unexpected for many was the order from Berlin to close down all facilities in the USSR "as soon as possible."

It makes no practical sense to wonder who gained the greater benefit from the joint military-technical activities—we or the Germans—considering the subsequent events. As is known, the Germans were able to train in Soviet territory several hundred pilots, tanks troops and chemical warfare specialists. Subsequently, they comprised the core of instructors for the mass training in these specialties in the Wehrmacht. Also crucial was the fact that in avoidance of the Versailles limitations, the Germans were able to develop and modernize many weapons for waging the coming war.

For the Red Army the results of cooperation also were rather favorable. This led to the laying of the foundation for the modern structures of the defense industry. The facilities for training military-technical personnel were enlarged. The combat and operational training in the RKKA began to be carried out considering the modern state and prospects for the development of the German Army. Uborevich, who spent 13 months in the Reichswehr, was considered a recognized expert on the



German Army and, as commander of the Belorussian Military District, used the gained experience in training the troops. The mutual exchange made it possible to be certain of the correctness of our previously elaborated military theoretical views and concepts and to conclude that in terms of the level of theory, in terms of structure

and organization, the German Army was becoming the most battleworthy force in Europe. This could not help but be taken into account.

But, as the experience of history was to show, all of this was not considered to the proper degree.

### What's New in Missile-Building Technologies

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in Russian No 10, Oct 90 (Signed to press 3 Oct 90)  
pp 40-41

[Article by Maj S. Mikhaylov, candidate of technical sciences: "What's New in Missile-Building Technologies"]

[Text] Missiles remain the basis of the U.S. strategic offensive forces. This is due, on the one hand, to their fairly high effectiveness and, on the other, their relatively low cost when compared with the rest of the triad components (strategic bombers and nuclear-missile submarines).

Evidence of the U.S. administration's rapt attention to missile technology was the entry into service of the fixed-basing variant of the MX intercontinental missile in 1986, the conducting of work to prepare 50 of these missiles for deployment on rail platforms, and also the further development of the program to create the small Midgetman mobile intercontinental missile. The U.S. military budget, which as before is about \$300 billion in 1990-1991, calls for increasing financing of missile development programs.

The status of strategic missile armament in recent years was characterized not only by its quantitative increase, but also by an increase in qualitative parameters, such as combat readiness, reliability, survivability, accuracy, and nuclear warhead yield.

I recognize that the United States will achieve parity with the USSR in the area of strategic offensive weapons. In these conditions, the indicators of the effectiveness and quality of missile armament and the level of its combat capabilities will play a large role. Increasing these indicators is the prerogative of advanced fundamental science and advanced technologies.

The U.S. administration, in stabilizing and even partially reducing its military spending, nevertheless is not doing this with respect to fundamental scientific research and advanced technologies. The level of financing of a corresponding program may serve as a quite objective indicator of its importance. Judging by this, in the immediate future the U.S. administration and Department of Defense will direct their main efforts at achieving qualitative changes in missile armament and at searching for new functional capabilities.

Missile armament improvement is aimed primarily at increasing its effectiveness. The effectiveness of strategic missiles is determined primarily by the nuclear warhead yield and the accuracy of the warhead.

It must be noted that there are virtually no reports in the American press about any new developments of nuclear warheads. A substantial reduction in nuclear testing and a subsequent complete termination are considered quite likely. There also are no nuclear projects among the main

technological projects. The prospects of further development of nuclear warheads are quite problematical in today's conditions. Increasing effectiveness by increasing the number of warheads in conditions of strategic arms limitations is practically impossible. Therefore, increasing the effectiveness must be linked to increasing the accuracy and mass of the warhead, which in principle is equivalent to increasing its yield.

Foreign experts believe that the achieved accuracy of ballistic warheads is close to the maximum possible. It is characterized by the magnitude of the circular error probable on the order of several dozen meters for the modern MX missile with an inertial guidance system. A higher accuracy has been achieved only on self-guidance warheads of cruise missiles possessing, however, a low speed at the target compared to ICBM warheads. It is likely that until recently this was one of the main obstacles to the development of self-guidance warheads for these missiles.

There are reports in the foreign press about work in the United States to create sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of up to 5,000 km and an expected accuracy of one meter. This is ensured by the self-guidance laser system, which was developed over the course of two years and has already undergone testing. This system uses a carbon dioxide laser in the terminal phase. It can be considered sufficiently developed, since it was created within the framework of the SDI Program, which is evidence of the start in creating a guidance system.

The stability and high accuracy of the laser beam gives experts reason to assert that such a guidance system may also be used for advanced ICBM's in the mid-1990's. However, the laser beam's penetration of the plasma which forms around the high-speed warhead during its movement in the atmosphere still remains a problem.

The high accuracy makes it possible for warheads with existing yields to hit fixed, hardened targets. With a reduction of the number of warheads on the ICBM, it is also possible to replace nuclear warheads with conventional ones for striking certain groups of targets.

New scientific and design developments in the area of equipping ICBM's may lead to a substantial increase in the effectiveness of fire, characterized, for example, by the probability of destroying a super-hardened target when the nuclear variant is used. On the other hand, in the opinion of foreign experts, replacing nuclear warheads with nonnuclear ones for all practical purposes will not result in a decrease in effectiveness due to compensation for the decrease in yield by increasing the accuracy and mass of the warhead. Such an approach may become quite relevant in the event testing is halted or nuclear weapons are banned altogether.

Guidance system components and the propulsion system which adjusts movement account for part of the net weight of a warhead with self-guidance. Therefore, increased demands are placed on their weight, size, and

strength characteristics; a number of recent achievements can be examined for satisfying them.

Thus, U.S. companies are developing a super-miniature inertial measuring unit on three gyroscopes. It is anticipated that it will weigh about 200 grams and withstand up to 35,000 G's. This unit can be used in self-guidance systems on cruise and ballistic missile warheads as well as on homing projectiles in protective echelons of an advanced ABM system.

Some success has also been achieved in creating miniature power sources for onboard loads. There already are experimental models of fuel batteries weighing about six kg which in their output parameters are equivalent to a nickel-cadmium cell weighing up to 30 kg. Liquified hydrogen and oxygen are the fuel for them. The expected output power of these sources will be 200-400 watts. The small size and weight, well-known fuel components, and their low price level make such power sources promising for use in missiles.

It is quite likely that the miniaturization requirements may prove to be not so harsh. According to foreign press reports, the possibility of using antimatter to create powerful energy sources is being examined in the United States. Its use in missile technology is expected to increase substantially the payload of ICBM's.

The main problems in this research are the slow pace of obtaining antimatter (about  $10^{-7}$  mg per year) and difficulties with its long-term storage. It is noted that these problems may not be resolved technically very soon since the obtaining and storing of antimatter require the creation of powerful electromagnetic traps for antiprotons.

About 10 mg of antimatter per year is considered sufficient for military application, which is linked to the significant increase of up to \$15 billion in annual spending for the program by the most modest estimates. Realization of this program will open up great prospects, since energy equivalent to 44 tons of TNT per one ton of matter is given off during annihilation of the antimatter, which is considerably more than during the course of a thermonuclear reaction. In the estimates of American experts, antimatter energy can find application in rocket engines, particle-beam weapons, and x-ray lasers. However, engineering realization of missile propulsion systems based on antimatter does not appear possible in the immediate future.

Work is in full swing in a nearby direction, which envisions obtaining chemical substances with a high energy density. Adding them to traditional rocket fuels would make it possible to increase the specific impulse of these fuels by a factor of 2-4. These substances are obtained by changing the electrons of their atoms into an excited state using a laser beam. For long-term storage, it is necessary to maintain substances with a high energy density in a cooled state, since they are very unstable at

normal temperature. Tetrahydrogen, fluorine azide, and certain nitrogen compounds are being examined as working media.

Experts consider it possible to create propulsion systems using such substances for ICBM's and carriers of heavy platforms of a future ABM system. Such widespread application and sufficiently thorough preliminary studies will obviously result in additional financing and launching of work on this subject matter in the near future.

The energy-weight efficiency of U.S. ICBM's, characterized by the ratio of the payload weight to the launch weight, is presently three-four percent. The use of antimatter or substances with a high energy density can increase this efficiency by at least one order of magnitude. At the given launch weight, the weight of the missile's combat equipment in this case already increases by almost an order of magnitude, and the weight of one warhead increases by a factor of six-eight.

The data cited should be considered as being possible to realize only in the next century. At the same time, there are developments with a more immediate future. They include the so-called concept of integrated missile stages with solid-propellant engines. The technical essence of this concept is that the shape of the supersonic portion of the engine nozzle must correspond to the shape of the upper bottom of the lower stage which has a conventional design. After the fuel is expended, this stage separates and the solid-propellant engine of the upper stage begins operating.

Foreign experts consider the most significant advantages of integrated stages compared to conventional stages to be the possibility of shortening the nozzle and omitting adapter modules between the stages, which will make it possible to increase the space filled with fuel. As a result, with the same volume and firing range a missile with integrated stages will have a 20 percent gain in launch weight and a 25-30 percent gain in payload weight. On the other hand, with the same launch weight and payload weight it is possible to increase the firing range by five percent or reduce the length of the missile by 20 percent, which will make it possible to reduce manufacturing costs. In addition, an integrated stage is simpler in design than a conventional stage, since it includes fewer parts, particularly moving assemblies.

The thrust vector can be controlled by injecting fuel combustion products of the solid-propellant engine into the supercritical portion of the nozzle. It is believed that the reliability of the missile will also be increased due to the cited circumstances.

Practical use of advanced technologies for ICBM's will require considerably more expenditures from the Pentagon. Thus, in 1990 it is planned to spend about \$100 million on the Midgetman Program. Use of antimatter or substances with high energy density in it, for example, will result in increasing this figure by an order of magnitude.

Increasing the reliability, survivability, and combat readiness of ICBM's is also seen as an equally important problem. This is linked to recent work in the field of microelectronics, laser technology, and superconductors.

There are a variety of possibilities for using laser technology in the development of ICBM's. The use of carbon dioxide lasers in homing systems has already been mentioned. There are reports in foreign sources about the development of an optical fiber system for starting and regulating the processes of various types of solid-propellant engines. The signal will be transmitted from the laser over optical fiber lines to the devices for fuel ignition, thrust vector control, stage separation, and flight control of the MIRV stage. The first experimental models have successfully undergone functional testing and testing for resistance to the effects of high temperatures, pressure, and the kill mechanisms of a nuclear burst. Use of such a system in standard models will increase engine reliability, increase the useful weight of fuel in the total weight, and in the final analysis improve the energy-to-weight characteristics of the missile itself.

Problems of creating laser gyroscopes are considered worked out sufficiently well. Their advantages are that they are miniature, possess high accuracy characteristics, are reliable during extended operation, and, in addition, reduce the time for preparing a missile for launch to several seconds.

Modern American technologies are having a significant effect on the characteristics of computer technology. The weight, size, fast operation, reliability of onboard digital computers and their resistance to kill mechanisms are most important for ICBM's. Even in small sizes, modern computers already have a speed of operation of several million operations per second, and use of gallium arsenide crystals would make it possible, in the estimates of experts, to increase the speed to 500 million operations per second. Supercrystals now being created with up to five million functional elements will provide for creation of several backup circuits within one crystal; they will operate in the event the main circuits fail. This capability of microredundancy will make it possible to increase the reliability of onboard digital computers based on supercrystals. It is expected that they will be able to operate troublefree for up to 50 years.

High-speed computer technology will ensure not only high firing accuracy and efficiency in target selection, but can also implement fundamentally new missile flight control circuits. "Artificial intelligence" control systems, whose possibilities are great, can be created based on this technology. Experts believe that creation of such ICBM control systems is quite realistic in the near future.

Researchers of many countries of the world have set out to solve the problem of creating technologies using the effect of superconductivity and introducing them into practice as quickly as possible. As we know, the advantages of superconductors involve the virtually complete absence of losses when electrical current passes through

them and their ability to deflect in a magnetic field. In 1987, thanks to a series of studies, the temperature threshold of superconducting material was achieved, which exceeded the temperature of liquid nitrogen—this inexpensive and easily obtainable cooling agent. Today, ceramic-based compounds possessing superconductivity even at near-room temperatures have been developed.

Superconductors for missile armament may find application in devices for increasing the operating speed of onboard computers, protecting them against the kill mechanisms of a nuclear burst, reducing the launch preparation time, and also when developing gyroscopic instruments and mobility equipment for ICBM's. In the last three years, about \$150 million have been spent on superconductivity research. No cuts in financing superconductor technology are foreseen in the next fiscal year.

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#### R-Adm Khuzhokov Praises Inter-Military Contacts

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ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 90 (Signed to press  
09 Nov 90) p 63

[Article by Rear Admiral V.Zh. Khuzhokov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Foreign Relations Directorate, under the rubric "Past and Present": "International Confidence-Building"]

[Text] The question of trust in inter-state relations has always occupied a special place in the history of mankind. And this is not surprising: To be confident that another state or group is not preparing a military attack in deep secrecy and that aggression will not occur—has this not been a dream that all peace-loving peoples have longed for? But how do we arrive at mutual trust and how do we simultaneously achieve the required guarantees?

Without exaggerating the role of the Soviet Armed Forces, its contribution to the reduction of tensions and the creation of a climate of international trust, and the radical improvement of Soviet-American relations in particular, we can confidently claim that the Soviet Army was an important and necessary element in ending the Cold War and "erecting bridges" between East and West. During 1985-1987, the Ministry of Defense annually received no more than 10 military delegations from Western countries with various visits. This number increased more than twofold (27) in 1988, fivefold (50) in 1989, and the number of separate groups, experts, and delegations who will arrive in the USSR will approach 80 in 1990. Since these exchanges are structured on a reciprocal basis, the increase of the number of trips abroad of various Soviet military delegations by invitation of foreign states armed forces is nearly the same.

What is the return from these foreign contacts and are there not many of them? While analyzing this process, you come to the simple conclusion that it is objective in



nature. Even its temporary freeze would throw us back. We need to frankly state that we still need to overcome the resistance of those circles that oppose eliminating tensions between the armies. As we all know, saber rattling suits them more than normal relations between people in military uniform. Using various falsehoods about the Soviet soldier and his high duty and mission, certain figures in the West are attempting to artificially constrain consolidation and development of military ties and a universal aspiration toward trust.

As for the Soviet Army, it is doing everything that is required of it to professionally explain the essence of the new defensive doctrine and its purely peaceful mission to its partners. Soldiers and seamen, ranking noncommissioned officers and cadets, officers, generals, and admirals have become the real ambassadors of our Homeland and its glorious Armed Forces. Really official negotiations, numerous conversations, and at times heated debates with foreign representatives are conducted not only on military topics, they also simultaneously touch upon the entire complex and diverse spectrum of the human relations of our domestic and foreign policies. In accordance with the policy of perestroika, the USSR Ministry of Defense's foreign ties are directed at promoting to the maximum possible extent the success of that broad political dialogue that the CPSU and the Soviet Government are conducting in the international arena.

The parties' aspiration to conclude long-term agreements that are formalized in the form of treaties, plans, or protocols is increasingly becoming part of the practice of reciprocal contacts on military policy. Today, we have such agreements with the Armed Forces of the United States, Canada, Great Britain, the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], France, Finland, and Turkey. Four more such agreements with Western countries are currently in the final stages. We can also talk with satisfaction about contacts and ties with other countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America that are in development and which are mutually enriching. New factors and interesting proposals are appearing. This permits us to provide, on a planned basis and while considering the parties' interests, for the exchange of visits of leaders of military departments and for the exchange of delegations from the general staffs, branches of the armed forces, military districts, fleets, individual task forces, military educational institutions, ships, air force squadrons, by various groups of servicemen, experts on military medicine and military history, journalists, museum employees, lecturers, military orchestras and musical collectives, and sportsmen. While planning these measures, attention is first of all paid to setting into motion and involving as large a number of various categories of servicemen as possible.

Not just military people visit us from abroad in order to become convinced of the reality of the perestroika processes in the USSR Armed Forces. Many members of parliaments, political figures, and representatives of the mass media want to become more familiar with our

army, to visit various military facilities, to meet with Soviet servicemen, and to become convinced of the conversion of military production.

Of course, we have our own priorities and emphasis in the work to establish, develop, and consolidate foreign ties. For example, we need to consider our bilateral ties with the U.S. Armed Forces as a real breakthrough. We have managed to cover the long road from dangerous confrontation to the establishment of normal relations in a very short span of time thanks to the parties' efforts. A number of important agreements have been concluded that will permit us to eliminate tension and transition to a long-awaited dialogue. The Soviet-American plan of contacts is being successfully executed and includes more than 20 diverse measures. Preparations are already occurring right now to approve the next agreement for 1991-1992.

Obviously, the time has not yet come when we can sum up the contribution of the Soviet Armed Forces and its representatives to the process of reducing tensions and improving the climate of international confidence building during the period of perestroika. However, we can already state right now that the Soviet Army and Navy have become actively involved in a matter of great state importance and feel a keen sense of responsibility for it.

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#### **U.S. Use of Small Satellites For Tactical Combat Support**

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[Article by V. Savichev: "A New Pentagon Concept"]

[Text] The Soviet Union and the United States of America are on the threshold of an agreement for a radical reduction in strategic offensive arms. They are concluding the working out of a treaty on conventional arms in Europe. All this will lead to a new situation in the field of security. At the same time, a number of factors which earlier played a secondary role and remain outside the framework of the negotiations on disarmament are increasing in importance. These include first of all the potential of manpower and resources which supports the effectiveness of combat use of strategic and conventional arms.

In the opinion of American military specialists, space support systems are acquiring special importance in this regard. It is thought that information arriving from satellites can increase the potential of the armed forces of the United States by a factor of three or four, and perhaps even more.

The space systems for reconnaissance, launch detection of ballistic missiles, navigation, communications, meteorology, topography, etc. presently in the U.S. armament are oriented toward accomplishing strategic tasks. At the

same time, the use of information from these satellites at the tactical level is limited. This is first of all because the multi-level centralized structure of space systems does not permit the necessary immediacy in processing information and delivering it to commanders at the tactical level.

American specialists believe this military-scientific task may be resolved through implementation of a new concept. These are considered its main elements:

- Creation of cheap, small satellites which have the capability of immediate launch and their orientation for use within the limits of a specific TVD [theater of military action];
- Transition to the use of one-time missile-boosters, primarily air-based, with the goal of ensuring the secrecy of launch of the satellites with rapid launch preparation;
- Development and use of mobile ground assets for receiving satellite information, and methods and equipment for processing and delivering it to commanders.

U.S. attainments in the field of electronics miniaturization and the vital reduction in the dimensions and mass of instruments have already made it possible to resolve a number of problems which affect realization of the concept and which earlier appeared practically insurmountable. Compact circuits, resistant to ionizing radiation, for processing and transmitting data, high-speed analog-digital converters, efficient and cheap IR detectors for focal arrays, and promising cryogenic equipment have reached the stage where they may be used for practical development of small satellites for various purposes. It is also thought that all this may ensure not only a qualitative superiority, but also render retaliatory actions by the opposing side obviously ineffective and extremely expensive.

So, what can small satellites do?

Just as larger ones, small satellites can conduct immediate optical-electronic, combined and detailed photographic reconnaissance for the purpose of detecting enemy troop elements, discovering his defenses and formations within its structure, and obtaining images of military installations in the TVD. They can also support the conduct of immediate radiotechnical reconnaissance by intercepting the emissions of radiotechnical equipment in order to detect it and determine its characteristics.

The developers of the concept assign an important role to small satellites in early warning and tactical air defense systems. Under conditions in which tactical missiles are used, due to the strict time shortage the task of warning and the task of air defense will be integrated into one task. Therefore small satellites must support detection of tactical missiles launches, generation and issuance of warning signals, and calculation and issuance of target designations directly to anti-missile missile launchers.

The idea of using already existing surveillance satellites and those under development within the framework of the SDI program, equipped with infrared sensors, in early warning and tactical air defense systems of U.S. expeditionary forces was hatched in 1987. The goal is for commanders of units and tactical formations to be able immediately to obtain information regarding the launch of enemy missiles directly from satellites.

As for small satellites in communications systems, in serving a limited region of combat action for a limited time period (up to a year), they are capable of performing tasks of communications support of tactical subunits with high secrecy and jamming resistance. In addition, small communications satellites may be viewed as a kind of "hot reserve" for communications systems based on large satellites.

The role and place of small satellites in resolving the tasks of navigational, meteorological, and topographic support continue to be clarified. However one may assume that developments for specific satellites are even now being conducted within the framework of research on other space systems.

Thus the U.S. is already developing in practice the new concept of using space support systems aimed at raising the effectiveness of combat application of tactical subunits. Its significance is especially increased in connection with events in the region of the Persian Gulf. Analyzing the situation developing there, Washington is more and more arriving at the conclusion that the main idea of American military strategy should be the concentration of special attention on regional conflicts and crises, and not readiness for a world nuclear war at short notice, as was the case previously. Within the framework of this doctrinal idea, the concept of small satellites is intended to ensure attainment of the goals of armed conflict by forces at the operational and tactical level.

Overall, small satellites should be viewed as a new class of arms, which under specific circumstances may lead to destabilization of the prevailing situation in the military field and a reduction in the level of international security.

#### Training of U.S. Army Officers Viewed

91UM02264 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 52, Dec 90 p 2

[Article by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Correspondent N. Soldatenkov under the rubric "AiF Correspondent at West Point": "American Cadets"]

[Text] Neither the helmets nor the special devices which are placed in the ears spared us from the howitzer's deafening shots. "Would you like to fire it?"—American Army Major Edward Evans yelled to me while pointing at the weapon. My acquaintance with the Military Academy at West Point was becoming increasingly like a hit movie.

### Forge of Leaders

The Military Academy on the picturesque bank of the Hudson, several hours drive from New York, was founded in 1902 [Translator's note: Actually, 1802]. Since that time more than 40,000 people have graduated from it among whom are such people as D. Eisenhower, for example, who are famous throughout America and the world. And each year nearly 900 people augment the ranks of the U.S. Army's professional military.

I became acquainted with Gregory Riker, a thin lad slightly over 20 years old. He is a cadet in the senior class. What compelled him to enter the academy and to study all these years while consciously limiting his pursuit of such pleasures that are associated with youth? "This is primarily an opportunity to obtain an outstanding education. I still do not know if I will continue my military career but problems in life practically do not occur with this knowledge. And there is one more thing—discipline is taught here. This is also quite important. And generally I think that all academy graduates serve their people and America. This is a great honor. The nation's leaders are trained here."

### Just Like in the Promotional Material

It is difficult to become a leader. Various types of recommendations, a good level of school knowledge and physical fitness, and many other things are required to enter the academy. Not everyone who wants to will end up here. And not everyone who ends up here will complete their studies—there are strict study and discipline rules at the academy. This is a typical daily schedule: 05:45—Reveille, calisthenics. 06:26—Breakfast, class preparation. 07:15-11:00—Classes. Lunch. From 12:30-14:30—Classes. 15:00-15:40—Sports. 16:00-18:30—Various training or drill and ceremonies. Dinner. Until 23:00—self-study. 24:00—Lights out. Days off—Sunday and national holidays. And all remaining time—is studying. Not everyone can handle that. There are also some people here who are lazy. "But the majority of the cadets do not like to waste time. I know that I would have been bored if I had spent all of these years slouching on a couch at home," says Gregory.

The first female cadets appeared at West Point in 1974 breaking a 150-year old tradition. They assert that female cadets do not lag behind the young men in anything, even in physical fitness. Incidentally, special attention is paid to sports at the academy as generally throughout America. There are gymnasiums, basketball courts, baseball fields, and facilities for gliders, sports parachuting, rappelling, golf, and facilities for many other sports at the cadets' disposal. Furthermore, they can study art, mathematical sciences, geology, or languages if they so desire.

When entering and studying at the academy, the cadets know that in principle they will be set for life. During their studies, they receive \$5,000 each per year (tuition, medical services, and housing are free of charge), they

only pay for food, uniforms, and certain other services. After graduation, cadets assume the military rank of second lieutenant in the regular army and are awarded a bachelor of science degree. Having served the prescribed five years in the army (the officer profession is considered to be prestigious and highly-paid in the U.S.), an academy graduate may decide not to continue his military career.

### Despite Its Awesome Appearance....

Naturally, despite its awesome appearance and observance of tradition, regulations, and everything else, a 20 year-old is a 20 year-old. When Public Affairs Officer Major Evans and I entered the barracks, "future leaders" were laughing, yelling, and chasing a mouse.

Or: The cadets found out that I had come to the United States at the invitation of "Rolling Stone" magazine and one of them, who spoke so that the major could not hear him, whispered that the cadets read the magazine although the leadership thought that the magazine is too radical. And he brought out the latest copy of "Rolling Stone" from somewhere in his tunic. And after dinner when I initiated a conversation about how difficult it must be for them without the normal parties for people of their age, girls, etc., the young man sitting next to me said quietly: "Better not ask about that. Do not upset the cadets."

### A Conversation on Delicate Topics

"I myself am from Cleveland," said Gregory, while answering my question if there are ethnic conflicts at the academy. "There is no open racism, but people prefer to live in separate areas: Chinese, Italian, Black, Slavic, etc. But we all live together at West Point. If you have a difficult time with mathematics, a Chinese, a Black, or anyone else may help you."

And relations that deviate from regulations? "When I entered the freshman class, any cadet from the senior class could rebuke or abuse me. I did not perceive this as anything offensive, on the contrary: If they are criticizing me, I am doing something incorrectly and I need to be corrected. Of course, some people may find it very difficult to accept this kind of criticism, everything depends on your upbringing in the family. But this is already in the past. Right now the cadets have reviewed their attitude toward underclassmen. And if society thinks that relations that deviate from regulations are not good, we must obey this. Today we treat underclassmen in such a way that they respect us not only due to force."

### Comment on U.S. SLBM Deployments to Indian Ocean

91UM02004 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Letter to the Editor: "Is the [USS] Ohio in the Indian Ocean?"]

[Text] During the Cold War period, plans existed in the Pentagon to deploy nuclear missile submarines [SSBN] into the Indian Ocean. Since that time, a noticeable decrease in military-political tension has occurred. Has the United States abandoned its plans under the new conditions?

S. Nikiforov, Moscow

Judging by materials in the foreign press, there is no basis to suggest that the United States has abandoned its plans to deploy its nuclear missile submarines into the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. military leadership has viewed the Indian Ocean as a potential area for missile submarine combat patrols since the 1960's. However, until the beginning of the 1980's, practical mastery of the Indian Ocean by U.S. missile submarines was constrained by objective difficulties in organizing support for them during cruises and patrol periods in new areas. Furthermore, Polaris and Poseidon first generation missiles had comparatively short firing ranges (up to 4,500 km) and could not reach targets on the territory of the USSR.

Practical preconditions for introduction of nuclear missile submarines into the Indian Ocean appeared when Trident-1 and Trident-2 missile systems with intercontinental firing ranges—up to 9,000 km—were introduced into the inventory. A submarine armed with these missiles can hit targets on the territory of the Soviet Union even while transiting into the Indian Ocean. Missile submarine combat and rear services support system preparations are also being conducted. According to information in the Western press, the Holt very long wave [VLF] communications hub, which was previously deployed in the southwest of Australia and which is designed to support SSBN command and control in the Pacific Ocean zone, can also be equipped to support missile submarines in the Indian Ocean. The Diego Garcia forward basing facility which was established in the 1980's and which has a first class airfield, communications, and anchorages for combat vessels has significant capabilities for SSBN rear services support and repair. As the foreign press points out, on the whole objective difficulties for deployment of American SSBN's in the Indian Ocean have practically been overcome.

This response was obtained at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.



### 'Sudpromimpeks' Shipbuilding Concern Approved by Council of Ministers

91UM0204A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 48, Nov 90 p 2

[Unattributed Article: "A Steamship Instead of a Cruiser"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers approved the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry association, enterprise, and organization workers collectives proposal to create "Sudpromimpeks" Concern. More than 30 shipbuilding plants and design bureaus, including the country's largest shipyard—Nikolayev's "Imeni 61 kommunara" and "Okean" Plants and Leningrad's "Admiralteyskoe" and "Baltiyskiy zavod" Associations, became part of the concern which will be founded as a stock company. A joint company for ship sales will be founded abroad with the participation of the concern and Inter-Maritime Management S.A. and their construction program itself for export deliveries during 1991-1995 was announced through a state order.

The Council of Ministers' decision completed the preparatory period for reorienting shipbuilding enterprises toward the output of civilian production under conditions of the conversion that is being conducted in the sector.

We all know that our domestic shipbuilding industry is one of the leading ones in the world but, of the 70 million tons of civilian vessels being built in all countries, its share is currently less than one (1) percent. And really demand for ships is growing at a rapid rate and, according to Western expert assessments, it will amount to 300 billion dollars during the next 8-10 years.

So the increase of Soviet ship exports will permit us to eliminate material and equipment problems and insure the resolution of social programs. The concerns short-term plans are shipyard modernization and obtaining up to four billion hard currency rubles from ship sales during 1991-1995.

According to Mr. B. Rappoport, President of Inter-Maritime Management S.A., the USSR has exclusive advantages which, in combination with the experience and capabilities of the company he heads, will permit the Soviet Union to rapidly become the leading shipbuilding and ship repairing country in the world.

### KRAZ Repair Facility Expands Civilian Contract Work

91UM0169A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel I. Ichenskiy (Retired), Kiev Military District: "Thanks to Enterprise"]

[Text] An auto repair facility headed by Colonel V. Boldyrev is known far beyond the confines of the Kiev

Military District. They repair all models of KRAZ vehicles here for the needs of the Ministry of Defense. Recently, civilian enterprises have also shown an increasing interest in the work of military repair crews about which virtually no complaints have been made. At present, their orders account for about 10 percent of annual quotas. However, due to an opportunity to sign direct contracts the volume of repair work for the needs of other ministries may increase markedly.

Contracts have already been signed for repairing 230 vehicles; more than 300 of them will be repaired next year. A new approach to organizing work will help the collective to prepare better for embarking on market relations and reinforcing ties with partners.

The following statistics testify to the results of a greater degree of freedom in the organization of commercial activities: In 1988, the plant produced consumer goods worth merely 5,600 rubles whereas this year it will be 100 times more.

Of course, the organization of work plays a considerable role. All shops and sections of the enterprise are economically accountable. This makes it possible to steadily fill state orders and generate respectable profits. At the same time, several cooperatives have been set up at the plant. One of them manufactures garages, gates, and other metal products from production waste. Another cooperative turns out hand-cranked sewing machines using its own raw materials. There is also the Nov cooperative that has embarked on manufacturing jackets and coats from modern fabrics for the young people. Members of the cooperative receive raw materials from a company to which they belong. The plant leases premises to them and provides electricity.

The successful accomplishment of production tasks makes it possible to create good working conditions for the people. An infirmary, a swimming pool, a sauna, and stress-reduction rooms are now at the disposal of workers. The plant also has its own recreational facility. For example, this year all female workers are given one day off with pay per month at the expense of the enterprise's own resources. It is planned to commission two residential buildings with 100 apartments each next year.

Such concern for the people brings the collective together and promotes good labor attitudes. They are confident that entering a market economy will not disrupt the pace of work at the enterprise.

### Uranium Enrichment Plant To Produce... Toothpaste

91UM0183A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
13 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by D. Gutenev, PRAVDA correspondent: "Uranium and Toothpaste"]

[Text] It is not likely that five years ago anyone could have assumed that the Caspian Mining and Smelting Combine, specializing in the mining and enrichment of uranium ore and rare metals and also the production of mineral fertilizers, would begin producing... toothpaste.

#### Contacts—Contracts

Already next year, tubes with the inscription "Made in the city of Shevchenko" will appear for sale. Recently a group of Italian specialists from the firm Engeko, which is involved in the delivery of equipment for the plant and supervision of its installation, visited here.

"Our contacts," said Mauro Cartei, administrator of the firm, "began last year. In August we signed a contract with the combine in Moscow. In Italy, the firm Mazzoni has an engineering group which is involved in planning pharmacological and cosmetic production facilities. We have a small plant that produces equipment for making such goods. We made a plan for the city of Shevchenko and are now completing the delivery of the first production line. We have fulfilled 80 percent of our commitments to the Soviet side..."

What about about the mining and smelting combine? Basically, everything is proceeding according to schedule here, too: construction of the buildings is nearing completion, and maintenance personnel are being brought up to strength. In the words of the plan director, Vyacheslav Vychkov, there is no shortage of people wishing to work at the plant.

Mauro Cartei and Gennadiy Isakov, assistant general director of the combine, assure us that the first products will be produced early next year. During the year the plant will send a total of 250 million tubes of toothpaste to trade. The filling agent in the toothpaste will not be chalk, as is done at Soviet enterprises, but dicalcium phosphate. To specialists in livestock breeding it is known as a feed additive. The combine produces it in large amounts and needs only to change the shape of the crystals and eliminate their abrasive properties.

Meanwhile, the plant is not limited to only one product. In time it will become a company that produces shampoos and other cosmetics. All this will bring the combine hundreds of millions of rubles in revenue annually, and it will help the state treasury significantly reduce currency expenditures for acquiring the same toothpaste abroad.

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